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REFLECTIONS ON COLUMBIA AND 
RICHLAND COUNTY 
John Hammond Moore 
Columbia, South Carolina· 
A year ago I discussed a single decade in the life of Columbia. Today my assignment 
is twenty-five decades, 1740-1990. 
To begin, a little geography. The region that became Richland County in the 1780s, 
Richland District in the 1790s, and Richland County once more in 1868, is shaped somewhat 
like an arrowhead aimed prophetically perhaps at Charleston, 100 miles away. An expanse 
of 771 square miles, its original boundaries (which have changed little through the years) 
were the Wateree River to the east and the Broad and Congaree rivers to the west and 
south, which rolling sand hills to the north. Indians undoubtedly lived here in past centuries 
and they certainly hunted here in the 18th, but by that date this region was a buffer .zone 
or a sort of no-man's land between the powerful Cherokee to the west and dwindling tribes 
of Congaree and Wateree to the east. 
The Yemassee uprising of 1715 prompted the Congaree to move north to Rock Hill 
to join the Catawbas, followed by the Wateree some years later. In that war, the Cherokee 
hesitated, but eventually came down on the side of the settlers. With peace, the British set 
up the first of several trading posts or forts near the juncture of the Congaree and Broad 
rivers, now the site of the city of Cayce. Ostensibly this facility (often called a factory) was 
designed to regulate trade with the Indians, for shoddy dealings by all concerned has been 
a prime reason for the Yemassee affair. 
Throughout the remainder of the 18th century, at least to the 1780s, neither Richland 
County nor Columbia existed. The action, the center of life, in this region ( often called "the 
Congarees," which can mean pretty much whatever you want it to) was largely on the west 
bank of the Congaree and the east bank of the Wateree, not in the land that would become 
Richland County. The main trail from Charleston into Cherokee country went through 
Cayce, and another to the east went from Charleston to Camden, this state's first inland 
town, and then on to North Carolina and Virginia en route to Philadelphia. A third trail, 
'This paper was delivered as the luncheon address at the annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association. 
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less important, split off from the Cherokee path a few miles north of Cayce, crossed the 
Broad River, and led to the Catawbas, also connecting with Camden. 
The first white men to live in this area were cowboys tending their herds of cattle and 
Indian traders. In their midst were occasional squatters and dirt-poor frontiersme~ but 
none of these folk held title to land and cannot be viewed as settlers. Th\! first such people 
were German-Swiss immigrants who, in the mid-1730s, established homesteads west of the 
Congaree in a township known as Saxe-Gotha. By 1740 another group of whites and blacks 
out of North Carolina and especially Virginia were doing the same thing in what would 
become known as "Lower Richland," the region south of the Sumter highway. So, from the 
beginning, we find divisions that continue to the present day. Richland--a relatively large 
black populatio~ ties to Virginia and plantation society, for "Lower Richland" would develop 
into a realm of huge holdings, white columns, magnolias, banjoes, all the trappings dear to 
Margaret Mitchell fans. Lexington--far fewer blacks, small farms, and a world more 
Piedmont than Low Country. Through the years Richland usually has had about twice as 
many people as Lexington. In 1980 the totals were 270,000 to 140,000, but Lexington had 
only 14,000 blacks, Richland, 104,000. Earlier, in 1765, some 12,000 people were living in 
or near the fall line zone stretching through the Midlands of South Carolina, and another 
10,000 could be found farther inland in the Piedmont. A decade later (1775), their ranks 
had increased nearly four-fold to an estimated 83,000, giving South Carolina a greater 
upland population than any other southern state. 
These people, often seeking cheap land safe from incursions by Indians, French, and 
Spanish, provide the impulse for the Regulator movement, a campaign for local government 
that achieved limited success on the eve of the American Revolution. The role of the 
Richland County area in both struggles is far from clear. The Regulators, upwardly mobile 
landowners yearning for stable social conditions, certainly enjoyed support, although 
research by Richard Maxwell Brown indicates that the prime centers of Regulator activity 
were a bit farther inland, in Fairfield and Newberry counties and Camden. 
As for the Revolution, divisions and wounds left by the Regulator hassle still were 
painfully fresh, and Robert Lambert tells us that loyalty to the crown was strong among 
newcomers, who undoubtedly were numerous in this area, and allegiance to King George 
certainly was evident among Germans living on the west bank of the Congaree. At least 
thirty-five men in a regiment commanded by Colonel Thomas Taylor ( often called the father 
of Columbia) went over to the British during that struggle. Wade Hampton I, apparently 
thinking war had ended with the fall of Charleston in May 1780, made his peace with the 
British. However, within six months he was actively backing the rebel cause once more. 
In the short run, the most important result of this war on the local scene was growth 
of a small commercial center on the we~t bank of the <?ongaree near Friday's Ferry, a 
community merchant Joseph Kershaw chnstened Granby m 1774 to honor the .Marquis of 
Granby, an advocate of colonial rights. (Six years earlier, for the same reason, Pine Tree 
Hill became Camden, to pay homage to Charles Pratt, Lord Camden.) However, in the 
mid-1770s Kershaw got into financial difficulty, and young Wade Hampton acquired his 
Granby store, thus beginning his rise to prominence. Then, when the British overran the 
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state in 1780, FORT Granby became a center of some importance and for a time, as noted, 
Hampton cooperated with them. That fort, as well as a small redoubt at the eastern end 
of Friday's Ferry were the scene of the only organized warfare in this region. Eventually, 
after a siege of several weeks, the British surrendered that fort to Virginian Henry Lee, 
father of Robert E., in May 1781. Henry Lee, having no ties to the area, permitted the 
defenders to depart with considerable property seized from local farms, so enraging Thomas 
Sumter that he threatened to resign his command. 
Thus, development of Granby had significance, as did the rise of Wade Hampton. 
Ronald Bridwell, in his massive Ph.D. study, notes with'awe that this man apparently owned 
no land in 1778. A decade later, at age 32, he was a wealthy planter with several hundred 
slaves and various commercial ventures, and by 1805 was enjoying an annual income of 
$50,000. Admittedly he was a free-hooter and war profiteer who grabbed everything not 
nailed down and also, in 1783, he made a fortuitous marriage to a wealthy Lower Richland 
widow who passed away the following year, leaving him both land and slaves. This 
development has significance, too, for it focused Hampton's attention for the first time on 
the Richland side of the river, not Lexington. He quickly teamed up with Thomas Taylor 
and others to take full advantage of the most important result of the war on the local scene 
( other than independence, of course): creation of a new state capital. 
The reasons for the move inland from Charleston--the first instance in modern times 
of a functioning bureaucracy moving to a wilderness setting--are obvious: A government 
closer to the people it serves, a community free of colonial associations, and a more 
"centrifical" place, a theme often stressed by Thomas Jefferson and his cronies. All colonial 
capitals except Boston, I might add, have relocated, either westward or inland. 
As debate began in March 1786, there was little question that the capital would leave 
Charleston, yet were it would go was uncertain. However, once the "centrifical" concept won 
acceptance, prime contenders were Camden, the junction of the Congaree and Wateree (the 
southeast corner of Richland County), and Friday's Ferry near present-day Columbia. 
Thomas Sumter spoke up for his lands near the High Hills of the Santee, but the tale of 
Stateburg losing out to Columbia by a single vote apparently is false; it was not even 
mentioned. Shrewd Wade Hampton, representing Saxe-Gotha, never spoke for his interests; 
he did not have to. He had three brothers serving with him in the General Assembly, and 
Thomas Taylor's brother James also was there. Thus the Hamptons and Taylors could 
count at least five votes, plus those of most Up Country legislators. 
Senator John Lewis Gervais of Ninety-Six sponsored the bill that led to creation of 
a town two miles square with broad streets, one of them appropriately named in his honor. 
Five commissioners were named to purchase that land at roughly $4 an acre from ten 
property owners, among them Thomas Taylor and Wade and Richard Hampton. Taylor and 
Richard Hampton also were members of the purchasing commission, a cosy arrangement 
indeed, and perhaps a precursor of legislative practice in the decades to follow. However, 
it appears that, although the ten landowners suffered no loss, this was no windfall. Instead, 
profits were enjoyed by those who subsequently purchased choice town lots or, like the 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Hamptons and Taylors, owned property on the outskirts of this new town that increased 
greatly in value. 
The General Assembly first convened here in January 1790--a brief session, only 
seventeen days, and probably a rather upcomfortable time for all concerned. Poems for and 
against Columbia appeared in Charleston papers, the best-known being those written by 
Philip Freneau. Freneau was then a sea captain, who tarried in Charleston from time to 
time to visit his brother, secretary of state, a man adamantly opposed to the move inland, 
thus the poems. Freneau portrays Columbia as a sad, disheartening town with no music, 
sermons, balls, or oyster pies, a place where owls screech and bears break into stores. His 
final blast in the Daily Advertiser (February 5, 1790) describes the trials of a local resident 
during the legislative session: 
Open the door, forsooth--the man is mad. 
Lodging is not so easy to be had; 
It is an article we do not trade in, 
Nor shall my bed by all the world be laid in, 
Our very garret is as full as can be, 
Push off, I say, and try your luck at Granby! 
I must say, after dealing in generalities such as "the area that ... " or "near the site 
of ... " it is a distinct relief to have definite boundaries as well as census figures. Both 
county and town (Columbia became a city in 1854) have grown through the years, though 
rarely in spectacular fashion. Each on one occasion has registered a decline ... the county 
in the 1850s, the city in the 1970s. (County figures, of course, are over-all totals and include 
city folk as well.) In 1850 the county had 30,243 residents; in 1860, 18,307. Its county seat, 
however, grew from 6,000 to 8,000 and, during the war that followed, was home to 15,000 
or more, many of them government workers and refugees from the Low Country. 
Several factors help to explain this decline of the 1850s: a troubled agricultural 
economy resulting in the sale of slaves, for the county's black population dropped from 
13,000 to 11,000, and the completion of rail tracks to Charlotte in 1852 and to Greenville 
the following year. Thus Columbia no longer was "Dodge City," the head of the line, the 
spot where cattle drives ended and cotton was brought to be shipped. Just as many 
marketing and distributing functions moved from Charleston to Columbia when the first 
train pulled into the depot at Gervais and Gadsden streets in June 1842, some of those 
involved in such operations now went further inland. Looking ahead, the cruelest blow to 
the local economy was, however, completion of still other rail lines in the 1870s stretching 
through the Piedmont from Charlotte to Spartanburg, Greenville, Anderson, and Atlanta, 
tracks that created scores of mill towns and made Columbia determined to duplicate this 
success. The drop in Columbia's population in the 1970s--down from 113,000 to 101,000--
was the result of integration and white flight to the suburbs. 
By 1940 the county had 105,000 residents, a figure that doubled by 1960 and stood 
at 270,000 in 1980. On at least two occasions municipal efforts to inflate census totals 
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backfired. In 1930 city fathers mounted a successful drive to break the 50,000 mark, only 
to discover that, by state law, the salaries of mayor and council members automatically 
doubled, adding $10,500 to the annual budget. Thirty years later the city set its sights on 
100,000; it was a move that triggered incorporation (at least on paper) of six suburban 
neighborhoods, blunting that drive. 
Although final figures for 1990 have not been released, in round numbers the county 
now has about 290,000 residents, with about 100,000 of them living within the city of 
Columbia. Together with Lexington's 170,000, this creates a metropolitan complex of 
460,000 or more. In 1980, by the way, Lexington was home to twenty-eight Eskimos, twice 
the number found in Richland County. The upcoming census data no doubt will be equally 
informative. 
How have these people been making a living through the years? Agriculture once 
was all-important, at least umtil World War II, when most roads leading into Columbia still 
had watering troughs for animals hauling wagons loaded with cotton. Now fewer than a 
thousand Richland residents are involved with farming, slightly more in Lexington. From 
earliest days local farms have produced corn, wheat, cattle, and hogs, largely for regional 
consumption. The principal money crops, in succession, were indigo (messy, yes, but the 
output of an acre could be put in an eighty-pound cask for shipment to the coast and there 
was a bounty in colonial times), then from 1770 to 1800, thanks to the Virginia influence, 
tobacco flourished, until overwhelmed by cotton, which reigned supreme into the first 
decades of this century. 
With the creation of Columbia, a small merchant class developed, together with 
lawyers, a few doctors, teachers, and professors at South Carolina College, which opened 
in 1805. The presence of that institution led to preparatory schools, a Presbyterian seminary 
(perhaps to counter the influence of one Thomas Cooper), and still other institutions, such 
as Columbia College. This intellectual elite gave the little community a cultural milieu that 
visitors found charming. Historian Jared Sparks, who in the spring of 1826 toured the South 
hunting for Revolutionary War records, after dinner with Cooper, David McCord, William 
C. Preston, and other luminaries, wrote in his diary: "Since leaving Boston I have not found 
a more intelligent, literary & hospitable society. The college doubtless has an influence on 
the literary air of the place." Others in succeeding years praised Columbia's gardens, broad 
avenues, and elegant homes. 
I should point out in passing that Columbia, though born to be seat of state 
government, was not the original center of county affairs. Instead, in the 1790s, adhering 
to centrality, that honor went to Horrell Hill, a site about ten miles east of Columbia on the 
way to Sumter. A courthouse was erected, but lawyers preferred Columbia, and within a 
few years the building became a school. County authorities built another courthouse in the 
center of town, a structure that was laid low by an earthquake in December 1811 and 
eventually was torn down and replaced by a third. The earthquake was a result of the 
famed New Madrid, Missouri, tremor. 
In addition to a small professional class and other trappings of urban life, Columbia 
also developed a core of construction personnel, men who erected public buildings, the 
South Carolina Historical Association 
college, asylum, private homes, the canal along the Congaree, and various railroads. In the 
late 1850s, for example, 375 to 500 men, 60% of them black, were working on the new 
capitol building; this means that about one out of every five or six adult males living in 
Columbia was involved with that project. By contrast, manufacturing was much less 
important in pre-Civil War Columbia and limited largely to necessities such as wagons and 
agricultural implements. Daily life had a certain rhythm; busy and active in winter when 
both legislators and students were here, and quiet and slow in summer when the mercury 
soared and well-to-do residents fled to the hills of North Carolina. 
Three general themes are evident 1800 to 1860: growth of religion and temperance 
(so closely allied they equal a single item), organization, and "southernness." Church-
centered activity, though not as pervasive as in the Up Country, became more apparent as 
years passed. Yet a gap exists between the ideal picture sketched by church histories and 
official ·records. By the late 1830s Columbia's Baptists (the most numerous faith) had 300 
members, one-fourth white, three-fourths black. At the same time, Trinity Cathedral 
(Episcopal) could count 120 members, over half of them non-communicants. Most churches, 
it appears, were plagued by a lack of consistent leadership, with ministers and preachers 
coming and going with great frequency. 
Nevertheless, temperance and religious fervor certainly influenced social life. 
Benjamin Rawls, who published a brief memoir in 1861, says, when he first came to 
Columbia in 1802, that any purchase at a Main Street store began with a drink supplied by 
the owner. Until the 1830s celebrations marking Washington's Birthday and the Fourth of 
July featured scores of toasts. After that time, the Sons of Temperance took over those 
holidays and strong drink disappeared. However, militia musters and political rallies 
continued to exude an odor of whiskey and peach brandy as before. Rawls also comments 
upon the career of Thomas Henry Egan, a young lawyer from the North, admitted to the 
South Carolina bar in 1800. Rawls writes that for some years Egan lived in Columbia with 
another man's wife and hence was known as the "Maryland stud." He notes that they finally 
got married "when the religious sentiment got in the ascendant." 
By organizational aspects of daily life I mean not only religion, but clubs and 
societies, fire companies, traveling road shows, circuses (organized entertainment), and 
things of the sort. As for the emphasis upon southernness, I don't think that requires 
comment, but I will give two examples. In November of 1856, at the first state fair held in 
Columbia, Benjamin F. Perry, in a speech Henry Grady could have written, chastised South 
Carolina for its dependence upon cotton and failure to grow foodstuffs, and foster 
manufacturing and industry. Yet before he sat down, Perry managed to balance this 
criticism with a stern defense of slavery. Four years later, in the spring of 1860, a Yale 
undergraduate visiting Columbia came face-to-face with an amazing vision of "southernness." 
Scores of South Carolina students had vowed to wear only fabrics made in this state. But 
the supply of shoddy blue cloth turned out by the Saluda Mill in Lexington County soon was 
exhausted, forcing them to dress in cheap and gaudy calicos. Some, he writes, were garbed 
in yellow and blue, others in red patterned goods, and still others in gigantic vines and 
flowers. Startling indeed! 
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The story of the war that followed we all know well, perhaps too well. Columbia's 
role, except for a hectic weekend early in 1865, was limited largely to homefront activity, 
supplying men and material needed for combat. During the next eight decades, down to the 
close of another war in 1945, this community played "catch-up," if not with the nation, 
certainly with the Piedmont. At first the answer seemed to be rail line& and cotton mills, 
and by the turn of the century this city had a goodly share of both. Mills finally found a use 
for the old canal, converting it to hydroelectric power. But with mills came mill people, 
whose ranks swelled to 10,000, individuals "old" Columbia viewed as shiftless, ignorant red-
necks who spurned both soap and school, people who taiked of unions and, worse still, voted 
for Jim Tillman and Colie Blease. So, in 1910 the city inaugurated commission government: 
a mayor and four councilmen elected at large, replacing aldermen chosen by wards, thus 
diluting the mill vote. 
The decades that followed--World War I, the twenties, and the Great Depression--
were not times for innovation, but a brief encampment here during the Spanish-American 
War (Camp Fornance) lit the spark that led to Camp Jackson during world War I and Fort 
Jackson during World War II and after, land which since the 1960s has been within the city 
limits. Today that training base is home to 15,000 servicemen and women, employs 3800 
civilians, and pumps $400 million into the local economy each year. 
The Depression--and I would like to pay tribute to Paul Lofton's fine dissertation on 
Columbia during those years--shook the faith many Americans had in industry as an 
economic cure-all, for they saw scores of industrial centers in chaos. They began to favor 
a diversified approach, not all eggs in one basket. Since 1945, aided by its geographical 
position and growth of state and federal programs, as well as public education at every level, 
Columbia has prospered greatly, enabling the community to shift rather easily from 
dependence upon farms and mills to distribution of goods, services of all kinds, and federal-
state payrolls. 
According to the 1980 census, in this metropolitan complex (Richland and Lexington 
counties), there were 10,000 federal workers [this does not include service personnel], 30,000 
state employees, and 12,000 individuals working for local governments, a total of 52,000, 
compared with about 125,000 in the private sector. In the latter category, retail trade, 
health services, and manufacturing loom large. 
Although some of these elements have been present from Columbia's earliest days--
government employment and retail trade, for example--this city does seem to possess what 
I like to call a "double N" factor: it is neither this nor that. Almost from the outset it was 
home to a college, but through accidents of history it is not a college town, say like Chapel 
Hill or Athens. It built cotton mills and acquired a huge military base, but never became 
either a mill town or a "soldier" town like Fayetteville, except perhaps in wartime. Scores 
have dreamed of the Congaree's potential, but Columbia failed to become a river port--if 
anything, thanks to Lake Murray, it is now a lake city. It has much for a tourist to see and 
do, but clearly is not a prime tourist center. You may interpret this diversity as weakness 
or strength, depending upon your point of view. 
7 
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So far, these reflections have been largely generalities, trends, and statistics. For 
balance I would like to introduce a handful of personalities, specifically individuals who have 
helped to shape present-day Columbia. I offer first two men prominent on the local scene 
from 1900 to 1925: banker-industrialist Edwin Robertson and black evangelist Richard 
Carroll. It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast. Robertson--Y ale-educated, son of a 
Reconstruction senator, the man who built Columbia's first skyscraper (the Barringer 
Building, for a time the tallest structure in the Carolinas), the father of Camp Jackson, the 
man who consolidated utility interests that made possible Lake Murray, and built for himself 
atop Arsenal Hill where the VA Building now stands one of the grandest homes ever seen 
in this town, with six bathrooms in 1900, when only a few had one! 
Carroll--born a slave in Barnwell County in 1860, son of a part-Indian mother and 
an unknown white father, and soon an orphan. He worked his way through Benedict and 
Shaw, became a Baptist Sunday School worker and a Spanish-American War chaplain, 
returning to Columbia in 1899 to establish an orphanage ( aided by Andrew Carnegie) and, 
in time, was recognized as this state's "Booker T. Washington." In 1905 Carroll launched 
the first of his annual racial conferences were he brought together white and black leaders 
(including Washington himself), governors, mayors, bankers, and educators. His message, 
one whites liked, was simple, direct, non-political. He told whites they had the power and 
would rule, so be just. Pay better wages, provide better housing, treat blacks fairly, educate 
them. Blacks, whom he characterized as followers by nature, not leaders, were cautioned 
to give good service, be honest, obey the law. Carroll who had the ear of the Gonzales 
family and in his last years was supported by them, had no trouble getting publicity in the 
State, but, as you might suspect, he was more popular with whites than blacks, some of 
whom called him "the white man's pimp." 
It is easy to criticize Carroll today, but in the first two decades of this century his 
practical approach made good sense and, I suspect, produced long-term results. His health 
failed in the early 1920s and he faded from view, dying in 1929, hailed by the State as a man 
of clear vision: "His were the ways of peace and constant endeavor ... these are the ways 
that succeed." W. E. B. DuBois wrote in Crisis that Carroll was the type of conservative 
southern whites liked, yet conceded that "he was not without ideals for his race and a hard 
worker." What Carroll did was to establish informal ties between white and black leaders 
of this community--lawyers, bankers, politicians, Benedict and Allen faculty--that, it would 
appear, continued in decades that followed. For whatever reasons, Columbia rode out the 
racial storm after World War I, the Klan troubles of'the 1920s, and even the integration 
crisis of the 1960s with relative ease, far better than many towns and cities. 
Of course, I am verging into the realm of "shadow" history, and no man was more at 
home in that realm than Lester Bates, a self-made insurance wizard who rose from abject 
poverty in Hell Hole Swamp to become a city councilman in World War II and mayor from 
1958 to 1970. A man of charm and humor who wanted desperately to be governor, in the 
1930s Bates gained regional fame (and customers) with short speeches, jokes, gospel songs, 
and renditions by the "Hired Hands," a musical group featured on Station WIS. As he 
quipped, "Anyone can get you a speaker, but where can you get one with a quartet?" 
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Elected mayor by fourteen votes in 1958, he subsequently referred to himself as "Landslide 
Lester." Always ready to greet conventions and promote Columbia, he usually began with 
these words: "It is a financial pleasure to have you with us!" But Lester's greatest feat was 
peaceful transformation to integrated schools, lunch counters, and public facilities. How did 
he do it? Apparently through arm-twisting, cajoling, and the interaction of both formal and 
informal groups. 
Two other individuals, both women, deserve mention. In 1901 Aiken native Matilda 
Evans, a graduate of Oberlin and Pennsylvania's Women's Medical College, founded Taylor 
Lane Hospital, a twenty-five-bed facility that also trained nurses. This city's only female 
physician and black, Dr. Evans built up a practice among white women that, in effect, 
subsidized black charity patients. She also, by contract, cared for black railroad workers and 
ran a truck garden and poultry farm that supplied food for her hospital. After that structure 
burned in 1914, she created local clinics that, in time, won financial backing of city and state 
governments and built a recreational center for black (Lindenwood Park) on the outskirts 
of the city. Although this little empire collapsed soon after her sudden death in 1935, here 
are the outlines of what the New Deal and subsequent federal programs would advocate. 
Inspired by Dr. Evans, in the 1930s former teacher Modjeska Simkins spearheaded 
state-wide efforts to stem tuberculosis and other diseases threatening blacks and after 1940 
moved on to the civil rights battle. As such, she became both a gadfly and a semi-ally of 
Lester Bates; while criticizing the mayor, she nudged him along, providing him with 
ammunition against those reluctant to embrace change. See what may happen, he could say, 
if we fail to act. 
Naturally, one comes to the end of a study such as this with questions not answered. 
How did Bates do what he did in the 1960s? We know the broad outlines, but not the 
details. How did Wade Hampton I get so rich so fast? Did Thomas Taylor really say they 
ruined a fine plantation to make a damned poor town? How did slaves, such as the Wallace 
boys (a fascinating tale), escape to the North in the 1850s? And were some slaves in those 
same years passing for free, with the connivance of their owners? It appears they were. 
Why was a Union officer, a prisoner of war under guard, selling sugar to blacks in the city 
market one day in the fall of 1864? (A local editor asked for and got an answer from the 
captain of the guard detail, but it is so convoluted that I can not understand it.) Who issued 
a death threat to Colonel A R. Taylor as he was trying to organize a home defense force 
in January 1865, adding for good measure, that if he didn't desist, his house would be 
burned down! And, question of question, General Sherman, did you or didn't you? Did you 
really orchestrate the burning of our fair city? 
But, no matter how many details of Columbia's past I present, I realize that most of 
you, especially if you hail from Charleston or Greenville, will drive along 1-26 later today 
firmly convinced of one fact: state capital it may be, but that city sure gets more than its 
rightful share of state and federal dollars! 
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The Role of the Germanic Males 
in the Early Middle Ages 
Kathy Pearson 
Emory University 
In the ongoing exploration of the early medieval family, one central player within that 
family--the male head of the household--has been largely overlooked. The influence of the 
Christian Church and the early medieval state brought considerable changes in the 
traditional functions and rights of senior men within the Germanic households. 
Exploration of pre-Christian Germanic social history is hampered by a lack of written 
primary sources. Only Caesar and Tacitus offer any real information on social customs. 
Between Tacitus and the early Christian writers of the fifth century, there are virtually no 
sources for social history. By the fifth century, Christian teachings were already reshaping 
families and households along medieval lines. Nevertheless, much of the earlier tradition 
survived well into the eighth and ninth centuries, preserved in the barbarian law codes and 
in property deeds recording transfers of land to the Church. In recent decades, archeology 
has revealed additional information about family settlement and religious practices among 
the Germans. 
Among the early Barbarian peoples, the Bavarians offer one of the best opportunities 
to observe the shift from the Germanic customs governing the family to those typical of 
early medieval Christian states. The Bavarians were not truly converted to Christianity until 
the late seventh and early eighth centuries. The Bavarian Code ( in its surviving form ) was 
not compiled until 744-748. In addition to the Bavarian Code, other valuable evidence exists 
within approximately 1500 property deeds recording eighth and ninth century donations to 
the various dioceses and cloisters of Bavaria. Recent archeological discoveries supplement 
the written records and provide information not only on family settlement but on family 
religion as well. Bavaria's late conversion and ample ~upply of written and archeological 
evidence thus provides an excellent opportunity to observe a society in transition from 
Germanic tribe to early medieval state. 
Early Bavarian society in the fourth through the seventh centuries was characterised 
by the existence of all-important extended kin groups, or Sippen, within which existed 
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Kathy Pearson 
smaller household units centered around a male patriarch or head of the household. The 
traditional functions of the Sippen were vested in the hands of these senior males of the 
kindred. In many ways, the Germanic head of the household occupied a position similiar to 
that of the Roman paterfamilias, although the Germanic man's authority in matters of life 
and death was not as great as that of his Roman counterpart.1 The head of the household 
held the mundiburdium, or legal authority, over his dependents within his household. The 
mundiburdium entitled him to arrange marriages for his children, represent the members 
of the household in legal actions, oversee the family property, and preside at the family's 
private religious rites.2 The Sippe's importance as the primary structuring element of society 
began to diminish with the emergence of the Germanic kingdoms and the conversion of the 
various peoples to orthodox Christianity. As the function of the Sippe was eroded, so too 
was the authority of its male heads of households. 
Barbarian contact with more sophisticated Roman forms of government during the 
chaotic invasion era of the third through the sixth centuries resulted in the development of 
both monarchy and the concept of the state as a people governed by a king.3 Continued 
pressure by Roman civilization upon nascent peoples produced other responses as well, such 
as the production of written law. The law codes were loosely constructed along the lines of 
Roman models and adapted to fit the needs of individual peoples. 
Germanic groups settling in the Roman Empire soon found their traditional legal 
practices inadequate to deal with the complications arising from settlement on land that was 
often already occupied by a surviving Rbman population. Laws appropriate to a migratory 
population did not cover issues such as property disputes that emerged once a particular 
people became sedentary. The barbarian codes were an attempt to preserve old law that was 
still applicable while creating new law to cover problems arising out of settlement or 
conversion to a new religion. The Codes routinely noted that legal authority over the 
people rested in the hands of a king who created a written law that supplanted the old oral 
tradition.4 
Both the establishment of a state under the authority of the king and the creation of 
written law struck a blow against traditional legal authority. Law in the pre-settlement era 
was a matter of oral transmission. The heads of households took action to redress wrongs 
committed against their dependents either through amicable settlement or blood feuds.5 The 
proper course of action was determined by consultation with senior males within the kindred 
who were the individuals most likely to remember earlier precedent. Written law eliminated 
the need for the cultural memory of the older men of the community. The king, aided by 
1David Herlihy, Medieval Households (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 198.S), 44-48. 
2Hcrlihy, 48-49; Tacitus, Germania, chap. 10; Katherine Fischer Drew, The Lombard Laws (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1973), 6-7. 
3Thomas Bums, A History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 18-23, provides a brief analysis of factors 
involved in the emergence of distinct barbarian peoples. 
4Sec Drew, The Lombard Laws, preface to Rothair's Edict; Drew, The Burgundian COtk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1949), preface to the Law of Gundobad; and Theodore John Rivers, Laws of the Alemans and Bavarians (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1977), prologue of the Bavarian Code, for good examples. 
5Drew, The Lombard Laws, 6-8; Rivers, Laws, 16-18. 
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his royal officials, took on the task of enforcing the written laws of his people and thereby 
usurped the authority of the heads of households in legal proceedings.6 Punishment of legal 
offenses no longer rested entirely in the hands of the heads of households and their male 
kin. The shift from customary law to written law, expressly stated in the preface of the 
Bavarian Code, eliminated not only the ultimate authority of family heads in legal matters, 
but also subordinated them to the abstract power of the state personified by a king and his 
appointed officials.' 
The adoption of Christianity by the Bavarians was likewise to make substantial 
alterations in traditional male authority. The conversion of most of Bavaria did not take 
place until the late seventh and early eighth centuries.8 Pre-Christian Germanic religion 
remains shadowy. Some evidence does remain of the veneration of ancestors and the 
central authority of the head of the household in the family rites. Tacitus noted in the 
Germania that the senior male conducted the religious rituals practiced within his 
household.9 Some family rites evidently centered around the veneration of ancestors. The 
senior male's role in conducting family religion is one familiar to us from the Romans. In 
both the Roman and the Germanic households, the oldest male served as the closest 
connection, by virtue of his age, to the venerated ancestral dead. The father of the 
household thus held the task of serving as the house-priest for family cultic observance.10 
The archeological evidence for Bavaria reveals that the ancestral dead occupied an 
important place in the family conciousness. A number of early settlements in Bavaria 
emerged in close proximity to an earlier burial of a warrior (defined by his grave goods) 
suggesting that the settlement developed around the burial of an important male member 
of the kindred in the pre-Christian centuries.11 The transition from the veneration of 
ancestors to the veneration of Christ and the Saints is most visible at the Western Bavarian 
settlement of Epolding-Miihlthal, which lay along the Isar river seven miles southwest of 
modern Munich. The village formed part of the hereditary property of the wealthy west 
Bavarian nobleman Waltrich. In 763 he founded a cloister at the nearby settlement of 
Schaftlarn and transferred control of Epolding-Miihlthal to the monastic community.12 Part 
of the gift included a proprietary church or chapel built by Waltrich's forebearers. 13 The 
church that occupied the site in 763 was not the first. Recent excavations reveal that two 
earlier churches lay beneath the mid-eighth century structure, the earliest dating possibly 
to the late Roman era but certainly before the end of the seventh century. Beneath the 
6Drew, The Burgundian Code, preface, 1-14. 
7Rivers, Laws, prologue to the Bavarian Code. 
8Friedrich Prinz, Fruhes Monchlum im Frankenreich. Kultur und Gesellschaft in Gallien, den Rheinlanden und Bayern am Beispiel der 
monasrischen Entwicklung (4. bis 8. Jahrhundert) ( Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1965), 345-360. 
~acitus, Germania , chap. 10. 
10H.H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BC, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1980), 392-393; and Jan de Vries, 
Altgermanische Religionsgeschichle, vol. 1, Einleitung. Die Vorgeschichlliche Z£it. Religion der Sudgermanen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1935), 
274-276, 307-314. 
llWilhelm Stormer, "Adelsgriiber im friihmittelalterlichen Baycm und Ostfranken," :zeitschrift fur bayerische Landesgeschichle 32 (1969) 
748-766. 
12Alois Weissthaner, ed., Die Traditionen des KJosters Schiiftlam (Munich: Beck, 1953), document 1. 
13Weissthaner, Schiiftlam document 1. 
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Kathy Pearson 
earliest and smallest church was the grave of a nobleman who was approximately fifty years 
old at his death. This particular grave possessed a special significance for the inhabitants of 
the village. Other ancestral members of Waltrich's extended family were buried in a series 
of cemeteries together with their dependent tenants. Only the warrior was buried alone.14 
At Epolding-Miihlthal, the evidence indicates that the ancestral veneration of one of 
Waltrich's forebearers was replaced at some point no later than the end of seventh century 
with a chapel dedicated to the veneration of Christ. Waltrich himself no longer practiced 
the ancestral cult but rather dedicated himself to the Cbristian community that he founded 
at Schaftlarn. 
The Church generally took a hostile view of the association of ancestral burial sites 
with the veneration of Christ and the Saints. The establishment of Churches over ancestral 
graves did not eradicate the presence of the burial itself, although in time the memory of 
ancestral veneration might be dimmed. The burial of noble laymen beneath a · new church 
or within the confines of an already existing church created a potential rivalry between the 
veneration of ancestors and the veneration of Christ and the Saints. Merovingian and 
Carolingian synods alike forbade the burial of lay nobility inside the confines of existing 
churches.15 The ancestral cult, presided over by the senior male of the family, was replaced 
with the cults of Christ, at whose rites a priest officiated. The senior male's proximity to the 
venerated dead was lost and with it authority in matters of family religion. The dead were 
removed from the sacred confines of the church and placed in a cemetery, well away from 
the intimate space devoted to the Christian mysteries. 
The shift from the ancestral rites to Christian rites was not the only attack made on 
the religious prerogatives of the head of the household. During the eighth and ninth 
centuries, the Church gradually assumed control over religious foundations which lay on 
private property under the authority of the landowners. In Bavaria, the diocese of Freising 
alone was home to no less than 140 such family chapels in the eighth and ninth centuries.16 
These chapels were normally built in the enclosed courtyard of the family estate.11 Here 
the Christian faith was practiced in accordance with the wishes of the head of the household. 
The enclosed courtyard held a special significance in early medieval society. It was the 
dwelling place for the family and its servants, the place of refuge for all persons on the 
estate, the administrative center of the property, and the center for family religious rites. 
Within this enclosed space, the authority of the head of the household reigned. 
The Church feared that the exercise of private religious observances under the 
control of the family head might lead away from orthodox practice into heresy. Accordingly 
the bishops sought a means of terminating the head of the household's authority over the 
private family chapel. Before the chapel could officially function as a holy place, it had to 
14Hermann Dannheimer,Au/ den Spuren der Baiuwaren. Archiiologie des fruhen Mittelalters in Altbayem (Pfaffenhofen: W. Ludwig, 1987), 
151-159. 
15Stormer, • Adelige Eigenkirchen und Adelsgriiber-denkmalpflegerische Aufgaben," 'Zeitschrift fur bayerische Landesgeschicllle 38 (1976), 
1148. 
16stormer, "Adelige Eigenkirchen," 1145, 1151-1158. 
17Stormer, "Adelige Eigenkirchen," 1145. 
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be concecrated by the bishop of the diocese. The act of consecration gave the bishop a 
certain amount of leverage in his efforts to acquire spiritual authority over the private 
church. The conflict between the nobleman Gunther and Bishop Virgil of Salzburg in the 
mid-eighth century serves as a typical case of successful coercion of a layman into 
surrendering his rights over private property. Gunther built a private cloister for monks on 
his estate in Otting with the intention of retaining control of both the property and its 
community of monks. When construction was finished, Gunther summoned Virgil to 
consecrate the cloister and install the relics. Virgil raised the question of authority over the 
assembled monks. When Gunther rejected Virgil's claims to religious authority over the 
community, Bishop Virgil then refused to consecrate the cloister until Gunther surrendered 
his legal rights over the foundation into the hands of the Bishops of Salzburg. Gunther lost 
authority over the property and over the assembled clergy of his private foundation.18 His 
traditional authority over religious practice within his holdings was usurped by the higher 
authority of the local episcopate. 
It was a pattern repeated over and over again as chapels were alienated from the 
property of the household and transferred into the hands of an outside presence--the 
Church. The head of the household henceforth had a rival for his authority within the 
intimate space of the enclosure. The head of the household thus suffered a dual blow: he 
lost his control of family religious practices as well as control of property lying at the heart 
of the estate. 
The concerted efforts of church and state were to impose further changes in other 
legal rights of the head of the household. Among these were alterations in the ownership 
and transfer of property by members of the household. In early Bavaria the communal use 
of land, and in some cases communal ownership of land, was frequently maintained within 
the family. 19 Land rarely left family hands except through the creation of dowries for 
marriagable members of the family. Land lost through the provision of dowries was likely 
to be acquired through the reverse of the process, so that the holdings of most landowning 
families remained relatively stable until the eighth century. Control over family property 
rested in the hands of the senior male of the household.20 It was his task to protect that 
property in court, and his consent and that of other close kin was normally necessary before 
any transaction involving inherited land could take place.21 In this fashion holdings were 
partially protected from the difficulties created by partible inheritance that recognized rights 
of all heirs in a family upon the death of their father. 22 
Christianity introduced a new dependent class of clergy in whose hands rested the 
task of insuring the salvation of the community through their prayers. A natural desire to 
provide sustenance for the clergy led to numerous gifts of property to the local monastery 
or diocese. The large-scale transfer of land to an entity outside the kindred was alien to 
18willibald Hauthaler, Salzburger Urkundenbuch , vol. 1 (Vienna, 1910), Breves Notiliae, chap. XIII. 
19Rivers, Laws, 29; Drew, TIU! Lombard Lows, 7. · 
20Rivers, Laws, 29; Drew, TIU! Lombard Laws, 7. 
21 Phillipe Dollinger, Der bayerische Bauernstand vom 9. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert , trans. Franz lrsigler (Munich: Beck, 1982), 96-98. 
22Rivers, Laws, the Bavarian Code, XV, 7-10. 
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Kathy Pearson 
traditional patterns of land ownership. The Bavarian Code therefore made detailed provision 
for the right of free Bavarians to dispose of family land by transferring it to the Church. All 
free persons could transfer their remaining property to the Church once they had honored 
the claims of their children, and no one had the right to prevent such a transfer.of property, 
not even the Duke of Bavaria himself.23 The introduction of the "spiritual heir" had 
two effects: it greatly curtailed earlier rights of the extended kin to family property, and it 
created enormous tension between the heads of households and their heirs over fair sharing 
of the patrimony.24 After 744-748 there was no legal recourse to prevent the head of the 
household from bestowing one-third of his entire estate upon the Church after dividing the 
other two-thirds among his children. They in turn could make the same provisions fr~m their 
diminished patrimony This was to become the typical pattern of donation and inheritance 
for several generations of Bavarian landowners. The transfer of enormous amounts of land 
to the church greatly reduced a family's property. Bitter disputes eventually arose among the 
heads of households, their heirs, and the Church over the disposal of an ever-shrinking 
patrimony. A series of disputes between the diocese of Freising and members of the 
powerful Huosi family in the early ninth century involved the attempted recovery of 
properties earlier given to the diocese.25 The family encountered enormous difficulties. The 
Church lay entirely outside the mundiburdium or authority of the head of the household. 
The family was unable to prevail in law, as its claims against the diocese were heard in 
ecclesiatical courts. With the introduction of the Church as a legal heir, the communal use 
or ownership of land was no longer practical, and the authority exercised by the head of the 
household over the disposal of family property was at an end. Partitioning of the patrimony 
into individual shares before the death of the head of the household became the accepted 
means of ownership, with a substantial portion of each generation's patrimony passing into 
the hands of the Church.26 
Another function removed from the control of the head of the household was the 
right to determine the composition of his kindred. The heads of households in pre-Christian 
society had absolute control over sexual relationships within the household, the marriages 
of dependents, and the determination of heirs among their children.v These rights were 
surrendered with only the greatest reluctance even after the acceptance of the Christian 
faith. Control over the composition of the household and kindred was of paramount 
importance in insuring the continuity of a family. Synodal and counciliar acts prohibited 
acts of incest, bigamy, divorce, concubinage and marriage between partners of unequal social 
status.28 Such clerical fulminations frequently fell on deaf ears. In the mid-sixth century, 
23Rivers, Laws, the Bavarian Code, I, 1. 
24Rivers, Laws, the Bavarian Code, XV, 10. 
~eodor Bitterauf, Die Traditionen des Hochstifts Freising, vol. 4 of Quellen und Erorterungen zur bayerischen Geschichle, new series 
(Aalen: Scientia, 1967 reprint of 1905 ed.), documents 19, 184·187. 
26Rivers, Laws, the BO\•arian Code, I, 1. 
Z7Paul Veyne, ed. A History of Private Life, vol. 1, From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 464-479. 
28Jo Ann McNamara and Suzanne Fonay Wemple, "Marriage and Divorce in the Frankish Kingdom," in Susan Mosher Stuard, ed., 
Women in Medieval Society (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), 101-103. 
15 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Chlothar I of the Franks managed to commit virtually every sexual offense forbidden by 
earlier councils. His final marriage was to the Lombard princess Walderada, the widow of 
his nephew Theudebald. This blatant act of affine incest brought bitter protests from the 
Frankish bishops. When Chlothar divorced Walderada, Garibald, Duke of Bavaria, promptly 
made her his wife.29 Her status as a once-widowed, once-divorced partner in incest did not 
outweigh her considerable political value for Garibald. Family structures were determined 
by the heads of households on the basis of necessity or desire. 
Two further cases involving the ducal family of Bavaria illustrate that such behavior 
continued even as Christianty was establishing a firm hold in the Duchy. St. Emmeram of 
Regensburg suffered martyrdom in the late seventh century after he raised objections to a 
liaison between Uta, the Duke of Bavaria's daughter, and Sigibold, the son of a Bavarian 
court justice. Uta, offended by the missionary's harsh words, complained to her brother 
Lampert. The irate brother, acting as his sister's guardian, then murdered Emmeram.30 
A slightly later incident around 725 involved Duke Grimoald of Bavaria and St. 
Corbianian. Grimoald married his brother's widow, committing a form of affine incest 
strongly prohibited from the fourth century onwards. The marriage served two purposes for 
Duke Grimoald. It preserved Pilitrud's widow's portion within the patrimony and continued 
a political link between Pilitrud's noble (possibly royal) Frankish family and the Agilolfingi 
dukes. Corbianian was appalled by the union, but his protests only resulted in his exile by 
the furious Duchess.31 
Efforts by the Church to restrict options to one lifetime union between a man and 
a woman of unrelated lineages were enforced by the Carolingians from the mid-eighth 
century onwards. The Carolingian monarchs, anxious to erode the strength of other potential 
rival noble families, endorsed religious restrictions on the inheritance of bastards, incestous 
marriages, divorce, and marriages between free and unfree and incorporated these into 
Carolingian law.32 From the early ninth century on, the ability of the head of the household 
to arrange marriages or other sexual relationships was drastically curtailed by the joint force 
of clerical and secular law. 
The Church's ability to restrict marriage is especially clear in those recorded cases 
where noblemen sought to marry their concubines or establish their children by a concubine 
as full legal heirs. The nobleman Tenil and his concubine Meripurc were the parents of a 
boy whom Tenil wished to make his heir. Tenil's own kin recognized his concubine as his 
wife despite her unfree status as a servant of the Bishop of Freising. In return for a 
substantial gift of property, the diocese of Freising surrendered temporary authority over 
Meripurc and Haguno to Tenil. At his death, the pair lost their temporary freedom and 
reverted to the status of servants of the diocese.33 By the end of the ninth century, even the 
highest nobility in Bavaria could no longer recognize illegitimate children as full heirs. King 
29Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, trans. Lewis Thorpe (New York: Penguin, 1974), IV, 9. 
30Aroeo of Freising, Vua Haimhrammi, ed. Bruno Krusch, MGH rerum Merov. VI, 6, 1920, chaps. 9, 14, 17-18. 
31Aroeo of Freising, Vita Corbiniani, ed. Bruno Krusch, MGH rer. Merov. VI, 7, 1920, chap. 24. 
32McNamara and Wemple, "Marriage and Divorce; 101-103. 
33Bitterauf, Freising documents 450 and 489. 
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Carlomann of Bavaria was unable to secure the throne of Bavaria for his bastard son Arnulf 
despite Arnulf s undoubted political and military talents. 34 
By the later ninth century little was left to men of their traditional functions in 
Germanic society except the life of a warrior. In warfare the Carolingian male found his 
counterpart to the women's dangers of childbirth. The average life expectancy of men was 
around 39 to 40 years.35 Two primary causes of death were battlefield fatalities and the 
related threat of infected wounds.36 Few males other than clergymen survived past their 
fifties. The Carolingian world was one populated by relatively young men whose value lay 
in their strength and vigour as warriors. 
A sober reminder of what life could be like for the older male in a society in which 
his role had been primarily reduced to his value as a warrior can be seen in a law of the 
Bavarian code which governed rebellion by the Duke's sons: 
If a Duke's son is so proud or foolish, that he wishes to remove his father through 
evil-minded intention or force and wishes to take his dukedom away from him, while his 
father is still able to contest in a judgement, lead the army, judge the people, mount a horse 
manfully, and command his weapons vigorously, is not deaf or blind, and can execute the 
king's orders in every way; let that son know that he acted contrary to the law and that he 
is excluded from his father's inheritance, and that nothing of his father's property belongs 
to him any longer.37 
A similar provision in Alemannic law specifically permitted the rebellious son to assume his 
father's office if he were strong enough to rule.38 In effect, this endorsed rebellion of the 
young against the old. If the Duke could no longer physically exercise the functions of office 
his office ceased to protect him. He faced the prospect of ambitious and vigorous rebels set 
on establishing their rule in his stead. Seniority could bring hostility rather than respect. 
In view of the changes occurring in the role of the male heads of households, it is not 
suprising that many men rejected secular society altogether and turned to the Church for 
refuge and protection. From the boy who faced dangers at the hands of older brothers who 
coveted his share of the patrimony to the old warrior in decline, men across the lifespan 
sought refuge in the Church. The Church further offered the opportunity to regain some 
measure of authority within the extended spiritual family of the religious community. The 
role of abbot or bishop offered the the ambitious man an ample arena for his talents. 
Thus the erosion of the functions of the Sippe in favor of the authority of Church and 
State radically changed the role of the senior male within the household. One by one, 
virtually every significant function was stripped from the head of the household by the 
breakdown of traditional Germanic society and the creation of the early medieval states. 
34Max Spindler, ed. Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichle, vol. l, Das Alte Bayem. Das Stammeshenogtum 2nd. ed. (Munich: Beck, 1981 ), 
272. 
lSwemple, Women in Frankish Society: Marriage and the Cloister, 500-900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 199-201. 
~or a forensic survey of early medieval society, see Alfred Czarnetzki et al., Menschen des fruhen Mi11elal1ers im Spiegel der 
Anthropologie und Medizin, exhibit catalogue, Wiintemhergisches Landesmuscums Stuttgan (fiibingen: Gulde, 1983). 
37Rivers, lAws, the Bavarian Code, II, 9. 
38Rivers, lAws, the Alemannic Code, XXXV. 
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The plight of an elderly man was in some ways worse than that of the older woman, who 
had at least been trained in valuable domestic skills such as the production of cloth or beer. 
The elderly layman, whose absolute authority within his family had been superseded by 
Church and State, whose heirs wanted control of family property, whose strength was no 
longer adequate to withstand potential enemies--his best recourse was the protection of the 
Church in a world turned hostile. 
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THE HUGUENOT EMIGRATION 
FROM THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE 
Bertrand van Ruymbeke 
College of Charleston 
On February 18, 1562 two small vessels left the harbor of Dieppe, France. On board 
a handful of Huguenots were ready to admire the much talked about wonders of the New 
World. Most of them were sailors and soldiers whom the peace of Cateau-Cambresis, 
signed between France and Spain three years earlier, had left unemployed. Their leader 
was a staunch Huguenot explorer named Jean Ribaut. The sponsor of this expedition, 
whose objective was to explore and not to settle or conquer, was Admiral Coligny. This 
nobleman was a nationally known Protestant leader who at that time was in high favor with 
the young king Charles IX. This expedition is the beginning of a fascinating story written 
in blood and lived in the name of freedom. Freedom to worship, to work, to raise a family--
in other words freedom to live. This story has chapters to which we can give titles: French 
Florida, the siege of La Rochelle, the Heath grant, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
or the French Santee. It also has its heroes: Jean Ribaut, Admiral Coligny, the Baron de 
Sance, Gabriel Manigault, Daniel Huger, and Henry Laurens. This is a story full of 
surprises such as the promotional pamphlets written in French and only intended to attract 
French-speaking settlers or the hope of producing salt in the South Carolina Low Country. 
A story full of excitement and suspense when it deals with the way these Huguenots left 
France. Finally, this migration became a true trail of tears when we think of how painful 
it must have been for them to leave behind their beloved relatives and revered homeland. 
Thus, the Huguenot emigration to South Carolina was . more than a mass emigration with 
its dates and statistics, but a struggle. It was a flight from the land of oppression to the land 
of liberty. Liberty--the little word that makes such a big difference. 
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I. THE ROOTS OF THE EMIGRATION 
The term "Huguenot" has for centuries referred to the French Protestants, but the 
origin of the word is controversial. As always in history when certainties can not be 
reached, hypotheses are their substitutes. The most common explanation has the word 
Huguenot derive from Eidgenossen which in German means sworn confederates. Initially 
it referred to the oath sworn by the three Forest cantons of central Switzerland. Later the 
term was applied to the inhabitants of Geneva, united in their struggle against the Duke of 
Savoy in the early 1520s. Allegedly Eidgenossen first became eyguenot and eventually, in 
the 1550s, took its present form Huguenot. Some historians contest this foreign origin and 
contend that the term Huguenot was coined to designate those in favor of the descendants 
of Hugues Capet, i.e., the ruling Valois dynasty as opposed to the Guise family. The Guise 
supporters were ultra-Catholics and added to the name Hugues the diminutive suffix not, 
that we find for example in the French nickname Jeannot, meaning "little John". 
Consequently, Huguenot would mean supporter of little Hugues.1 
Ironically enough in the sixteenth century French Protestants were also called 
Lutherans, even though their creed was Calvinistic. In the seventeenth century they were 
referred to as the members of the Religion Pretendue Reformee (Self-styled Reformed 
Religion) as opposed to the Religion Catholique Apostolique et Romaine (Roman Catholic). 
French Protestants were also named parpaillots, which is the popular name of a black 
butterfly in Southern France. Such a nickname was an allusion to the fact that the 
Protestants of the first generations were always dressed in black as a sign of their religious 
and moral austerity. 
In the early 1560s France was at peace with Spain--at last, one may say--and its 
colonial policy was in an embryonic stage. It was far behind her southern neighbor who 
already owned a huge empire on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. France had a great 
potential, whether demographic with a population of 16 million people or economic. It was 
well situated with its numerous Atlantic ports. But it had too few statesmen concerned with 
overseas expansion. Admiral Coligny was one of them, but did not France need tens of such 
foresighted leaders? Coligny was a Huguenot, which made him suspect in the eyes of many. 
Nonetheless, Coligny convinced Charles IX to send an expedition to the coasts of Florida 
and explore them in the name of France. He was careful to obtain royal sanction even 
though the leaders and most of the members of that expedition were Huguenots. Coligny 
knew that some day a major struggle between the French Catholics and the Protestants 
would occur and that the losers, in this case in all likelihood the outnumbered Protestants, 
would need a refuge somewhere. Thus for the first time in history North America was 
perceived as a land of refuge for Protestant minorities. Huguenots paved the way for the 
Puritans and the Quakers. It was something that Cotton Mather clearly understood when, 
1Gray, Janet G. "The origin of the word Huguenot," The Sixteenth Century Journal, 14 (Fall 1983) pp. 349-59. 
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a century later, he wrote that to the Huguenots fell the honor of having first regarded 
America as "the receptacle of the Protestant faith"2 
On May 20, 1562 Jean Ribaut implanted the arms of France and built a small fort 
on an island protecting the harbor of Port Royal, the exact location being subject to 
controversy. The fort was named Charlesfort in honor of the boy king Charles IX. Two 
months before, while Ribaut was crossing the Atlantic, the Religious Wars had begun in 
France with the Massacre of Wassy. This slaughter opened the way to almost thirty years 
of merciless warfare between two religious groups determined to gain control of the throne. 
More than ever was Coligny convinced of the necessity of settling part of North America 
for the safety of the Huguenots. Yet Charlesfort soon disappeared and Ribaut found 
himself imprisoned in the Tower of London accused of trying to deceive Queen Elizabeth.3 
The admiral chose Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, another experienced Huguenot sea 
captain who had been second in command in 1562, to lead a new expedition, which left Le 
Havre on April 22, 1564. This time the goal was not to explore, but to settle. Laudonniere 
selected a site for his fort near the mouth of what was then the May river (now the Saint 
John's river) in Northern Florida. He named it Fort La Caroline, still in honor of Charles 
IX . 
Here begins an interesting controversy about the origin of the name Carolina. 
Undoubtedly the Carolinas were named after Charles II of England, but it should not be 
forgotten that the word Caroline was first used in that area by Laudonniere. Thus not 
surprisingly, in a map of North America drawn by the most famous of Louis XV's 
cartographers, Guillaume De l'Isle, and currently exhibited in the Museum of the New 
World in La Rochelle, one can find the legend" Caroline named after Charles IX, king of 
France." The important thing is not to know who is right and who is wrong but to 
remember that for centuries French people firmly believed that Carolina had been 
discovered and named by their compatriots. Despite the reinforcements headed by Ribaut, 
this attempt at settling Northern Florida failed in a sea of blood, with the Matanza 
Massacres in the fall of 1565. This failure was due to many reasons among which lie the 
lack of support from the French court, the monopoly then exerted by Spain over North 
America and the cruelty with which it was enforced, the mismanagement of the colony, and 
the lack of foresight of the settlers who relied too much on the Indians' help. To crown it 
all, Coligny was assassinated on August 22, 1572 and became the first victim of the Saint 
Bartholomew Massacre. 
Nonetheless, Coligny's effort was not in vain. The name Caroline sounded magical 
to the ears of scores of Huguenots. Laudonniere's and Ribaut's accounts were published, 
soon followed by others.4 French Protestants had found a place where they could emigrate, 
and in paving the way for others they died as martyrs. History and legend merged to 
maintain Huguenot interest in the land south of Virginia. Here lies probably one of the 
2Chinard, Gilben. Les Refugies huguenots en Amerique, Les Belles Lcttrcs, Paris, 1925: p. 22. 
31..owcry, Woodbery. "Jean Ribaut and Queen Elizabeth", The American Historical Review, April 1904; pp. 456-459. 
4Ribaut's account was published in 1563, Laudonniere's in 1586, and Le Moyne's in 1591. 
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most intriguing aspects of our study. The appeal exerted by South Carolina to the 
Huguenots is deeply rooted in the collective imagination of their community. 
II. A SIEGE, A GRANT: FROM SANCE TO HEATH 
In 1610 Henri IV was assassinated. The Huguenots lost a protector and France a 
great king. Under the reign of his son, Louis XIII, three Protestant rebellions occurred: 
1620-1622, 1625-1626, and 1627-1629. They affected the southern (Beam, Languedoc) and 
Atlantic provinces (Aunis, Saintonge, Poitou). Occasioned by specific events such as the 
invasion of Beam by Louis XIII or his marriage to the Spanish inf anta, they symbolize a 
more deeply rooted struggle between an armed minority, jealous of its privileges, and a 
Catholic and absolute monarchy willing to establish its authority. Those domestic wars 
ended in 1629, with the treaty called Grace d'Ales. The very term "Grace," meaning pardon 
in French, well shows who was the winner and more importantly who was in the wrong, at 
least in the eyes of the court. This peace treaty marked the end of French Protestantism 
as a military and political force. In the following years scores of influential noblemen 
converted to Catholicism in order to have access to important state positions and be nearer 
to the king. Others would choose to leave France. 
The peak of the last war was the siege of La Rochelle, last Protestant stronghold on 
the Atlantic coast. La Rochelle had been a Protestant city for years and during the 
Religious Wars it had already undergone a siege by the royal troops in 1572-1573. But when 
one refers to the siege of La Rochelle in French history, it is the siege of 1627-1628 that 
comes to mind. One particularly thinks of the famous painting representing Richelieu as 
he was inspecting the dyke built around the harbor to prevent any ship from entering or 
leaving La Rochelle. In the summer of 1627, English troops, headed by the Duke of 
Buckingham, landed on the Island of Re, located a few miles off La Rochelle. In the fall 
a treaty was signed between the inhabitants of the rebellious city and the Duke. But royal 
troops soon drove the English from the island and La Rochelle had to stand by itself. It had 
rebelled, expelled the priests, and signed a treaty with the enemy. This was an open 
challenge to the French crown. From November 1627 to March 1628 royal troops built an 
impressive wall seven miles long with some twenty forts. Moreover, Louis XIII decided to 
erect a dyke made of stone in order to close the bay. On two occasions an English fleet 
attempted to break the blockade, but to no avail. Huguenot reinforcements from the south 
were supposed to rescue their northern co-religionists, but were defeated miles away from 
La Rochelle. 
On October 31, 1628 the city surrendered after a long siege of almost a year. La 
Rochelle lost about twenty thousand people, that is to say over three-fourths of its 
population. Famine, not fighting, had taken the largest toll. Following this dramatic defeat 
most Huguenots converted, but some chose exile. Antoine de Ridouet, Baron de Sance, a 
prominent Protestant leader who had taken part in the rebellion, reached England before 
La Rochelle fell. His English protector and friend was none less than the Duke of 
Buckingham himself. As early as February 1628 the latter had secured Sance a small 
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pension of a hundred pounds per annum.5 Three months later Sance informed the English 
authorities of his desire to send Huguenot settlers to North America. He intended to create 
a new colony that would benefit the English as well as serve as a Huguenot haven. 
The English crown was interested, but Sance was neither influential nor wealthy 
enough to undertake such an enterprise by himself. Thus he contacted Heath and 
persuaded him to obtain a grant. No later than on October 30, 1629 Heath was granted a 
patent that made him proprietor of a territory between thirty-one and thirty-six degrees 
North latitude. Due to a lack of source material, th~ rest remains shrouded in mystery. 
Were Sance and his friends Heath's supporters or competitors? Heath also contracted two 
other parties, why? An agreement was drawn on May 15, 1630 concerning the settling of 
the northern half of Carolana by Huguenots. Why did this not result in something tangible? 
Lack of funds? Mistrust between the partners? Finally, why in April 1632 did Heath reach 
an agreement with the king specifying that only Anglicans would be admitted in Carolana? 
Had be become disenchanted with the Huguenot contractors? 
Even though nothing came of this Carolana project, Sance's first plan deserves a close 
study as it is extremely revealing of Huguenot intentions. From the very beginning Sance's 
hope was to found a colony that would serve as a Huguenot haven. Thus Sance was faithful 
to Coligny's designs. Same area of North America, same goal, with the difference that the 
Huguenots were now well aware that any attempt at settling the New World had to be done 
through English channels. Sance's second idea was to base the economy of the future 
colony primarily on salt production, at least initially. Two reasons can account for that 
hope. First, salt was a very useful commodity at a time when the preservation of food was 
a problem. Secondly, Sance was from the most important salt-producing area of France, 
namely the provinces of Aunis (location of La Rochelle), Saintonge, and Lower Poitou. He 
certainly hoped to get salters as potential settlers very easily and was probably familiar with 
salt-producing techniques. However, the question remains as to how Sance could be so sure 
that the South Carolina Low Country would be ideal for salt production. On what accounts 
was his knowledge of the area based? Those of his Huguenot forerunners such as Ribaut 
or Laudonniere? 
III. REVOCATION AND EMIGRATION 
On October 25, 1685 Louis XIV made a major decision that would have great 
cultural, social, and economic consequences. He revoked the Edict of Nantes, which a 
renowned French historian has labeled "wobbly, imperfect, exceptional."6 Louis XIV's act 
must not be interpreted as a turning point in his reign, but just as a landmark. The 
Revocation was the logical outcome of more than twenty years of persecution. A long trail 
of deprivations and harassment meant to make the lives of the Protestants so miserable that 
conversion to Catholicism would appear as a relief. It began with petty measures such as 
5Kopperman, Paul E. "The Carolina Project 1629-1640," North Carolina Historical Review, vol. LIX, January 1982, p. 3. 
6Garrisson, Janine. "Banca!, imparfait , exceptionnel: The Edict of Nantes; Reforme, number 2984 (23 March 1985). 
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the ban on psalm singing in the streets (1659), the ban on daytime funerals (1662), and the 
limitation of family gatherings to twelve people (1670). Soon more serious restrictions 
appeared and the Huguenots were no longer eligible for high civil positions such as city 
councilmen, aldermen, or judges (1679).7 After 1680 restrictions gave way to open 
persecution with the use of the dragonnades. The royal dragoons were mounted infantrymen 
with muskets and pikes. These soldiers were launched in a province and given free rein in 
order to obtain as many conversions as possible. Protestant populations were literally 
terrified as torture, robbery, and rapes became widespread. This turned out to be the most 
brutal but most effective means to reduce Protestantism in the kingdom. But to attract new 
converts, Louis XIV also used more peaceful incentives such as tax exemptions for a few 
years or bounties paid by the Bureau of Conversions created in 1676. However, let us 
mention that within a few months after the royal dragoons were sent to Poitou more than 
thirty thousand had converted, that is more than the Bureau had garnered in three years for 
the entire kingdom.8 
Impressed by the high number of conversions submitted to him in daily reports, Louis 
XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, probably thinking that since the number of the Protestants 
had been dramatically reduced, it no longer concerned an important portion of his subjects. 
Moreover, most of the provisions contained in the Edict had been so severely restricted that 
all in all it had a lessened value. Therefore the Revocation is more a glorious feat than 
anything else, done to impress the pope and restore Louis XIV's image of the Most 
Christian King. The Edict of Fontainebleau, which replaced the one revoked, outlawed 
Protestantism and provided for extremely harsh measures for those who tried to resist the 
king's will. All Protestant churches had to be destroyed without delay, pastors had to 
convert or leave the country within fifteen days, and Huguenot schools were closed. The 
Protestants were denied the jus emigrandi or right to emigrate, except for a few influential 
noblemen who were even given passports. The Huguenots who chose to flee France took 
a great chance, as the sentence was the galley for the men and the convent for the women. 
Despite those measures intended to limit the exodus, historians estimate that about 
two hundred thousand Huguenots left France in the twenty years following the Revocation. 
The French provinces were affected differently according to their geographic location--
whether the access to a foreign Protestant country was easy--and to their Protestant 
population. Areas where Huguenots greatly outnumbered Catholics were safer and less 
prone to emigration. The Atlantic provinces {Annis, Saintonge, Normandy) lost more than 
twenty thousand each. La Rochelle itself saw two thousand and five hundred Huguenots 
leave, that is to say about one half of its Protestant community. The southern provinces 
(Languedoc, Dauphine) had fewer than eighteen thousand departures. Destinations, called 
countries of refuge, varied. England and Holland welcomed the highest number of refugees 
with over fifty thousand each, that is half of the total. Switzerland was regarded as a 
7Van Ruymbeke, Benrand. "The Huguenots and the Early Colonization of South Carolina. The Emigration ofa Persecuted Minority," 
(pan II) Transactions, 1990, pp. 30-42. 
8Golden, R M. (ed.). The Huguenot Connection: The Edict of Nantes, ils Revocation and Early French Migration to SoUlh Carolina, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1988: introduction p. 18. 
24 
on 1 
to 
of 
cou 
to 1 j 
exp1 
oth 
at~ 
to 
SUSf 
Hu, 
IV. 
200 
p. 141 
IC 
ll 
du~ 
the 
)ns 
:ity 
>en 
1en 
tin 
illly 
lOSt 
1ew 
few 
us 
1an 
for 
mis 
mts 
cts. 
hat 
ban 
[ost 
ved 
the 
I to 
rhe 
1tial 
ook 
ten. 
1out 
ion. 
>n--
tant 
less 
ban 
1ots 
ices 
lied 
:ees 
LS a 
>rity," 
olina, 
Bertrand van Ruymbeke 
stopover on the way to Protestant countries farther away such as Holland, Brandenburg, 
Denmark, and even Russia. 
Getting out of France not only demanded courage and money but also shrewdness 
on the part of the refugees. The borders were closely watched and people were encouraged 
to give away Huguenots on the run. Ways of escape varied greatly according to the means 
of the Protestants and where they lived. The wealthiest would generously bribe guards 
stationed on the borders. Fees ranged from one thousand to six thousand livres, enormous 
sums of money when we consider that a wet-nurse, for example, earned only twenty-four 
/ivres a year. Refugees also used tricks to elude the guards. Some dressed up as local 
peasants and with a few oxen peacefully crosse_d the border to a field on the other side. 
Some women dressed as male servants or pretended to be the guides' wives. To outwit this 
last trick guards had the alleged couple lie naked in bed before authorizing them to cross 
the border.9 
Those who lived in a port on the Atlantic coast generally were helped by foreign 
merchants--English or Dutch--who hid them in their ships, especially equipped with secret 
compartments, in return for a sum of money. James Fontaine tells us that he paid an 
English merchant a hundred livres per person to be taken to England.10 But foreign ships 
could not land on the French coast to embark refugees, so Huguenots had to pay a smuggler 
to take them to a ship waiting on the high seas. This of course represented an extra 
expenditure and the risk to be caught. A refugee tells us how he was hidden with eleven 
other persons in the hold of an English ship of twenty-five tons, whose access was through 
a trap door placed under a sailor's bunk. Coast guards searched the boat and his son began 
to vomit as a they were walking right above them. Fortunately they did not hear anything 
suspect.11 This sort of anecdote shows us the calm that such a flight required. 1 As for the 
Huguenots who fled across land, mainly those from the southern or eastern provinces, they 
were helped by guides. Marked routes to borders with lists of inns, taverns, and private 
homes where they could hide were secretly circulated. A guide could earn over a thousand 
livres per trip but punishments were extremely severe. Until 1687 a guide caught helping 
Huguenots was sentenced to the galley, subsequently to death. Some Huguenots regarded 
England or Holland only as a stopover on their trips. With no hope of ever returning to 
France, they were ready to try their luck in the Dutch colony of South Africa or in British 
North America. 
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA: A SEMI-TROPICAL HUGUENOT PARADISE? 
Out of some fifty thousand Huguenots who emigrated to England, between 1500 and 
2000 chose to cross the Atlantic and settle in one of the British North American colonies. 
9Carr, John L. Life in France under Louis XIV, European Life Series, P. Quennell (ed.) Capricorn Books, New York, 1970 (1st ed 1966); 
p. 142. 
1
°Fontaine, James. Memoirs of a Huguenot Family, Ann Maury (tr.), The Knickerbocker Press, New York, 1900, p. 114. 
11Jourdan L. (4d.) "Les Emigres de La Rochelle. Relation de la fuite de Baudouin de la Bruchardiere", Bulletin de la Societe d' Histoire 
du Protestantisme Fram;ais, Tome 18 (1869), p. 427. 
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A large majority of them--probably two-thirds--reached South Carolina either directly from 
England or by way of another colony. It is not always clear whether those refugees had 
South Carolina on their mind as a final destination in leaving their hometown in France or 
made up their minds only later in England. Judith Giton, who fled France in 1685 and 
married Peter Manigault in 1699, tells in her diary that her brother had "nothing but 
Carolina in his thoughts".12 Others may have stopped at the Carolina Coffee House in 
London and made the decision there. Nonetheless there is no doubt that South Carolina 
exerted a strong appeal to the Huguenots, several factors accounting for it. For one, when 
the Huguenots began to be severely persecuted and when the Edict of Nantes was revoked, 
South Carolina was entering its most active period of colonization. Indeed, after 1680 the 
Lords Proprietors invested more funds and adopted a more effective colonial policy. 
Settlers were in great demand, economic opportunities were real and land--the dream of all 
Europeans--was plentiful. Secondly the Lords Proprietors were extremely tolerant in 
religious matters and promised future settlers freedom of worship. Moreover, South 
Carolina was not unknown to the Huguenots who had read Ribaut's or Laudonniere's 
accounts. The name itself evoked Fort Caroline or Charlesfort where French Protestants 
had died in martyrdom. Finally, emigration increased as the Huguenots left for South 
Carolina, knowing that there was a large number of their countrymen already settled in that 
colony and hoping that it would make things easier for them. 
Soon the Huguenots became the target of an active advertising campaign launched 
by the Lords Proprietors. In their eyes the French Protestants were extremely valuable 
settlers. They were reputedly hard working, inexperienced in democratic rule (therefore 
easier to govern), fairly well educated and somewhat indebted to England for saving their 
lives. The Huguenots were also coveted for their expertise in wine, olive, and silk cultures. 
Salt industry disappeared from official texts, but probably remained in the minds of many. 
Those were commodities that England lacked and was forced to import from France, its 
economic rival. The possibility of making South Carolina a center of production for all of 
them appealed greatly to the English crown. From 1679 to 1685 five promotional 
pamphlets, written in French, were published in London and The Hague.13 Three of them 
came out in 1686, in the year following the Revocation. Those pamphlets, whose size varied 
from two to more than twenty pages, described South Carolina in glowing terms. According 
to them the province enjoyed an ideal climate, a fertile soil, a luxurious vegetation, and 
some sort of democratic rule. Of course those documents did not mention the Spanish 
andlndian threats, the extremely hot summers, or the lethal epidemics that plagued the area. 
Of course, the latter may not have deterred the Huguenots of the Atlantic provinces, used 
to living among mosquito-infested marshes and therefore familiar with malaria. 
Undoubtedly the Lords Proprietors were successful, since South Carolina attracted 
the highest number of Huguenots. A reasonable estimate ranges from eight hundred to a 
little more than a thousand for the period 1680-1710. At a time when South Carolina's 
12simons, Slann L C. "Early Manigault Records" in Transactions No. 29 (1954), pp. 24-27. 
13Kane, Hope F. "Colonial Promotion and Promotional Literature of Carolina 1660-1700," Unpublished Dissertation, Brown University, 
1930. 
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population was extremely low, this constitutes an important inflow of emigrants. Baldwin's 
list of early settlers informs us about the French provinces from which most of the 
Huguenots came.14 The figures indicate that 23% came from Aunis, 17% from Poitou and 
Normandy each, 5% from Languedoc, and only 3% from Dauphine. The Atlantic provinces 
were overwhelmingly represented, which is not surprising since they had easy access to 
England; the inhabitants of the southern provinces, being far from the Atlantic coast, were 
more prone to flee to Switzerland. Among those who left the province of Aunis, 52% lived 
in La Rochelle and 42% were from the island of Re. Jhis concentration proves that the 
Huguenot families were connected back in France or at least knew each other. Another 
interesting statistic shows that 34% of the Huguenots came from Atlantic ports, the majority 
of them being from La Rochelle and Dieppe. Dieppe was the hometown of Jean Ribaut, 
the explorer who founded Charlesfort in the harbor of Port Royal. Undoubtedly his 
adventures were remembered in the Protestant population of this city. The very fact that 
most Huguenot settlers left coastal areas leads us to think that a high number of them were 
merchants involved in some maritime trade or sailors, and only a few worked in agriculture. 
This thought is corroborated by the fact that Protestantism--except for a few areas--did not 
penetrate the French peasantry significantly. 
If we add the number of Huguenots who originated from Aunis (23% ), Saintonge 
(10%), and Poitou (17%) we obtain 50%. Those bordering provinces can be regarded as 
a regional unit in terms of population and economy. In other words, following the approach 
that David H. Fischer chose to use in his book Albion's Seed, they played the same role as 
East Anglia for the Puritans. They all gravitated around the city of La Rochelle, which 
constituted a dynamic center. All these provinces had large numbers of Huguenot 
communities and for all the salt industry was an important aspect of their economy. The 
coastal sections of those three provinces are very similar, consisting of vast expanses of 
lowland with numerous marshes and thoroughly watered by a great number of rivers. A sort 
of South Carolina Low Country without the palmetto trees, the alligators (fortunately!) and 
the stifling heat. This indicates that for half the Huguenots who settled in South Carolina 
the scenery they encountered somewhat reminded them of their home, a psychological factor 
that must not be underestimated. 
CONCLUSION 
The emigration of the Huguenots to South Carolina is a fascinating illustration of the 
American dream. Like a dolphin who regularly dives and surfaces, it swims across the 
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In 1562 Ribaut and his men founded 
Charlesfort, in 1629 Sance attempted to send salters to Carolana, and in 1680 the first 
organized group of Huguenot settlers arrived in Charleston. These were different people 
and different eras, but the idea of founding a Huguenot refuge in that part of North 
America was a constant objective. This characteristic adds a dreamlike, almost legendary, 
14Baldwin, Agnes L. First Seulers of South Carolina 1670-1700, Southern Historical Press, Inc., Easley S.C., 1985. 
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dimension to this emigration and makes its study interesting. Interesting yet frustrating, 
because how will the historian ever be able to define this dimension? Figures and statistics 
cannot reveal what Daniel Huger or Gabriel Manigault had on their minds when they left 
England bound for South Carolina. How did they picture the colony? What did they expect 
to find? How little or how much did they know about this transatlantic Low Country? At 
least we know where they came from and how well most of them did in their new homeland. 
How can we forget that in November 1777 Henry Laurens succeeded John Hancock as 
President of the Continental Congress and in this way entered the pantheon of American 
revolutionary heroes? His ancestors had escaped persecution in order to live free, and he 
fought in the name of that freedom. Jean Ribaut did the same. 
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SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS: 1988 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
John V. Crangle 
Benedict College 
One of the many areas in the field of South Carolina political history which has 
received little attention by historians and political scientists is the history of the financing 
of campaigns for public office at the state and local levels. South Carolina has required the 
filing of campaign finance disclosure documents since 1976, but they have attracted little 
attention except for occasional use by journalists focusing on the campaign of a particular 
candidate. As a consequence little research is available on the subject.1 
In 1988 the state governing board of Common Cause/South Carolina authorized me 
to undertake a comprehensive study of both the primary and general elections for the South 
Carolina General Assembly held in 1988.2 The purpose of this study was very practical: 
the organization wanted the information in order to provide a factual and analytical basis 
for reviewing the state's campaign finance system which Common Cause suspected on the 
basis of fragmentary evidence of irregularities, inequities, and abuses, including excessive 
reliance on PAC and corporate contributions and the inability of non-incumbents to raise 
competitive amounts.3 
If the study revealed the anticipated findings, then substantial evidence would be 
available for use as the basis for arguing that the South Carolina system of campaign 
financing needed to be reformed. The motivation for undertaking the research was 
somewhat different from that behind much of ordinary historical research. 
1The South Carolina Ethics Act requires candidates for state and local office to file campaign finance disclosure forms within thirty 
days of primary and elections. 
2Minutes of Common Cause/South Carolina board meeting, October 1988. 
3Personal knowledge of author as Executive Director of Common Cause/South Carolina. 
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Unfortunately the information on which this research was based was deficient in 
several significant ways. In the first place, some of the financial disclosure forms filed by 
the legislative candidates were filed late, that is more than thirty days after the November 
6, 1988 date of the election. Secondly, many of the disclosure forms were improperly 
completed, lacking essential factual information. Thirdly, many forms were confusing in that 
the information provided by candidates was ambiguous, unreadable, misidentified, and 
improperly categorized. Even worse, the forms used lacked specificity and did not require 
sufficiently precise identification of the sources of campaign contributions. Finally, the 
forms were not reviewed or audited by the Senate and House ethics committee offices to 
assure compliance or accuracy. As consequence the researcher was compelled to work with 
intolerably soft data.4 
In spite of serious problems with the data base, the research disclosed a number of 
facts about campaign finance in the 1988 General Assembly elections which provided 
Common Cause with important and useful data sufficient to suggest generalizations and 
support a limited analysis. Even though the findings could not meet very exacting standards 
they were useful in meeting the objectives of the study. 
The research showed that campaign finance in legislative elections is greatly affected 
by many candidates who raise and spend little money since they have no general election 
opposition. In 1988 twenty-two incumbents in the Senate had no opposition, nearly half the 
forty-six Senators up for reelection. Furthermore, three non-incumbents had no opposition. 
Primary elections, too, are often uncontested and only four incumbent senators lost their 
primaries. Three incumbents did not run.5 
Of the fifty-nine who filed disclosure forms by the December 8, 1988 deadline, Senate 
candidates indicated that in both primary and general election campaigns incumbents raised 
much more money than non-incumbents, especially from business and political action 
committee sources.6. 
Business contributions to the nine incumbent Senate Democratic primary winners 
averaged $3,906, while nineteen non-incumbent Democratic losers averaged only $215. 
Business contributions to the three losing incumbent Democrats averaged $7,950. In the 
general elections twenty-five incumbent winning Democrats averaged $5,090 from business, 
while the three losing non-incumbent Democratis received nothing from business. These 
and other data clearly show a pattern of business contributors giving much larger average 
contributions to incumbents than to non-incumbents for the Senate. Business contributions 
were 12% of primary and 13% of general election contributions received by Senate 
candidates.7 
4Campaign finance discl05ure forms on file with the Senate Ethics Committee (for all Senate candidates) and the House Ethics 
Committee (for all Senate candidates). 
5Preliminary Report on Campaign Finance of State Elections in South Carolina: 1988 elections for the General Assembly and 1986 
Elections for Governor and Lt. Governor. John V. Crangle and Gerald R Roys (Columbia, S.C.: Common Cause/South Carolina and 
Benedict College, 1989), p. S-2. 
6Ibid., p. S-2. 
7Ibid., p. S-3. 
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Business contributions in House races followed the same pattern in 1988 primary and 
general elections. Incumbents raised not only more business contributions on average than 
challengers, but averaged a larger percentage of their money from business sources than 
non-incumbents. For example, winning incumbent Democrats in the general election raised 
10% from businesses, while winning non-incumbents raised only 4% from businesses.8 
Political action contributions flowed in larger amounts to incumbents than non-
incumbents. P ACS poured $413,597 into primary and general Senate campaigns, with 
$291,289 to the latter. Nine winning incumbent Democrats averaged $6,012 from PACS in 
primaries while nineteen losing non-incumbents averaged $74 in the same contest. In the 
general elections, a similar pattern emerged with nine winning incumbent Republicans 
receiving $6,916 from PACS, while the twelve losing non-incumbent Republicans averaged 
only $104 from PACS. Figures for other classes of candidates evinced the same pattern of 
PACS favoring incumbents. PACS gave 14% of primary and 15% of general election Senate 
receipts.9 
House candidates received large PAC contributions in 1988. In the general election 
winning incumbent Democrats received 31 % of their contributions from P ACS, while similar 
Republicans received 37% from PACS. However, non-incumbents received much less from 
PACS: winning non-incumbent Democrats received 10% from PACS and similar 
Republicans took 17% from PACS.10 
PAC preference for incumbents was pronounced in both Senate and House races with 
incumbents generally receiving not only larger absolute amounts but also a larger percentage 
of their funds from P ACS. House primaries showed a remarkable 54% of winning 
incumbent Democrats' and 48% of similar Republican funds from P ACS. (Winning non-
incumbent Democrats got 11 % from PACS and similar Republicans got 33% from PACS.)11 
Political party contributions for legislative campaigns for obvious reasons are limited 
to general elections with rare exceptions. Parties are not a major source of such campaign 
contributions, donating only $24,322 to all state Senate candidates. The Republican party 
contributions to the nine winning Republican Senate incumbents averaged $500, while the 
Democratic party averaged only $163 to its twenty-six winning Senate candidates. The 
largest amount given was $1,450 to one winning non-incumbent Republican. (The twelve 
losing Republican non-incumbents averaged $832 in party funds, while the three losing non-
incumbent Democrats averaged $100.) In all, parties donated less than 1 % of total Senate 
receipts.12 
On the House side party money flowed more from Republican sources than 
Democrat: for example, incumbent Democrats received only 1 % from their party, while 
Republicans received 6% of their total contributions from the party.13 
a.Common Cause/South Carolina Report Bares 1988 House Campaign Funding,• Common Cause/South Carolina Vol, 89, No. 4 
(December 1989), p. 1. 
9Repon on Campaign Finance, pp. S-3 and s-4. 
10Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p. 1. 
11Ibid., p. 2. 
12Report on Campaign Finance, pp. s-4 and S-5. 
13Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p. 2. 
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Personal money is seldom a factor in South Carolina legislative races. Among Senate 
general election candidates nine winning incumbent Republicans used only $1,700 of 
personal money and all $1,700 was used by a single candidate. Twenty-five winning 
incumbent Democrats used a total of only $5,468 of personal funds. The only winning non-
incumbent Republican used no personal funds, while eight winning non-incumbent 
Democrats used a total of $3994 of personal money. u 
Loans were a very insignificant part of most campaign chests and few candidates of 
any type borrowed funds to pay campaign expenses. However, one Senate candidate (Rose) 
borrowed $33,000, while another borrowed $80,000 (Waddell). Although candidates seldom 
borrow, total Senate borrowing amounted to $125,037 (primaries) and $381.575 (general 
elections). House borrowing is the exception. Loans provided a total of 17% of Senate 
primary and 25% of Senate general election campaign funds. 15 
Contributions from private persons were the largest single source of legislative 
campaign money in 1988. In the Senate primaries 43% (389,833) came from private 
sources, while $40 ($756,886) of general election money came from private individuals.16 
On the House side, winning incumbent Democrats in the general elections raised 59% from 
individuals, while Republican winning incumbents raised $49 from individuals. Non-
incumbents raised even more from private persons: General election winning non-incumbent 
Democratic representatives raised 87%, while similar Republicans raised 64%.11 
Other sources of campaign resources included by Senate candidates totalled 12% of 
primary and 3% of general election funds. A major item in this catchall category was the 
estimated fair market value of in-kind services and goods donated to candidates.18 
The amounts related to the 1988 campaigns are noteworthy. House candidates raised 
$1,200,000 for their primaries and $1,000,000 for the general elections.19 Senate candidates 
raised $903,134 for primary and $1,896,465 for general elections.21) 
The ten incumbent Democrats with opposition spent $707,536 in the general election. 
The five opposed incumbent Republicans spent $245,145 in the general election. (James 
Waddell (D), Dist. 45 (Beaufort) spent $163,505 as of his December 7, 1988 filing. The 
biggest Republican spender was John Courson (R), Dist. 20 (Richland) $104,556.)21 
Unspent campaign funds were considerable. Nine Senate winning incumbent 
Republicans held average surpluses of $7,352, including $38,475 carried over by Courson. 
Twenty-six winning incumbent Democratic Senators carried over average surpluses of 
$15,778, including $81,486 carried over by Sen. Isadore Lourie.22 
1'Report on Campaign Finance, pp. S-5 and 5-6. 
15Ibid., pp. 5-6 and S-7. 
16Ibid., pp. S-7 and S.S. 
17Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), pp. 1-2. 
18Report on Campaign Finance, p. 510. 
19Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p.1. 
21lReport on Campaign Finance, p. S-11. 
21Ibid., p. S.S. 
22Ibid., p. S-9. 
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The findings of the study clearly showed significant problems in financing legislative 
campaigns in South Carolina, the most serious of which was that non-incumbents were 
seldom able to raise sufficient funds to make them competitive with incumbents. This was 
so not only because incumbents tended to draw more contributions from private 
contributors, but even more so because of the preference shown for incumbents by large 
business and PAC contributors who in many instances supplied the bulk of funds raised by 
incumbents, whereas non-incumbents, especially challengers, raised little, if any funds, from 
business and PAC sources. 
Political parties were not significant sources of campaign contributions in the 1988 
legislative races. Candidates put little of their own money into their campaigns, indicating 
that in fact the specter of the rich man using his personal fortune to buy legislative office 
is more theoretical than real. Loans financed a few campaigns, but most candidates avoided 
borrowing. 
The study attempted but was unable to determine the specific sources of campaign 
funds, because the identification of the P ACS, businesses, and individuals on disclosure 
forms by the 1988 legislative candidates was very frequently unclear and confusing. It 
appears that the same contributor is often identified by various names by different 
candidates. Obviously a more precise system of identifying contributors is needed. Even 
so there is substantial evidence that certain P ACS, businesses, and individuals are major 
sources of contributions for many candidates. 
Identification of candidates by committee membership, chairmanship, sex, age, race, 
location or type of district, years of legislative service, and the like was not attempted. Such 
research probably would indicate that membership on key committees, especially their 
chairmanships, and urban location correlate with larger contributions. The study did not 
examine the uses of campaign funds, including disposition after election expenses were paid. 
Such research is needed, especially since South Carolina permits conversion of campaign 
funds to personal use. The study did not attempt to compare the financing of the 1988 
legislative campaigns with the financing of similar previous campaigns as no research of any 
significance has been done on such previous campaigns. The study did not compare its 
findings with those of other states. 
Initial findings were presented at The Common Cause/South Carolina conference 
on campaign finance reform held in Columbia on January 28, 1989, providing useful 
information for discussion.23 The study was also published in the Common Cause/South 
Carolina newspaper in December 1989 which was circulated to Common Cause state 
members, Common Cause affiliates in other states, the members of the General Assembly, 
and the media. 24 
The Common Cause/South Carolina governing board used the study as a basis for 
arguing for campaign finance reform both before and after the FBI sting of July 1990. In 
an op-ed piece published by The State on January 21, 1990 Common Cause/South Carolina 
23Common Cause/South Carolina Conference on Campaign Finance Reform, Marriott Hotel, Columbia, S.C., January 28, 1989. 
24-rhe media arc staIVCd for useful research on campaign finance in South Carolina. Sc extensive coverage in Rock Hill Herald, Jan. 
27, 1990. Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), pp. 1-2. 
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pointed out the problems with the current system.25 Three days after the FBI sting was 
announced Common Cause/South Carolina called a news conference at the State House at 
which Professor Robert J. Moore, a member of the national governing board of Common 
Cause and a member of the executive committee of Common Cause/South Carolina, 
presented the Common Cause/South Carolina agenda for reform, including a limitation of 
campaign contributions, prohibition of cash contributions, prohibition of contributions by 
corporations, labor unions, and law firms, and a ban on the conversion of campaign funds 
to personal use. 26 · 
The study focused on a subject seldom examined by historians and had a practical 
purpose. It was financed by an organization which had a well established political position, 
favoring campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, the use of objective historical methodology 
in collecting, selecting, analyzing, and presenting the research materials produced a report 
which had both credibility and utility not only as a basis for decision-making by the 
sponsoring organization but also for the media, the public, and public officials. Historians 
can render a public service by undertaking research in neglected areas of history where 
factual information and objective analysis is needed as the basis for the formulation of 
public policy. 
'15The State, January 21, 1989, p. 3-D. 
~ State, July 29, 1990, p. See also coverage of the Common Cause/South Carolina proposals for campaign finance reform. Greenville 
News, July 25, 1990, p. SA. 
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REFORM AND REFORMERS IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Walter B. Edgar 
University of South Carolina 
For those who know the state's history, the phrase "~eform in South Carolina" might 
appear to be an oxymoron. Political and social reform have been far from the minds of 
most of the state's leaders for three centuries. Permitting the people to have any real voice 
in government has been something to be resisted at all costs. 
The times in which we find ourselves today give rise to the need to take a brief look 
at the history of reform in our state. After "Operation Lost Trust," the Highway Department 
scandal, continuing evidence of incompetence at the Department of Social Services, not to 
mention the problems at the University of South Carolina, there seems to be--for the first 
time in South Carolina history--a genuine groundswell for major political reform. 
The first attempts at political reform began in the 1780s as the Backcountry began 
to demand a more equitable role in state affairs. A few crumbs were tossed toward the 
Piedmont: the removal of the capital from Charleston to Columbia (1786) and the creation 
of the South Carolina College (1801). Neither of these really addressed the Backcountry's 
major grievance, the malapportionment of the General Assembly that gave the Low Country 
parishes firm control of state government. Two thirds of the state's white population resided 
in the Backcountry, but Backcountry voters elected only 60 of 124 representatives. St. 
Stephen's Parish with a white population of 226 elected three representatives; so did 
Edgefield with a population of 9,785 and Pendleton with a population of 8,731.1 
The wrangle over reapportionment lasted from 1790 until 1808 when the 
"Compromise" of 1808" resulted in apportioning half of the House of Representives 
according to population and half according to taxable wealth. The Backcountry got a fairer 
1[Harper, Robert Goodloe], To the People of South Carolina, by Appius (n. p., 1972), pp. 40-42. 
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share of house seats. In fact, after 1808 the upper part of the state had a majority in both 
the House and the Senate. 
This major political reform, followed two years later by universal white male suffrage, 
was not a triumph for democracy. Rather, it was a victory for the Low Country and its 
social/economic system based upon plantation slavery. The spread of cottun production into 
the Backcountry--and with it the expansion of slavery--not reform or idealism, made these 
changes in South Carolina government a reality.2 
Following the Compromise of 1808, reform did not rear its head again until 
Reconstruction. The Constitution of 1868 with its provisions for public education, equal 
opportunity for all South Carolinians, and the election of statewide officeholders by the 
voters all were significant reforms. 
Unfortunately, the way in which the Reconstruction reforms were implemented 
doomed most of them to a short life. The integrated University of South Carolina was 
closed in 1877 as soon as Wade Hampton moved into the governorship. Support for public 
education remained strong and until Tillman was elected, black South Carolinians received 
virtually equal funding for their schools.3 
The rise of Benjamin Ryan Tillman has been characterized by some historians as a 
"reform movement."4 Tillman also refered to his followers as reformers, but in reality his 
movement was more than simply a reformation of South Carolina society and politics. 
Personally, I prefer Tillman's self-image of himself as a revolutionary. In his inaugural 
address he boldly stated: "I ... the exponent and leader of the revolution which brought 
about the change, am here to take the solemn oath of office."5 Tillman was right, the 
historians were wrong. He was a revolutionary. 
Reform and Ben Tillman is also a contradiction in terms. What did Tillman do that 
"reformed" South Carolina? Little if anything. Several of Tillman's major accomplishments, 
the Dispensary and the Constitution of 1895, can scarcely be classified as reform measures. 
In particular, the creation of the former made a mockery of the very notion of reform. 
Tillman turned a voter-approved referendum calling for prohibition into one of the slimiest 
cesspools of political corruption this state has seen--until the 1990s and "Bubbagate."6 
The racial injustice and convoluted political system that emerged from the 
constitutional convention of 1895 hamstrung South Carolina for nearly another century. The 
Jim Crow society Tillman decreed has been dismantled, but one of the basic difficulties with 
state government today is the unwieldy state government that is embodied in Tillman's 
Constitution. Tillman's partisans called themselves reformers. They were not. 
2David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina (3 vols.; New York, 1934), 2:372. Herbert Ravenel Sass, The Story of the South 
Carolina Lowcountry (3 vols.; West Columbia, SC, n.d.), 1: 161-66. 
3George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes (Columbia, 1952), pp. 214-17. 
4Wallace, The History of South Carolina, 3:355, 562. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman , passim. 
5Francis Butler Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton Rouge, 1944), p. 170. 
6wallace, The History of South Carolina , 3:376, 391-92, 419-22. "Bubbagate• is a term used informally by staffers of The State newspaper 
to describe "Operation Lost Trust." Author's conversations with Gil Thelen, Executive Editor; Robert Hitt, Managing Editor; and Paula 
Ellis, Assistant Managing Editor, 12 September 1990, 18 October 1990. Gil Thelen to the author, 19 September 1990. 
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Richard I. Manning did not run on a platform of reform, but his two administrations 
(1915-1919) are easily the most reform-oriented in the state's history. Manning was a 
Conservative from Sumter District, but clearly a progressive in the Woodrow Wilson 
tradition. During his term of office he championed the reorganization and modernization 
of the State Hospital for the more humane treatment of its patients. He backed legislation 
reorganizing the corrections system, creating workman's compensation, establishing the 
South Carolina Highway Department, and authorizing a local option for compulsory school 
attendance. Upon his recommendation, the South Carolina Tax Commission was created. 
It equalized assessments and effectively enforced the state's income tax laws.7 Just one or 
two of these actions would have garnered the label "reformer" for any governor. Richard 
I. Manning, aristocrat though he was, reorganized, created, or reformed basic institutions 
of South Carolina government to provide better, more efficient services for the people of 
the state. 
Ironically, during his governorship a group of dissident Democrats, led by Coleman 
L. Blease, John G. Richards, and John P. Grace, formed a group they called "Reform 
Democrats." Like their Tillman forebears, this group cared little about reform. It simply 
was opposed to the faction of the party that was in control. Fortunately for the state, unlike 
Tillman these so-called "Reform Democrats" failed to attract a following. 8 
John G. Richards, one of the "Reform Democrats" later managed to get himself 
elected governor. An overly pious Presbyterian, he campaigned against the immorality of 
the Jazz Age. In his inaugural address he declared that his administration had only one 
purpose, "to place South Carolina upon a pedestal where she can be proclaimed by the 
world as a leader in rightousness.'"' Richards was able to stamp out gambling, but his heavy-
handed attempts to enforce the state's blue laws brought him and South Carolina only 
ridicule.10 After Richards, reform in any sense disappears from the South Carolina scene 
for a quarter of a century. 
James Byrnes considered himself a reformer, particularly of the state's schools. 
However, he was not elected as a reformer but as an individual who could best preserve the 
status quo. In urging passage of the three-cents sales tax to provide adequate funding for 
the state's schools, he counseled the General Assembly that it was the state's "duty to 
provide for the races substantial equality in school facilities .... "What the colored people 
want, and what they are entitled to, is equal facilities in their schools. We must see that 
they get them."11 
Social reform came to South Carolina during the 1960s and 1970s, but the 
dismantling of Jim Crow was not the result of any gubernatorial candidate's platform. 
7Wallace, The Hiszory of South Carolina, 3: 440, 456-57. Robert Milton Burts, Richard I. Manning and the Progressive Movement in South 
Carolina (Columbia, 1974), pp. 83-113, lS0.203. 
8Burts, Richard I. Manning and the Progressive Mo1 ·ement in South Carolina, pp. 169-79. 
9Mary Katherine Davis Cann, "lbe Morning After: South Carolina in the Jazz Age• (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
South Carolina, 1984), p. 365. 
10Cann, pp. 366-68. S.R. Anderson, "Governor John G. Richards and the Blue Laws" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of South 
Carolina, 1983), pp. 32-58. 
11 James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), pp. 407-08. 
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Sometimes changes were forced from without, but under a succession of "New South" 
governors from Hollings through Riley significant social changes occurred. Similarly, 
educational reform during the same period came about without any governor ( except for 
Riley) running on a platform espousing school reform. Nevertheless, there were several key 
pieces of legislation that laid the groundwork for Richard Riley and the Education 
Improvement Act of 1984. Robert E. McNair, using the Moody Report that he had 
commissioned, convinced the General Assembly to pass a penny sales tax to fund a 
statewide kindergarten program.12 
The inequity facing students in poorer school districts led James B. Edwards to creatr 
a task force to study the problem. It recommended legislation that eventually was passed 
as the Education Finance Act of 1977. The State Department of Education's "Defined 
Minimum Program" could be offered in all school districts as the state provides 
proportionally more funds to poorer districts.13 Statewide kindergartens, the Education 
Finance Act and two other pieces of legislation--the Basic Skills Assessment Act and the 
Educator Improvement Act--were necessary predecessors for the BIA. 
Improving education was the most significant plank in Richard Riley's platform in 
1982. His reelection was clearly a mandate for reform; however, his first attempts to get an 
education act through the General Assembly in 1983 failed. Only after he convinced key 
business leaders and went over the heads of the General Assembly to the people was he 
able to see his dream become a reality.14 
Today we face a situation that earlier generations have not: the opportunity to 
significantly change South Carolina's antiquated system of government. Last fall Blease 
Graham and I wrote a series of op-ed pieces for The State.15 Several things are unusual 
about that. Not that we had not thought before about South Carolina's inefficient, 
ineffective government, but that two academics could write essays taking on the legislative 
state and live to tell the story. I do not believe that we could have written such strongly 
worded essays ten or even five years ago. Even if we had, The State surely would not have 
printed them. And I know that we would not have gotten the reaction--most of it positive--
that we have. 
The essays were reprinted in weekly newspapers· and from all across South Carolina, 
Blease, The State newspaper, and I received letters urging us on and, more importantly, 
asking what could be done.16 A former state president of the League of Women Voters 
wrote: "The succinct article by you and Blease Graham should convince South Carolinians 
that there is need for a new constitution."11 The widow of a former editor of The Greenville 
12Moody Investors Services, Inc., Opportunity and Growth in South Carolina, 1968-1985 (New York, 1968), pp. 49, 53. 
13walter B. Edgar, "Pennies for Education• in "Changes and Challenges," centennialsupplement to the the Suue (Columbia), 10 March 
1991. 
14Interview with Russell McKinney. March 1990. 
'5walter B. Edgar and Cole Blease Graham, "Crisis of Confidence," a series of o~d essays, The S:ate, 26 August 1990, p. D-2; 29 
August 1990, p. A-14; 31 August 1990, p. A-18. 
J6Among the weekly newspapers that carried the essays was The Marlboro Herald Advocate, 13 September 1990, p. 84 and 4 October l990, 
p. B-14. 
17Mary L Bryan to the author, 27 August 1990. 
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News telephoned with the message "NOW is the time to act."11 A Low Country man wrote: 
"I think this undertaking will need all the help it can get and although I have no influence 
in the affairs of state, I would like to help in some way."19 "Great. You have called the 
shots as they are withoug pulling any punches," commented a native Columbian. "Most of 
us in South Carolina get so used to bad government that we no longer recognize it as being 
bad."20 
There was also interest in state government for reform. During the last weeks of his 
campaign, Republican Governor Campbell began to talk about restructuring state 
government. So did the Democrat lieutenant governor; so did the Democrat Attorney 
General and the successful Republican candidates for Secretary of State and the State 
Superintendent of Education. "Making government more accountable" was the theme of 
their campaigns. Reform was not a partisan issue; it was neither Republican nor Democrat. 
It was just plain old South Carolina common sense. And it was a theme to which the voters 
responded with enthusiasm. 
The term mandate is often misused. It is inappropriate with regard to the 1990 
election; no candidate asked for a mandate. However, virtually every successful candidate 
for statewide office ran on a campaign of making government more efficient, more effective, 
and more accountable. That might not be a mandate, but the 1990 election results certainly 
indicate that there was a groundswell for reform in South Carolina. 
If we want to help make history and well as just record it, we need to do all in our 
power to see that the last vestiges of Tillmanism--the convoluted system of government that 
grew out of his Constitution of 1895--become footnotes, not remain the fundamental law of 
South Carolina. 
18Notes of a telephone conversation between Nancy Vance Ashmore Cooper of Southern Studies and Tini Freeman, 31 August 1990. 
19J. McNary Spigner to the author, 13 September 1990. 
'1/JA Mason Gibbes to the author, 27 August 1990. 
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STATE GOVERNMENT 
REORGANIZATION IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Cole Blease Graham, Jr. 
University of South Carolina 
Although the governor is the chief executive of the American state, this office in the 
Southern states· traditionally has been weak, both institutionally and politically. Limited 
formal powers have typically restricted the southern governor to little or no direct role over 
state administration.1 South Carolina is often identified by scholars and observers as the 
most extreme example of a weak Southern governor.2 Simultaneously, South Carolina has 
been almost exclusively a legislatively dominated state. 
An overview of features and background of the weak formal executive in South 
Carolina is the underlying focus for this discussion of the state's administrative structure. 
This essay surveys future reorganization of state agencies from the 20th-century reform 
perspective of more unified executive control. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEMES OF LEGISLATIVE DOMINANCE 
The legislature in South Carolina has traditionally captured most of the executive 
functions. In many stages of the state's history, the governor's office has been more 
symbolic and honorific than functional. For example, political scientist V. 0. Key noted 
that: 
1Robert B. Highsaw, "'The Southern Governor-Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme," Public Administration Review 19 (1959),pp.7· 
11. 
2see discussion by Thad L. Beyle, "Governors," in Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, Politics in the American Stales 
4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), pp. 180-221 and pp. 454-459. ' 
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South Carolina's chief executive has limited power. 
He controls the. state constabulary. He has power of 
appointment to state office except many of the really 
important state agencies. He can grant pardons, send 
messages to the legislature and exercise the power of 
veto.3 
Journalist W. D. Workman observed in 1947 that the South Carolina legislature cleverly 
restricted the governor from doing anything significant by authorizing the office only trivial 
powers and duties: 
Full power and authority is given to the governor to 
make by proclamation such regulations as, in his opinion, 
may be necessary to prevent the entrance of Asiatic cholera 
into this state, and the spreading thereof in this state! 
Another example of general formal weakness is the fact that the governor shares the 
power to appoint members to administrative boards and commissions with the legislature 
and has sole authority for appointment in relatively few cases. Appointments to most major 
boards and commissions in the state are by joint legislative assembly or require legislative 
approval of a governor's recommendations.5 In addition the state constitution requires 
popular election to four-year terms for three department heads ( agriculture, education, and 
the adjutant general). Other members of the executive branch who may be appointed in 
states with an institutionally strong chief executive also are elected in South Carolina. They 
are the Comptroller General, Treasurer, Attorney General, and Secretary of State. 
Additional weakness in formal executive powers stems from an arrangement through 
which the governor shares budget-making power as one member of a five-member board, 
the State Budget and Control Board.6 This Board also has extensive staff and supervises 
other agency-wide, centralized executive functions, such as planning and personnel 
administration. In yet another example, the governor has little statutory power to change 
the organization of state government or to create or abolish offices or assign and reassign 
duties of administrators. The legislature plays the major role in state government 
3V. 0 . Key, Jr. "South Carolina: The Politics of Color," in Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, Knopf, 1949), p. 150. To 
update Key's observations, the reader should note that a State Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services was created in 1941 and 
today operates under provisions in the State Constitution as well as state statutes. 
4 W. D. Workman, Jr., as quoted in V. 0 . Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 151. 
5See Harold B. Birch, "South Carolina State Government Administrative Organization: The Orthodox Theory of Administration 
Reexamined," in L. F. Carter and D. S. Mann, Government in the Palmetto State (Columbia, South Carolina: Bureau of Governmental 
Research and Service, 1983), pp. 115-135 . 
6 Today's State Budget and Control Board was created by the General Assembly through Reorganization Plan No. 2 in 1950. The new 
Board replaced the older, three-member State Budget Commission by adding two more "executive" seats (the State Treasurer and the 
Comptroller General) to the original members (the Governor, the Chair of House Ways and Means, and the Chair of Senate Finance). 
The Board is thus a "hybrid" executive with three separately elected executive members and two legislative members. 
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reorganization and legislative members dominate deliberations of the state's reorganization 
commission. 
These evaluations of the institutional powers of South Carolina's chief executive do 
not describe a new phenomenon. Throughout the political history of the state, the governor 
has been lacking in formal power. For example, according to the Constitution of 1790 the 
governor had no veto power and was elected by the legislature for a two-year term. This 
practice of legislative selection of the chief executive to a brief term continued until 1860. 
James Banner described the pre-Civil War status of South Carolina's governor as: 
... a creature of the legislature; and no matter 
his personal authority, once in office he was an 
impotent figure, lacking the powers of veto and 
appointment, ineligible to succeed himself after a 
short two year term and empowered primarily to command 
the militia and call special sessions. An aggressive 
gubernatorial aspirant might court legislative backing 
and, if elected, might seek to advance legislation or 
promote appointments; but without power or tenure, he 
could never be fully independent of the planter-dominated 
legislative majority which chose him, nor could he success-
fully set about creating a 'governor's party' much less a 
stable political organization.7 
An institutionally weak governor and heavy reliance on state and local boards and 
commissions in South Carolina are rooted in the colonial background, were well-established 
by the time of post-Reconstruction governments, and continue to the present time.8 
The tradition of legislative dominance in South Carolina has resulted in a politically 
weak chief executive and a generally fragmented state government structure. These 
conditions have tended to encourage legislative initiation of a new agency and legislative 
arrangements for its governance by a board or commission. Seldom does the legislature 
delegate any new responsibility to the office of the governor for the administrative control 
of an existing board or commission or a newly created one. A splintered administrative 
structure is the result. 
ADMINISTERING TODAY'S STATE GOVERNMENT 
In contemporary times new state agency boards are created and old ones have been 
renewed and redefined by the legislature in response to new program challenges or 
7 James M. Banner, Jr., "The Problem of South Carolina," in The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick ( eds.) 
(New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 76. 
8Ralph Eisenberg, "The Logroll, South Carolina Style," in Richard T . Frost (ed.), Cases in State and Local Government (Englewood 
Qiffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961). 
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Cole Blease Graham, Jr. 
opportunites. More than half of South Carolina's existing statewide boards and commissions 
have been created or significantly revised since 1960.9 The continuing proliferation of these 
boards gives the agency-governing structures wide variety in size, number, and composition. 
As a result there are over two hundred separate boards and commissions supervising diverse 
and fragmented departments and agencies in South Carolina today. 
Organizationally the state's bureaucratic agencies are typically insulated from 
executive leadership regardless of size or importance. Three agencies account for over half 
of the comprehensively budgeted expenditures of the state: the education, social services, 
and highway departments, but each is organized and administered differently. The highway 
department uses only earmarked funds and the social services department is primarily 
dependent on federal funds approved by a state health and human services finance 
commission. 
Yet there are other agencies that perform significant functions, even though they are 
very small and may have little, if any, state appropriations. Getting a licence to practice a 
profession from one of these small agencies may be just as important to physician and 
patient as the work of one of the largest agencies. 
Observers have frequently attempted to picture the array of state agencies through 
an organization chart.10 Even the "successful" attempts are confusing to many citizens 
because of the wide variety of agencies that provide services and that regulate the activities 
of private businesses. 
STATE REORGANIZATION EFFORTS 
The efforts to reform and streamline the administrative structure of the state have been 
extensive, but none of them achieved the reorganization ideals of Professor J. Karl Coleman, 
a longtime professor of history and government at The Citadel, of University of South 
Carolina Law School Dean Robert Figg, or of many other reformers. Several major studies 
(Griffenhagen Report, 1920; the Coleman Report, 193511 ; and the Preparedness for Peace 
Commission, 1945) advocated the classical or reform approach to state organization. These 
reports generally reflected the "good government" movement in America and recommended 
an integrated structure of state agencies in which there would be one chief and centralized 
authority--the governor .12 
9South Carolina Legislative Manual (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina General Assembly, 1982), pp. 294-403. 
1
'The official organization chart for state government is issued by the State Reorganization Commission. 
11J. Karl Coleman, Stale Administration in South Carolina (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935). 
11The "Good Government" movement is generally connected to reforms advocated by the Progressive Party in the United States. This 
new model added the notions of control and efficiency. The principal responsibility of public administrators was to implement policy 
directives sent from political decision makers. The focus of responsibility was a centralized, fairly elected chief executive. 
"Good Government• advocates espoused principles by which 'corrupt• governments should be reorganized. According to A. E. 
Buck, The Reorganization of Stale Governments in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 14-28, these principles 
are: 
1. Responsibility should be concentrated in the governor for the direction of administrative affairs. To accomplish this, the ballot 
should be shortened as most other previously elective executives became the governor's appointees and administrative functions were 
consolidated into a small number of departments, each guided by a single officer appointed and removable by the governor. 
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It would take almost a legislative revolution in South Carolina to implement these 
classical proposals or their contemporary variations. Many boards and commissions would 
have to be abolished or their functions reduced to advisory status. The Budget and Control 
Board would have to be redesignated as the staff arm of the executive under the direction 
of the governor. 
To focus the appointment of administrators with organized responsibilities in specific 
functional areas, the numerous and scattered state agencies would have to be reconcentrated 
and reorganized into executive, cabinet-type agencies. No doubt overlaps and duplications, 
especially in management levels, would set many state employees against each other in a 
battle for survival in the new, streamlined structures. 
Administrative reorganization in South Carolina is a reformer's dream and a 
bureaucrat's nightmare. But, still today, the legislature has control of state administrative 
organization, much like South Carolina's Commons House controlled the pace and extent 
of colonial reforms two centuries ago. 
A state reorganization commission has existed since 1949 to broker the legislature's 
interest in administrative changes. Usually the commission has functioned meaningfully only 
for brief periods. But when it has come to life it has usually made some significant 
recommendations. For example, the State Reorganization Commission made the basic 
proposals for the establishment of the Budget and Control Board in 1950, recommended the 
merger of the health and pollution agencies in the early 1970s, and called for the 
consolidation of alcohol and drug abuse programs for more efficient administration. More 
recently it has made extensive studies of state government structures and operations, 
including a county-based demonstration of state agency service coordination.13 The major 
elements of these recommendations and the results of these studies on specific bureaucratic 
programs are highly varied. Yet there are the common themes in South Carolina 
reorganization efforts of increased emphasis on state agency economy and cooperation and 
of reduced agency jealousies and inflexibilities. 
2. Previously existing offices, boards, commissions, and other agencies of administration should be consolidated and their 
activities integrated into a few departments, each of which should be organized on the basis of the major function performed. 
3. Due to division of authority and persistent absence of initiative and responsibility, boards are impractical for purely 
administrative work. They should be replaced by single executives. Boards ought to be used only for advisory, quasi-legislative, and quasi-
judicial functions. 
4. Staff services-principally budgeting, accounting and reporting, purchasing, and personnel-should be brought together in a 
single staff department. Personnel should be administered on the basis of the merit system. Legal advice should be available from an 
attorney general not elected but appointed by the governor. 
S. The legislature should have an officer-an auditor independent of the executive-to serve as its checking and investigating 
agency to look into the financial operations of executive agencies. 
6. The cabinet concept should be employed by the governor in the same manner as in the national government. 
13Human Services in South Carolina: A Report on the York County Demonstration Project (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina 
State Reorganization Commission, 1982). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In a democratic society today an executive branch is organized with two main 
objectives: (1) to be responsible politically and (2) to provide for the most efficient and 
effective administration of the government. Neither of these objectives is easily attainable 
if the executive branch is made up of a haphazard collection of unplanned, spread-out, 
uncontrolled, and uncoordinated boards, commissions, agencies, departments, divisions, and 
authorities. 
According to the early 20th-century reform approach, the sprawling, costly state 
government may be reorganized so that it can function with relative unity. This will allow 
administrators to emphasize speedy, fair, and courteous service of deserving citizens at the 
most satisfactory levels of economy and efficiency. The way to get more unified 
performance is to establish a clear organization for administration with the popularly elected 
chief executive at its head. It is the governor upon whom the attention of the people can 
focus and from whom administrative leadership flows. By making the governor responsible 
for administration and by giving the office the formal authority necessary to meet 
comprehensive responsibilities, enhanced political accountability and improved 
administrative effectiveness in state government have a chance of being accomplished. 
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THE EMINENT LIEUTENANT MCKAINE 
Miles S. Richards 
University of South Carolina 
At the turn of the twentieth century white supremacy was all-powerful in South 
Carolina. The rigid system of racial segregation known as "Jim Crow" had been 
implemented in the 1890s. Accordingly, most gifted young black South Carolinians born in 
this era sought betterment elsewhere. These emigres included such notable figures as Kelly 
Miller, Benjamin E. Mays, William Pickens, and Mary McLeod Bethune. Another "exile" 
who departed in 1908 was Osceola Enoch McKaine of Sumter; however, unlike most of his 
peers he eventually returned to South Carolina and became a noted civil rights activist.1 
Osceola E. McKaine was born on December 17, 1892, the eldest son of Selena 
McKaine [later Abraham], a self-employed laundress. He graduated in 1907 from Lincoln 
High School in Sumter, although he later stated that his course of study there was only the 
equivalent of a grammar school education. But he supplemented that early schooling with 
extensive personal reading. 
In 1908 McKaine left his home to sojourn around North Carolina. According to his 
close friend Modjeska M. Simkins, McKaine gained employment out of Savannah, Georgia 
on a merchant freighter that ranged the waters of Latin America; "He used to claim always 
that it was his first chance to get out of the jungle." The ship made its final docking in 
Boston, Massachusetts where McKaine opted to remain. After graduating from Sumner 
High School (all black), McKaine attended Boston College for several terms.2 
In the late summer of 1914, after conversing with some black troopers in Boston, 
Osceola E. McKaine decided to enlist in the army. To his great satisfaction he was assigned 
to the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Philippines. A year later, the regiment was recalled 
to North America where it was quartered in Columbus, near the Mexican border. McKaine 
and his regiment in 1916 were part of the American expeditionary force, commanded by 
General John J. Pershing, that crossed into Mexico to capture the Mexican revolutionary 
and sometime bandit Francisco "Pancho" Villa. 
1George B. Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-()() (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), p. 306. 
20ral interview conducted with Mrs. Modjeska M. Simkins of Columbia, S.C. on February 12, 1989. 
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In February 1917 McKaine, recently promoted to second lieutenant, was transferred 
to the newly formed 367th Regiment, stationed at Camp Upton on Long Island, New York. 
This outfit came to be known as the "Buffalo Regiment," a title with roots in American 
military lore. It was derived from the fact that in the frontier wars of the 1870s the 
Cheyenne Indians had applied the term "Buffalo soldier" to African-American cavalrymen. 
The troops of the Buffalo Regiment were quite proud of the title. As McKaine stated in 
1918: 'The 367th Regiment is the only regiment in the National Army with a name, 
regimental swagger sticks, and a regimental song."3 
During World War I he served with distinction in France. For battlefield bravery 
during the final Allied assault on the fortress of Metz, McKaine received a field promotion 
to first-lieutenant. To his relatives "Ossie" was very much of a legend, because accounts of 
his exploits abroad were proudly alluded to by his mother. But most members of the family 
did not know Osceola E. McKaine until his return home in December 1940. Interestingly, 
in later years he tended to avoid discussing this early period of his life.4 
Following his discharge in November 1919, McKaine chose to reside in the Harlem 
section of New York City, where he became friendly with various noted figures of the 
"Harlem Renaissance," including Alan Locke and James Weldon Johnson. He also 
associated with many of the entertainers who worked at the chic Harlem nightspots. 
In 1920 he began to edit the New York Commoner, a short-lived newspaper which 
began circulating in Harlem in the spring of 1920. The journal was of sufficient quality to 
gain the favorable notice of W. E. B. Dubois in The Crisis, the national organ of the 
NAACP. For a variety of reasons, though, this newspaper never became a financial success; 
consequently the paper went out of business in early 1923. Unfortunately, no extant copies 
of the Commoner seem to remain even in New York City. 
Although McKaine found much personal uplift residing in Harlem, the paramount 
racism in North America was wearisome. As Ansley Abraham recalls: "Ossie was always 
a proud, non-conforming person and he just got tired trying to buck Jim Crowism all the 
time--so he looked to Europe." Certainly he recalled the comparative racial tolerance 
displayed by Europeans toward African-Americans. Language was no bar to McKaine's 
settling in Europe. By the 1930s he was fluent in four European tongues and could speak 
adequately in at least seven others. A failed marriage further convinced him to return to 
Europe in 1924.5 
After traveling across the continent for some months, McKaine decided to live in 
Ghent, Belgium. Initially he worked as a doorman at a nightclub, "Le Perroquet." There 
he made useful contacts which he utilized in 1928 when he opened a rival supper club 
known as "Mac's Place." His partner was a white Belgian, Charles Vanderburg, who had 
worked with him at "Le Perroquet." Within a few years McKaine's cabaret, located on the 
Quai des Tonneliers, was considered the posh "in spot" for nightlife in Ghent. He personally 
30sceola E. McKaine, "The Buffaloes," Outlook (May 15, 1918), 19, pp.144-147. 
40ral interview conducted with Professor Ansley A Abraham of Tallahassee, Florida on April 10, 1989. 
5/bid. 
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called his club the "place for nice people" and at its zenith employed over 30 persons. It was 
quite popular with both American tourists and expatriates. McKaine lived alone in a 
spacious house two doors from "Mac's Place.'16 
He asserted that his success in Europe owed to being an African-American. He 
realized that black American entertainers were quite popular with Europeans; moreover, 
they were partial to black music forms, such as jazz and Negro spirituals. Wherever 
McKaine traveled he was usually treated warmly, although he also noted that "colored 
migrants" from the colonial world were scorned.7 
McKaine was in Ghent when the German Wehrmacht occupied the city in May 1940. 
Initially the Belgians accepted the German occupation with a certain resignation; however, 
that attitude quickly changed when the Gestapo arrived to take charge. Against his will 
McKaine was forced to keep open the cabaret for the benefit of the German officers. The 
action convinced McKaine that he must return to North America without delay. 
Accordingly he closed his club after persuading a longtime employee to move into his house. 
In the autumn of 1940 McKaine sailed from Le Havre to New York City, with South 
Carolina his ultimate destination.8 
When he returned to Sumter in December 1940 McKaine was a virtual stranger to 
most townspeople. His mother had recently died and he had never met many of his 
relatives, although McKaine's illustrious reputation had preceded him. His first cousin, 
James T. McCain, has characterized him as "clean-cut in every sense of the world.'' There 
was a distinct French inflection in his deep bass speaking voice which sounded quite 
resonant. Above all, McCain relates, "Ossie" was an intensely private person who confided 
mainly in his half-brother, Professor Ferdinand Abraham of South Carolina State College.9 
The cosmopolitan McKaine was an instant celebrity in Sumter; moreover, word of 
his arrival spread quickly among African-American circles throughout the state. McKaine 
was a popular lecturer all over South Carolina and he wrote articles for leading black 
journals, including the Columbia Palmetto Leader. His pieces also began to appear in such 
major white newspapers as the Columbia State. 
On May 18, 1941 the State featured his thoughts concerning his return to Sumter. 
He well recalled the racial segregation that had induced his departure in 1908, 
acknowledging that he returned with "at least a splinter on my shoulder.'' Yet what 
McKaine had witnessed in three months certainly impressed him. He believed that there 
was far less Jim Crowism in Sumter than in many northern cities. McKaine regularly rode 
on public transportation without experiencing undue harassment. He concluded: "Yes siree, 
in Sumter the races understand and esteem each other as in few other places.'' He could 
60sceola E. McKaine File in the South Caroliniana Library of the University of South Carolina (Columbia). Specific information was 
furnished by Cicile Van Haccke of Ghent, Belgium who on August 9, 1976 interviewed Mrs. Toni Goethals, a former employee at "Mac's 
Place.• 
7Columbia Palmetto Leader, May 17, 1941. 
8Columbia Palmetto Leader, May 17, 1941. 
90ral interview conducted with Dr. James T. McCain of Sumter, S.C. on January 28, 1988. 
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have added that the city's black leadership had been quite adept at gaining concessions from 
the white political structure over the years.'0 
It was probably invitable that Osceola E. McKaine became involved in the civil rights 
efforts in his native state. In October 1939 a group of black activists had met in the 
basement of Benedict College Library in Columbia to form the South Carolina Conference 
of the NAACP. The Sumter Branch, with James T. McCain as president, was one of the 
six charter members of the South Carolina conference. In the summer of 1941, due to 
serious internal strife, the branch had temporarily disbanded. 
McKaine's long absence permitted him to be unaffected by any of the local feuds; 
therefore, he was instrumental in drawing the fragmented leadership together. He actively 
participated in the April 1942 meeting that revitalized the moribund branch. James T. 
McCain was retained as president, while Osceola McKaine wass asked to serve as executive 
secretary. At this conclave the branch membership voted to support a project that McKaine 
had been pursuing for some months.11 
As he often told associates such as Modjeska Simkins, McKaine deeply resented the 
poor educational opportunities afforded him in South Carolina during his youth. He was 
dedicated to improving the scholastic conditions of black pupils in the 1940s. A basic reason 
for the poor prospects was that many talented black educators left the state due to salaries 
that were far below those of their white counterparts. White primary teachers annually 
earned $1183 while their black peers gained $713. At the secondary level, whites received 
$1445 and African-Americans received only $850. As 43% of the black students of South 
Carolina in the early 1940s attended rural, single-teacher schools, the salary equalization 
issue was of critical importance.12 
Prior to McKaine's arrival, the South Carolina NAACP had contemplated initiating 
a pay equity suit. The all-black Palmetto State Teachers Association was also interested in 
filing such a litigation. But neither organization had the ready cash to fund the undertaking. 
Consequently a dedicated person was required to perform the necessary statewide research 
to document the salary disparities. 
In October 1941 Osceola E. McKaine was commissioned by the Palmetto State 
Teachers Association to canvas the state by county and collect data on black teachers' 
salaries; however, McKaine was expected to absorb his own traveling expenses. He 
convinced the membership of the Sumter Branch to adopt salary equalization as their 
primary activity.13 
After his initial research was finished, McKaine commenced the needed follow-up 
activities. For instance, he embarked on an extensive speaking tour that greatly taxed his 
10Columbia State, May 18, 1941. 
11 The Minute Book of the Sumter Branch of the Souzh Carolina Conference of the NAACP, April 12, 1942; hereafter cited as Sumter 
Branch Minute Book. The original text is in the collection of the South Caroliniana Libraiy. 
12Frank De Costa, "The Education of Negroes in South Carolina," Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1947), XVI, pp. 405-416; 
reprinted in the Palmeuo State Teachers Education News (Januaiy 1948). 
13Sumter Branch Minute Book, June 28, 1942. 
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health. He also assisted in establishing the ''Teachers' Defense Fund" to collect money for 
a ''war chest" which financed the coming court litigations. By June 1942 McKaine had 
convinced the executive board of the South Carolina NAACP to endorse formally the 
equalization crusade. He was deeply involved, moreover, in consultations with Thurgood 
Marshall, the chief national legal counsel of the NAACP.14 The first salary equity lawsuit 
was won by the black teachers of Charleston in 1944; in 1945 the Columbia teachers won 
a similar case. These were the first civil rights legal victories won by black South 
Carolinians in nearly six decades. 
The state NAACP made extensive use of McKaine's oratorical talents during the 
various statewide membership drives. He went to locales where the NAACP was not yet 
formally organized. A foray into Clarendon County in 1942 convinced some local black 
leaders to affiliate with the Sumter Branch. Among them was the Rev. Joseph A DeLaine 
of Summerton, who later was instrumental in initiating the famous Clarendon County school 
desegragation case of Briggs v. Elliott. 
It is often forgotten that the Clarendon County case began in 1946 as a suit meant 
only to secure equal school bus transportation for local black pupils. It was also a follow-up 
to a similar litigation effort launched in Darlington County on March 19, 1944. McKaine 
was the main driving force behind that early project. As he told Thurgood Marshall: 
We's done dood it agin! At a meeting yesterday 
of the Darlington Branch [NAACP] it was moved, 
seconded and passed that a suit be brought for 
equal school bus transportation. $140 were raised 
and a committee of energetic men and women was 
formed to work toward an immediate goal of $1000 
in thirty days. How inspiring! 
He added: "Yes, I was the speaker for the occasion."15• Despite these high hopes the 
Darlington case was aborted in 1945 for lack of adequate funds. 
In the course of his work, McKaine had reason to travel often to Columbia. Through 
Modjeska Simkins he was introduced to John H. McCray, the editor of the Columbia 
Lighthouse and Infonner, an important newspaper to many black South Carolinians. McCray 
had begun publishing that journal in 1938 in Charleston, calling it the Lighthouse. After he 
moved operations to Columbia McCray's paper duly assumed its longstanding title. Initially 
McKaine served as McCray's main agent in Sumter, as well as a regularly featured 
columnist. In 1943 McKaine became an associate editor and that convinced him to move 
to the state capital to be nearer his work. 
14Minute Book of the South Carolina NAACP Executive Committee, June 15, 1942. This primary source is in the possession of Mrs. 
Modjeska M. Simkins. 
150sceola E. McKaine to Thurgood Marshall, March 20, 1944, The Papers of the NAACP, 1913-1950, Part 111, Series 8. 
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By that point McKaine had exhausted the cash reserve that he had brought from 
Europe. The need for a steady source of income was met when Modjeska Simkins hired 
him to manage one of her liquor stores in Columbia. As she states: "Of course, by day he 
could preach the word to the customers who came in--then at night Ossie would pursue his 
serious political work.1116 
In February 1944 McCray and McKaine took a major step in promoting black 
suffrage in South Carolina. Through their paper they circulated the word that the time was 
ripe to build an independent black political group. Recent events had made it timely for 
African-American voters to challenge the white Democratic party's stranglehold on the state 
political process. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Smith v. Allwright (March 1944) 
had ruled the established all-white primary election in Texas as unconstitutional. The 
decision sent shock waves through the Deep South, especially the Palmetto State. 
Governor Olin D. Johnston and most state legislators reacted with great fury to Smith 
v. Allwright. Johnston summoned a special session of the legislature to discuss this fresh 
threat to white supremacy. In contrast, McKaine called upon the South Carolina General 
Assembly to ref~ain from political speeches which tended to foment race hatred. In a letter 
to the Columbia Record he wrote: "It would be a fine contribution to better race relations 
if some eminent white citizens could persuade the General Assembly ... to abstain from 
individious remarks about Negroes during this period of increased racial tensions.'111 
Subsequently the legislature in special session (April 1944) repealed nearly 200 statutes that 
made specific references to state primary elections. The legislators were attempting to 
create the fiction that the Democratic organization was a private club with rules immune 
to public regulation.18 While the lawmakers strove to frame what was called the "South 
Carolina Plan," a number of black activists, including McCray and McKaine, watched the 
proceedings from the public gallery. They relished the knowledge that most members of the 
legislature were very upset that a "Negro Democratic Party" was being formed. 
On May 23, 1944 some 150 delegates from 38 counties concluded in Columbia the 
first state convention of a bi-racial organization now called the Progressive Democratic Party 
(PDP). Eighteen delegates (with two alternates) were chosen to challenge the regular state 
party contingent at the national Democratic convention in Chicago that July. John H. 
McCray, the state chairman, announced that a statewide black voter registration drive would 
be mounted later in the summer. As the state executive secretary, Osceola E. McKaine 
made the keynote speech to the convention. He supported calls for President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to seek a fourth term and "continue truly democratic government in this country.'' 
He believed that the United States was about to experience a "third American Revolution.'' 
McKaine called for a political alliance between African-Americans and progressive white 
16Simkins Interview, February 12, 1989. 
17
•AJong the NAACP Battlefront," Crisis (March 1944), 53, p.90. 
18
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Alfred A. Inc., 1979), pp. ~301. 
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elements in order to end Jim Crowism in the Deep South. He was always a consistent 
advocate of grassroots black-white cooperation in achieving meaningful racial reform.19 
Predictably white political leaders were quick to denounce both the actions and 
rhetoric of the Progressive Democrats. Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South Carolina 
declared that the remarks made at the convention were "so fantastic and illogical that ... 
they need no comment except to say that the responsible negroes of South Carolina will not 
follow the leadership of agitators and troublemakers. It appears to me that nothing but 
trouble can come from such absurd and far-fetched thoughts that existed in Columbia." 
Maybank expressed "absolute confidence" that national party leaders would have "no use at 
all" for the PDP in Chicago.20 
When the Democrats convened their national convention on July 16, 1944 in Chicago 
the representatives of the PDP were on hand to challenge at least eight of the eighteen 
delegate slots allocated to South Carolina. Contrary to their public comments, Governor 
Johnston and other white leaders took the Progressive Democrats quite seriously. As Judge 
Eugene S. Blease of Newberry wrote to Maybank: "It is my candid opinion that if the Negro 
delegates, or any one of them should be seated in Chicago ... , then our entire delegation 
will withdraw from the convention, and ... several other Southern States may join our 
delegation in that action."21 Such sentiments were stressed by the regular Democrats in 
their national lobbying efforts against the PDP. 
Although McCray and McKaine (among others) made spirited appeals at a hearing 
of a sub-committee of the Democratic National Committee, their request was turned down. 
The committee members were well aware of the threat of a southern walkout. Even though 
various allies were willing to champion their cause, the majority of the PDP delegation 
chose not to initiate a challenge that would lead to a vicious convention floor fight. 22 
In August the state executive committee of the PDP decided that Osceola E. 
McKaine should run as its candidate for the U.S. Senate in opposition to Governor Olin D. 
Johnston. That autumn McKaine, the first black South Carolinian to run for that office, 
mounted a vigorous statewide campaign. His electoral efforts dovetailed with the PDP's 
voter registration drives around the state. Although officially accorded 3214 votesZ3 that 
November, PDP poll watchers around the state, including Modjeska Simkins and Levi Byrd, 
claimed he had received a tally approaching 7800. Accordingly the Progressive Democrats 
19Sumter Daily Item, May 24, 1944. 
20Sumter Daily Item , May 27, 1944. 
21Eugene S. Blease to Burnet R Maybank, June 16, 1944, Olin D. Johnston Gubernatorial Papers (1944), Box II, Folder 1. This 
collection is located at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, SC .. 
220fficial Proceedings of the Democratic Parry National Convention, 1944 (Chicago, Ill.) July 19-21, 1944. "Meeting of the Democratic 
National Committee," July 17, 1944, pp. 360-362. 
Z3Supplemental Report of the Secretary of State: South Carolina, November 7, 1944." Official report of the electoral returns for 
the U.S. Senate race as determined by the South Carolina Board of State Canvassers. 
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produced a score of affidavits to prove that fraud and voter intimidations throughout South 
Carolina had made an accurate count impossible.24 • 
At the Sumter Branch's meeting in January 1945 McKaine spoke to the membership 
about the recent campaign. He had just returned from Washington D.C. where he 
personally filed a protest against Johnston's election; however, his action received only pro 
forma attention from the U.S. Senate and went nowhere. McKaine stressed to his associates 
in Sumter that a great amount of party building had to be done in the state by the 
Progressive Democrats. He was concerned that various elements in the state's NAACP were 
hostile to the new party. He also believed that black civil rights efforts would fail without 
the active co-operation of white southern liberals.25 
During his last two years in South Carolina McKaine maintained his affiliation with 
the PDP. He also continued his editorial work with the Lighthouse and Informer. Beginning 
in January 1945 he added a weekly column for the Norfolk Journal and Guide. At the same 
time McKaine served on the National Adult Advisory Board of the Southern Negro Youth 
Congress (SYNC) and helped arrange a youth legislature for October 1946 in Columbia. 
In the summer of 1945 Mckaine went on salary as a field worker with the inter-racial 
Southern Conference on Human Welfare (SCHW). For much of 1945-46 McKaine 
participated in the SCHW'S extensive regional voter registration drives. In this project, 
McKaine and other field operatives traveled to most of the states in the Deep South. In 
late 1946, though, pressing personal reasons forced Osceola E. McKaine to return to 
Belgium. 
After World War II friends in Ghent had notified him that his properties in Ghent 
had come through the conflict unscath~d. Loyal employees had reopened the club in his 
stead, but they begged McKaine to return and take charge. Quite reluctantly he sailed for 
Europe in early December. After his return to Ghent several dinners were held in his 
honor, but McKaine was disappointed that his club was not very solvent. Yet he relished 
residing again in his fashionable home. He stated, "Here I have all my meals prepared, my 
clothes brushed and pressed--even my shoes are shined." It was a "joy to live without being 
Jim Crowed--to have full and unadulterated freedom." McKaine had thoroughly enjoyed his 
participation in the American civil rights movement. The expatriate concluded: 'There we 
live dangerously and feel our living is worthwhile--a positive dynamic existence. Never 
doubt I shall remain away any longer than is necessary."26 
Unfortunately "Mac's Place" never managed to match its pre-war success. The old 
patron base had dispersed and top-flight acts were hard to book. Furthermore, the physical 
locals where the club was located drastically declined in quality in the 1950s. By 1955 
McKaine was bankrupt and the cabaret permanently shut its doors. 
24 Affidavits of Modjeska M. Simkins, Levi Byrd, William L. Riley, et al. attesting to widespread vote frauds on November 7, 1944 
in the U.S. senatorial contest. Drafts of these documents are in the John H. McCray Collection at the South Caroliniana Library. 
25Sumter Branch Minute Book, January 28, 1945. 
260sceola E. McKaine to John H. McCray, December 29, 1946, John H. McCray Collection. 
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It was the nadir in McKaine's life. Besides the bankruptcy, his once robust health 
was failing. In World War I he had been exposed to poison gas which later caused him 
respiratory problems. The fact that he was a· heavy smoker did not help that condition 
either. In addition he had developed a severe case of bleeding ulcers. In September 1955 
Mckaine renewed his passport and intended to return to North America. Late in the 
morning of November 17, 1955 in Brussels he was stricken with an acute attack of internal 
bleeding; he died shortly after being admitted to St. Pierre Hospital.27 
Ferdinand Abraham arranged to bring McKaine's body back to Sumter for burial. 
On December 3, 1955 his military funeral was held at the Palmer Funeral Home. The main 
eulogy was offered by John H. McCray. At the interment in the family plot in Walker 
Cemetery an honor guard from Shaw Air Force Base fired a salute volley. Osceola E. 
McKaine--Sumter native, soldier, journalist, businessman in Europe, and civil rights activist--
was laid to rest. 
27U.S. Department of State: Consular Services, "Report of the Death of an American Citizen." This official report on McKaine's 
death was prepared by the U.S. Consultate in Antwerp, Belgium on December 12, 1955. 
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GEORGIA'S RESPONSE TO 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
1954-1961 
Thomas O'Brien 
Emory University 
This paper is part of a larger literature review entitled "Georgia's Response to Brown 
v. Board of Education, 1954-1961." The larger paper, which is a synthesis of the secondary 
source literature, describes, explains and evaluates what is known about the Georgia 
response to Brown. The paper also 'identifies what is unknown about the Georgia story, and 
ends with suggestions for further research. 
This study is limited to a brief seven-year period in a Deep Southern state during the 
reign of massive resistance. It was not until 1961 that two black college students and nine 
black children entered previously all-white institutions of learning in Georgia. These actions 
neither constituted an end to racism in Georgia nor did they constitute meaningful 
integration. Yet they were a meaningful change in a society that for three hundred years 
had insisted on almost total social separation of the races. Using Elizabeth Jacoway's words, 
this change "in terms of numbers was minimal ... and was only accepted under extreme 
pressure, [yet] even this minimal softening on the fundamental issue of race constitutes an 
historical phenomenon worthy of careful analysis (Jacoway, p. 2). 
* * * 
On May 17, 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Brown v. Board of Education, which 
declared that racial segregation had no place in public education. Perhaps the most 
aggressive immediate reaction to the school desegregation decision came from Georgia. 
Outgoing Governor Herman Talmadge challenged the Supreme Court to try enforcing the 
decision (Muse p.21; Wilhoit, 1973, p. 61). Talmadge, who had watched his father make a 
living on the race issue in Georgia,1 asserted that Brown "had reduced the Constitution to 
1 Herman Talmadge was the son of Eugene Talmadge who served several terms as governor of Georgia. 
55 
South Carolina Historical Association 
a mere scrap of paper."(Kluger, 1976, p. 710). Soon more of the Deep South's powerful 
demagogues--Marvin Griffin (GA), James Eastland (MS), and Leander Perez (LA)--as well 
as more reasonable politicians--James Byrnes (SC), Harry F. Byrd (VA), and Richard B. 
Russell (GA)--joined Talmadge in a chorus of resistance (Bartley, 1969 p. 68, 325; Sherrill, 
1968; Wilhoit, 1973 p. 86). 
In Georgia, Brown strengthened the Talmadge faction's position in state politics. 
"Long recognized as unwavering defenders of white supremacy, the Talmadge forces now 
had an immediate threat to resist." (Bartley, 1970, p. 26). After Talmadge showed how 
politically advantageous denouncing Brown could be, members of his faction, competing for 
the job as the state's chief executive, tried to outdo each other with segregationist rhetoric 
(Black, 1976). Winning the office in January 1954 was staunch segregationist Marvin 
Griffin, who pledged in his campaign that "Come hell or high water, races will not be mixed 
in Georgia schools." (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 42).2 Referring to those who were moderate on the 
school-race issue, Griffin declared that "they should be chased out of town with a brushy top 
sapling." (Wilhoit, 1973, p.42). 
Several administrative agents of state government also took part in resisting the 
implementation of Brown (Bolster, 1972, p. 140). Encouraged by governor Griffin and the 
state legislature, state school officials extended the effect of the Talmadge faction's 
apartheid policies (Bolster, 1972, p. 140). Prior to Brown, Talmadge had created the 
Georgia Education Commission which lobbied for and, thanks to the County unit system, 
won approval of a state constitutional amendment that would give the lawmakers the power 
to close down the public schools. Shortly after Brown, the Georgia State Board of 
Education made a rule to revoke the license of any teacher who was a member of the 
NAACP or any related organization. The Board also ruled to revoke teacher certifications 
if they supported or condoned "mixed classes" (Sarratt 1966, p. 104). Also adopted by the 
Board was a resolution prohibiting teachers, principals, and pupils from participating in bi-
racial meetings ·(Sarratt p. 104). 
Between 1955 and 1959 the Geor~ia legislature passed "an avalanche of legislation 
designed to prevent compliance with Brown." (Bolster, p. 138). In 1955 the legislature 
passed two critical laws that reinforced the requirement that public schools close before 
desegregating.3 One law made it a felony for any public official to spend public funds on 
an integrated school. Another required the governor to cut off state funds from any school 
that allowed the races to "mix." This legislation was only the start of the state government's 
effort to defy Brown. 
In June 1955, hours after the U.S. Supreme Court called for "a prompt and 
reasonable start" toward integration, the national chapter of the NAACP recommended that 
its branch organizations petition local school boards for compliance. (Bartley, 1969, p. 82). 
2 Bolster, (1972, p. 137) notes that Griffin only captured 36% of the popular vote, but won the state Democratic primary because 
of the County unit system. 
3 Bolster (1972, chap. 4) and Huie (1967, chap. 4) provide complete accounts of all the massive resistance legislation passed in Georgia 
by the General Assembly. 
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That summer, Georgia's NAACP leader, William Boyd, instructed Georgia's thirty-five local 
chapters to petition their local school boards immediately, and to follow up with inquiries 
until they received a response (Bolster, 1972, p. 159). As part of the campaign, Boyd's state 
chapter chose to help the cities without branches. But the NAACP efforts were nearly 
stymied by white resistance and intimidation! By September only eight branches had 
submitted petitions. (Bolster, p. 159). 
Upon receiving petitions from black parents in June 1955, the Atlanta Board of 
Education appointed a committee to study the desegregation issue. In August the board 
unanimously approved the committee's resolution, which pointed out that the board was 
subject to the mandates of all laws and authorities, and would have to do its best to preserve 
the system until the conflict between federal and state law could be resolved by the proper 
authorities (Huie, 1967, p. 77).5 
At its meeting in 1956, the all-black Georgia Education and Teachers Association 
(GETA) passed a resolution calling for "fair play and good will" and desegregation of the 
state's public schools (Sarratt, 1966, p. 105). The GET A also went on record opposing the 
state's private school plan, which had been set up by Talmadge prior to Brown in the event 
of federally enforced racial school desegregation.6 Although the GETA did little else to 
support Brown beyond passing these organizational resolutions, its stance on the school-race 
issue was particularly effective in countering white assertions that blacks did not desire 
desegregation (Bolster, 1972, p. 149).7 
Meanwhile state leaders across the South, particularly in the Deep South, cried 
louder for continued segregation in spite of its unconstitutionality and began to organize to 
defy Brown. In Virginia in early 1956 U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd coined the term "massive 
resistance," and called for an all-out defense of white supremacy and segregation. (Bartley, 
1969, p. 109, 111). Soon every Deep South state called for resolutions and passed laws to 
resist implementation of Brown. Byrd was also active in Washington, where he recruited 
Georgia Senators Walter George and Richard B. Russell to lead the congressional charge 
to defy the ruling. On 12 March 1956 Senator George, who had chaired the drafting 
committee, introduced the "Declaration of Constitutional Principles," better known as the 
"Southern Manifesto," a document that formally denounced Brown and resolved to reverse 
the decision and to resist its implementation (Killian, 1985, p. 121, Sarratt, 1966, p. 41, 
4 See footn~te 23, below. 
5 The resolution also directed the superintendent to make studies on: The relationship between race and I.Q., race and achievement, 
race and average educational training; whether integration would impair the preservation of safety and order; whether blacks could teach 
whites; and extracurricular activities, PTA, etc. (Huie, 1967, p. 77,78). 
6 To date no scholar has located a document outlining Georgia's "private school plan.• Most descriptions of the plan come from a 
reading of Georgia laws and constitutional amendments. 
7 This display of black solidarity was particularly courageous. Black teachers, perhaps, would lose the most if public schools 
desegregated. The chances were great that white teachers would be hired before black teachers in a bi-racial system. The influence of black 
teachers and their leadership role in the black community also would be diminished in a bi-racial system. 
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Wilhoit, 1973, p. 51-55). The declaration, drafted by Senator Russell, was signed by 101 
Southern congressmen (Muse, p. 63; Sarratt, 41).8 
In Georgia the state legislature adopted resolutions calling for "interposition," the 
impeachment of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and declaring the 13th and 14th 
amendments null and void (Muse, 1964, p.72; Sarratt, 1966, p.38; Woodward, 1974, p. 
156,157; Ziegler, 1958, chap. 3). The Georgia House passed a resolution that called for a 
return to segregation in the armed forces (Bartley, 1969, p. 74; , 157). I11 1956 the law-
makers also "passed five bills designed to implement the private school amendment," 
including one that allowed local boards to lease any property in their control, one that made 
private school teachers eligible for retirement benefits, and one that made individual tuition 
grants from the state available to school children (Bolster, 138). Other laws and state actions 
were aimed at derailing the NAACP.9 
Althougr the Deep South's public resistance to Brown unified during the second half 
of the 1950s, it only accounted for a portion of the white resistance. The decision sparked 
a revival of the Ku Klux Klan across the South and gave rise to alternative resistance 
organizations known as the Citizens Councils. 
Georgia was the only state in the Deep South that did not develop a vibrant Council 
(McMillen p. 79; Wilhoit 1973 p. 115). Whereas Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana 
boasted memberships of well over 100,000 collectively, Georgia, at its peak, had fewer than 
10,000 members (McMillen, 1971 p. 80). In spite of having an all-star cast of seemingly 
dedicated segregationists, including ex-Governor Herman Talmadge, Governor Marvin 
Griffin, political boss Roy Harris, and Attorney General Eugene Cook, popular support for 
the States' Rights Council of Georgia (SRCG) was weak (McMillen, p. 81-85). The lack of 
popular support for the Citizens Councils in Georgia was due, perhaps, to the existence of 
the county unit system, which enhanced the influence and power of local leaders and county 
organizations.10 
8 Wilhoit (p. 51) points to the Southern Manifesto as the starting point for a unified political position of defiance to ~ 
throughout the South. Muse (p. 63) confirms that Senator Byrd intende<I to use the declaration as a means of unifying the South's 
politicans, but he also notes that Senator George was unenthusiastic about the resolution, and that Senator Russell's final draft was not 
as strong as the original drafts. 
9 In the wake of Brown II Georgia state officials, notably Attorney General Eugene Cook, attacked the NAACP, and made the 
organization fight a battle for its survival (Bolster, 1972, p. 132). One scholar (Murphy, 1959 p. 374,378) who reviewed the Southern legal 
attack on the NAACP, notes that Georgia refined and tightened common law offenses of barratry (habitual stirring up of quarrels and 
suits), champerty (assisting in litigation with money or service in exchange for some of the proceeds of a case) and maintenance (officious 
intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting a party) in a deliberate attempt to weaken the NAACP. 
Murphy also describes how the state revenue service harassed the Atlanta chapter in an investigation of purported income tax evasion. 
Bolster (p. 180) notes that Attorney General Cook aimed much of his attack on black teachers who made up much of the NAACP. Cook 
advised local superintendents to check the records and to fire teachers who were NAACP members. Cook also spread propaganda linking 
the NAACP with Communism. Cook's activities, concludes Bolster (p. 183), had a major impact on the NAACP's ability to effect change. 
10 Mc Millen ( chap. 5) agrees -with Bartley (1969, chap 6) that the lack of grass-roots support in Georgia was not related to a softening 
on the issue of race. Noting that Georgia was the "cradle of the Klan• and the "political habitat of such symbols of racial bigotry as Tom 
Watson and Eugene Talmadge," McMillen contends that white Georgians were every bit as racist and intolerant of social change as their 
white neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama. McMillen and Bartley argue that Georgia failed to organize a resistance movement because 
leaders of the movement tended to be political bosses who already had an influential voice in state government. In effect, the SRCG was 
superfluous. What both scholars overlook is how the county-unit system magnified the power of the state's rural political leaders and their 
constituents. A true reading of the popular opinion in Georgia, though very difficult to assess, would be more moderate than either scholar 
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Striving for respectability, the Citizens Council attempted to appeal to business and 
professional men and shunned the lower-status whites (Sarratt, 1966 p. 302). Lower-status 
resisters and those rejected by the Citizen Council in tum joined the Ku Klux Klan (Sarratt 
p. 302; Wilhoit p. 101-103). 
By late 1956 the anti-semitic, anti-catholic, anti-black Klan reorganized under the 
leadership of Atlanta spray-painter Lee Edwards. Edwards claimed his group, the U.S. 
Klans, the legitimate successor of the Invisible Empire, and established active organizations 
in all the states surrounding Georgia and in Arkansas ()3artley, 1969 p. 202-203). In spite 
of this interstate revival, the Klan failed to promote competent leaders or to unify. Splinter 
organizations became common across the South and were symptomatic of organizational 
defects in the movement. 
Although the Klan did not dominate Georgia during the period of massive resistance, 
the Invisible Empire was an intimidating force to be reckoned with. (Wilhoit, 1973 p. 110).11 
For the Klan Brown served not as a cause but as an excuse for hate. The Klan was 
responsible for many notorious bombings, beatings, murders, cross burnings, hooded 
marches, etc. during the post-Brown period. Although these acts terrified the minority 
groups, they did not attract support from the white majority. The news media, politicians, 
and local community leaders kept a running attack on the Klan (Bartley, 1969, p. 206). 
Most status-conscious politicians and community elites, many of whom were quite 
comfortable with Jim Crow, distanced themselves from the violent, predominately working-
class Klan. As a result, Klansmen were often denied charters and the use of public 
facilities.12 
In the face of open governmental and private resistance, the Atlanta chapter of the 
NAACP shifted from a petition strategy to litigation. On 11 January 1958, almost four years 
after Brown, the parents of 28 black children filed a suit in federal court charging the 
Atlanta School Board with operating a racially segregated system (Bolster, 1972, p. 161; 
Huie, 1967, p. 76,77). The case, Latimer v. Calhoun, moved through the courts slowly and 
was not officially attended to until June 1959. 
By 1958 the NAACP was not the only organization in Atlanta that opposed the state 
government's resistance policy (Hornsby, 1982, p. 129,133). In late 1958 an organization of 
moderate white professionals and middle-class women formed, and called themselves Help 
Our Public Education (HOPE) (Bolster, p. 152; Hornsby, p.129). HOPE set a simple goal: 
To keep all the public schools open (Bolster, p. 152). HOPE deliberately steered clear of 
the issue of segregation while enthusiastically promoting the open schools movement 
indicates. 
11With this in mind, it is remarkable that-in spite of the racist rhetoric from the Georgia state government, the tradition of the Klan 
in Atlanta, and the eight Klan-like factions that survived in Atlanta and Georgia in the late 1950s (Sarratt, 1966, p. 304)-the schools 
peacefully desegregated at all in 1961. Perhaps there were other forces at work. 
12 Bartley (1969 p. 206) contends there was an "element of psychological and tactical expediency in the public attack on the Klan. 
Neobourbons could assault 'extremists' including both the NAACP and the Klan and thus strengthen their conservative positions.• Wilhoit 
(1973, p. 110) disagrees with Bartley's analysis. Wilhoit maintains that the actions of the Klan were detrimental to the conservative position 
because the Klan brought "about a degradation of the South's traditional conservativism by equating tradition with mindless fanaticism and 
total reaction.• 
59 
South Carolina Historical Association 
(Bolster, 152-155; Sarratt, 1966, p. 315). By year's end HOPE initiated a small amateur 
political movement that won letters of support from 417 city doctors, 312 clergy, and most 
of the faculties from Emory University and Agnes Scott College (Bolster, p. 152). 
HOPE's activities had not only succeeded in capturing the attention of Atlanta's 
professionals, they were also noticed by Governor Ernest Vandiver, wh(' had in 1958 won · 
the state's highest office with the campaign pledge "No, not one [black will school with 
whites]." (Harmon & Dannenbaum, 1989, p. 22). By mid-December 1958 Vandiver stated, 
"I have no patience with those who are now coming out in the open and demanding that the 
races be mixed in the classrooms in the schools of Georgia, contrary to the laws and the 
constitution of this state." (Bartley, 1990, p. 214,215). Angered by Atlanta's white moderates, 
Vandiver ranted that they were "running up the flag of surrender over the capital city and 
displaying a defeatist spirit."(Bartley, 1990, p. 215). 
By early January 1959 Vandiver had his first opportunity as governor to live up to 
his campaign promise to prevent school desegregation. Three years earlier, two black 
students had been denied admission to the all-white university system (Bolster, p. 163). The 
Atlanta branch of Georgia State College rejected the students because they did not meet 
a new admission requirement--signatures from two alumni from that college. When two 
white alumni "[stood] with the applicants, ready to testify to their moral character," the black 
students were again denied admission because the two white alumni had graduated from a 
different campus in the university system (Bolster, p. 164). In November 1956 the local 
NAACP filed a suit in federal court.13 On 9 January 1959 a federal district court ruled that 
the admission requirement to Georgia State College violated due process (Bolster, 164). 
But, before the college could admit the students, Governor Vandiver suspended registration 
indefinitely (Bolster, p. 164, 165). Over the next few days Vandiver, with the cooperation 
of the legislature, ·pushed through a thinly veiled law prohibiting admission of students who 
were over the age of twenty-one (Bolster, p. 165). Since the black students were over 
twenty-one, they were excluded. Vandiver had put a plug in the massive resi~tance dike, but 
the barrier was showing signs of collapse. 
In June 1959, after waiting seventeen months, Atlanta's NAACP finally got a hearing 
in federal district court in the Calhoun case (Bolster, p. 161; Huie, p. 29). During the trial 
Vandiver warned that if the courts ordered desegregation he would have no choice but to 
close down the public schools. Attempting to shift the burden of school-race issue onto the 
shoulders of the judiciary, the governor expressed hope that "the federal courts will not force 
the closing of a single school." (Sarratt, p. 235). After hearing testimony, Judge Frank 
Hooper14 issued an order enjoining the Atlanta School Board from operating a segregated 
13 
~Isler (p. 162-165) docs not mention the name of this case or the presiding district coun judge. He is the only scholar who 
identifies the case. 
14 Hooper, a former Georgia legislator, was no stranger to civil rights cases. He presided over a case that originated in 1952 involving 
a black student denied admission to the University of Georgia Law School. The student, Horace Ward, went into the armed forces before 
his case came to trial. Upon his release from the military in 1956 he was again rejected at UGA, but entered Nonhwestern Law School. 
In 1957 Hooper ruled against Ward on the grounds that he did not reapply to UGA in 1956. Hooper also ruled the case moot since Ward 
was already in law school (Bolster, p. 163). 
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system. Hooper then declined to set a fixed date for compliance, opting instead, like Brown 
//, to allow the board "reasonable time" to comply (Huie, 1967, p. 30,31). He did, however, 
order the board to submit a desegregation plan by 1 December 1959 (Huie, p. 31). 
Concomitantly, with all attention focused on the Cal.houn litigation that summer, two 
black Atlanta college students, encouraged by the local NAACP, started a relatively quiet 
campaign against segregated higher education in Georgia. On 15 July 1959 Charlayne 
Hunter (who would go on to be an anchor on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour) and Hamilton 
Holmes (who would later become a successful physican in Atlanta) applied for admission 
at the University of Georgia (Bolster, p. 165). After a quick rejection because of "limited 
facilities," the students reapplied in August for the winter term, only to be told that 
applications were not being accepted for future quarters (Bolster, p. 165). That fall Hunter 
returned to Wayne University in Detroit, and Holmes attended Morehouse College in 
Atlanta. Both students, howyver, continued to inform the university that they desired to 
transfer, and continued to ask for advice on the application process (Bolster, p. 165; Trillin, 
1964, p. 4). 
By 1960 many of Atlanta's younger, more determined blacks were frustrated by the 
glacial progress toward desegregation and were actively searching for alternative methods 
to bring about change. As membership in the Georgia NAACP fell, this new and more 
militant mood spread quickly in the black community. (Bartley, 1990, p. 216; Hampton, 
1986; Hein, 1972; Hornsby, 1982). By the start of the decade alternative black organizations 
that prefered direct action emerged to challenge the NAACP's court-oriented, gradualist 
methods. (Bartley, 1990, p. 216-217). 
The arrival of Martin Luther King Jr., the acknowledged leader of the civil rights 
movement,15 in Atlanta in February 1960 (Sarratt, p. 326) no doubt added fuel and focus 
to the direct action campaign. Having accepted co-pastorship with his father at the 
Ebenezer Baptist Church (Bartley, 1990, p. 217), King moved to Atlanta at a time when the 
old guard was giving way to the new in the black civil rights movement. His presence 
augmented Atlanta's emerging direct action movement, while also temporarily creating a rift 
in the black community (Bartley, 1983, p. 197).16 
In 1959 Hooper handled another civil rights case that originated in 1957, when 20 black ministers from Atlanta boarded Atlanta's buses, 
occupied "white" seats, and were later arrested (Bolster, 171). Typical of Hooper's civil rights cases, litigation mOYCd slowly. Hooper ruled 
in favor of the ministers, but gave no injunctive relief (Bolster, 172). 
Hooper would play a pivotal role in public school desegregation in Georgia. Most explanations of his actions are favorable (Peltason, 
1961; Muse, 1964; Sarratt, 1966), but Bolster's account (1972, chap 4) raises the suspicion that Hooper may have been more interested in 
deliberation than speed. 
15 In late 1955 and 1956 Martin Luther King Jr. emerged as the "spiritual and symbolic leader• of the civil rights mOYCment during 
the year-long. black boycott of city buses in Montgomery, Alabama (Muse, p. 52; Sarratt, p. 324). The boycott was triggered by actions of 
a black NAACP secretary named Rosa Parks-who courageously refused to give up her bus seat to a white passenger. Park's action gave 
King his first opportunity to test his theory of non-violent protest (Sarratt, p. 325). King's methods were quite different from the NAACP's 
legal campaign in fundamental ways. The movement stressed non-violent mass protest, persuaded participants that it was their duty to 
protest, and assured participants that God was on their side (Hampton, 1986). 
16 In the 1950s Atlanta's established black leadership had maintained •generally effective control over the emerging black protest" 
(Bartley, 1983 p. 196). Unlike blacks from other cities, Atlanta's blacks had developed a political alliance with the white municipal power 
structure and business community (Hein, 1972; Hornsby, 1982; Plank & Turner, 1987). Through bloc voting and "wheeling and dealing• 
at City Hall (Hornsby, 1982, p. 124), blacks had become-since 1946-a major political force in Atlanta (Plank & Turner, 1987; Racine, 1969). 
61 
South Carolina Historical Association 
As head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), King sought not 
only the desegregation of schools, but also the elimination of all racial restrictions (Sarratt 
p. 284 ). King's leadership ignited the entire black community, not only in Atlanta and the 
South, but nationwide, and served to help blacks and many whites recognize and demand 
their rights as U.S. citizens. In 1959 the SCLC held its first non-violent institute at Spellman 
College in Atlanta (Bartley, 1983 p. 196-197). There King trained participants in the 
techniques of non-violent protest. 
Following the lead of the successful lunch counter sit-ins that had taken place in 
Greensboro on 1 February 1960, two-hundred college and high-school students, many from 
the six black institutes of higher education in Atlanta,17 staged the state's first sit-in at 
Rich's department store in Atlanta on 15 March 1960 (Bartley, 1990, p. 217; Bolster, p. 193; 
Sarratt, p. 327). Although King supported and participated in the sit-irt movement (Bolster, 
p. 193), the campaign started independently of him and his organization (Sarratt, p. 327).18 
The sit-ins continued periodically for one year, and by March of 1961 the city agreed to 
open its lunch counters (Bolster, p. 194). 
In the spring of 1960 several major developments occurred in the black and white 
communities across Georgia. In the wake of the sit-in movement student leaders organized 
the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which established headquarters 
in Atlanta (Bartley, 1990, p. 220). SNCC's purpose was to pass on information about the 
direct action campaign to "sympathizers, friends, the press, [and] anyone who cared to find 
out about it." (Rose & Greenya, 1984, p. 29). Also by the spring of 1960 Charlayne Hunter 
and Hamilton Holmes were convinced that the University of Georgia was ignoring their 
inquiries for transfer. They hired NAACP attorney Donald Hollowell, who appealed their 
case to the Board of Regents. The Board denied the appeal on the grounds that the two 
had not completed the admission process by submitting to personal interviews (Bolster, p. 
165). While Hunter and Holmes submitted to interviews, Hollowell filed a suit for them in 
federal court. The litigation began in August 1960 (Muse, 1964, p. 223). 
While progress seemed glacial to the black community, HOPE and other open school 
advocates saw a sliver of light at the end of the tunnel. Hoopers' ruling in Calhoun ignited 
Mayor Hartsfield moderated his position on race, and blacks did make significant progress within the "separate but equal" restriction. Since 
the direct action campaign of 1960 threatened this vehicle of progress, many of Atlanta's black leaders sought to control it. This was done, 
in part, through a black newspaper called the Atlanta Daily World. But with the arrival of the direct action movement, the tight control 
the black "bourgeois" had over the black community began to loosen (Bartley, 1983 p. 197). Bartley (p. 197) contends that the controversy 
this created within the black leadership was short-lived, primarily because the sit-in and demonstration movement in Atlanta was highly 
successful, and because it was carried out by young in-school blacks aspiring for an equal opportunity to be middle-class. 
17 Morehouse College, Spellman College, Oark College, Morris Brown College, Gammon Theological Seminary, and Atlanta 
University, collectively known as the Atlanta University Center. 
18 King went to Greensboro to observe the first major student sit-in (Sarratt, p. 328). In Atlanta, it was a publication by Atlanta 
University students in a few of the city's daily papers entitled "An Appeal for Human Rights" that provided the catalyst. The students 
proclaimed that they would "use every legal and non-violent means at (their] disposal to secure full citizenship rights as members of the 
great democracy." (Bartley, 1990, p. 217) 
Bolster (p. 193) notes that the conservative Atlanta Daily World failed to give this movement adequate coverage or support. An 
alternative black paper, the Atlanta Enquirer, started in 1960 by student activist Julian Bond, covered the sit-ins and was a more enthusiastic 
supporter of the new direction that the civil rights movement took. 
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HOPE. The organization managed to get the state legislature to consider a local option 
plan that sought to keep the public schools from closing (Bolster, p. 154). But the 1960 
Georgia legislature and Governor Vandiver rejected the plan, opting instead to appoint a 
committe to study the school-race issue (Bartley, 1969, p. 334, Bolster, p. 154) 
In Februrary, March, and April 1960 the "Committee on Schools," chaired by John 
A Sibley, 19 went to the ten congressional districts and held hearings to find out how "the 
people" felt about public school desegregation. The creation of the committee was greeted 
with skepticism. Most Georgians probably felt that Vanpiver was either attempting to build 
a stronger case for defiance, or attempting to shift the burden of closing the schools to 
another set of shoulders. Nevertheless, HOPE took the work of the commission seriously. 
HOPE ''worked energetically to get their people, local black people and respectable white 
people before the committee." (Bolster, p. 154).21) 
By 28 April 1960 the Sibley committee had completed its study and had written a 
report on the findings. Sibley wrote a majority report that, though highly critical of Brown, 
supported keeping public schools open and recommended a policy that would permit local 
communities to proceed with public school desegregation in any manner they wanted 
(Bartley 1983, p. 195). Delighted with the recommendations, HOPE launched "Operation 
Last Chance" to win legislative support for Sibley's majority report (Sarratt, p. 315). 
With all eyes on the Calhoun case in Atlanta, an unexpected turn of events occurred 
in another federal court room in Macon. On Friday, January 6, 1961 Judge William T. 
Bootle found that Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes would have been admitted to 
the University of Georgia in the fall of 1960 if they had been white (Bolster, p. 166). In a 
ruling that sent Attorney General Eugene Cook scrambling all weekend (Hornsby, 1982, p. 
127), Bootle ordered Hunter and Holmes admitted immediately, and issued a permanent 
injunction against the university, preventing it from discriminating between black and white 
applicants (Bolster, p. 167). On Monday, January 9, 1961 Cook appealed the decision, and 
Bootle granted a stay of his order pending an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
(Hornsby, p.126). But before the Attorney General could relax, Chief Judge Elbert P. 
Tuttle rescinded the stay (Trillin, 1964 ). Bootle's and Tuttle's decisive actions changed not 
only the time and place for the showdown, but also the level of public schooling at which 
desegregation would first occur in Georgia. 
On January 9, 1961, three days after Bootle's ruling, Hunter and Holmes registered 
for classes at the University of Georgia in Athens (Bolster, p. 167, Trillin, 1964, p.51). Back 
in Atlanta on the same day, Vandiver, speaking to the legislature, said "we cannot abandon 
public education," and pointed out that he had not cut off any state aid to the university 
(Hornsby, 1982, p.127). Two days later, on January 11, Vandiver reversed himself, saying 
19 
Born in 1888, Sibley grew up in Milledgeville, Georgia (Bennett, 1986, p. 18A). By the age of seventy-one he had become one 
of the state's most highly regarded men. He was a respected lawyer, banker, businessman, and was a leading member of the Atlanta 
establishment (Bartley, 1990, p. 215). It was, perhaps, Sibley's link to the business community that would moderate his position on the 
school-race issue. 
20 This effort was critical because the final report acknov.ledged that only forty percent of those who testified were in favor of keeping 
the public schools open even with segregation. 
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he ''would deny funds to any school that desegregated," and warned the NAACP that ''we 
are going to resist ... again and again. We are going to exhaust any legal means and 
remedy available to us." (Hornsby, p 127). Georgia's policy of massive resistance hung in 
the balance. Although the federal judiciary had admitted two blacks to the state's revered 
university and enjoined the governor from cutting off state funds to the school, most of 
Georgia's school segregation legislation remained intact. Further, there was no guarantee 
that breaking the color line in higher education would translate into its disappearance at the 
high school or elementary level.21 
The question was now starkly presented. Would Georgia abandon its public schools 
or its policy of massive resistance? In late January Vandiver called a joint session of the 
legislature. In a speech that was broadcast by radio and television, he made Georgia's 
choice. "Public education in Georgia will be preserved!" (Muse, p. 224 ). After the speech 
the legislature remained in session and "enacted three laws that had the effect of wiping out 
[Georgia's] school segregation laws" (Muse, p. 224). An era had passed. 
This paper has been a brief descriptive synthesis of the secondary source literature 
on the rise and fall of massive resistance in Georgia. Due to a lack of time important 
descriptions, explanations and evaluations contained in the scholarly literature needed to be 
excluded. Needless to say, there are many research needs and opportunities. This author 
over the next twelve months will fill the gaps in the Georgia story. 
21 In the 1930s Charles Houston had theorized that racial desegregation in higher education would be more easily accepted by the 
general public than mass common school desegregation (Ravitch, 1983, p. 122). Notably, Arkansas's desegregation of two elementary school 
districts in 1955 did not prevent the conflagration over the 1957 desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock (Muse, 1964, p. 23). 
64 
B 
B 
B 
E 
E 
I 
Thomas O'Brien 
References 
Bartley, N.V. (1969). The Rise of Massive Resistance; Race and Politics in the South during 
the 1950's. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University. 
Bartley, N.V. (1970). From Thunnond to Wallace, Political Tendencies in Georgia, 1948-1968. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 
Bartley, N.V. (1983). The Creation of Modem Georgia. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
Bartley, N.V. (1990). The Creation of Modem Georgia (3rd ed.). Athens: University of 
Georgia Press. ·· 
Bennett, T. (1986, October 26). "John Sibley, Savior of Schools, is Dead." The Atlanta 
Journal/Constitution. pp. la, 18a 
Black, E. (1976). Southern Governors and Civil Rights, Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue 
in the Second Reconstruction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Bolster, P.D. (1972). Civil Rights Movements in Twentieth Century Georgia. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation. University of Georgia, Athens. 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) 
Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964) 
Dowdey, K. & Dannenbaum, J. (Producers). (1989). Dawn's Shining Light, Ralph McGill and 
the Segregated South (Cassette Recording No.31394013) Center for Contemporary 
Media. 
Hampton, H. (Executive Producer). (1986). Eyes on the Prize I. (Cassette Recording) 
Blackside Inc. 
Harmon, D.,& Dannenbaum, J. (1989). Viewer Guide, Dawn's Shining Light, Ralph McGill 
and the Segregated South ( Cassette Recording N o.31394013) Center for Contemporary 
Media. 
Hein, V.H. (1972). "The Image of a 'City Too Busy to Hate': Atlanta in the 1960's." Phylon, 
33(3), 205-221. 
Hornsby, A. Jr. (1982). "A City that was Too Busy to Hate." In E. Jacoway & D. Colburn 
(Eds.), Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (pp. 121-136). Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana Stpte University Press. 
Huie, M.H. Sr. (1967). Factors Influencing the Desegregation Process in the Atlanta School 
System, 1954-1967. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens. 
Jacoway, E., & Colburn D.L. (Eds.). (1982). Southern Businessmen and Desegregation. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana Sate University Press. 
Killian, L.W. (1985). White S9uthemers. (2nd ed.) New York: Random House. 
Kluger, R. (1976). Simple Justice. New York: Knopf. 
Martin, H.H. (1973). Ralph McGill, Reporter. Boston: Little Brown. 
McCain, R.R. (1968). "Reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court Segregation Decision of 1954." 
Georgia Historical Quarterly, 52, 371-387. 
McMillen, N.R. (1971). The Citizens' Council, Organized Resistance to the Second 
Reconstruction, 1954-1964. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
65 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Murphy, W.F. (1959). 'The South Counterattacks, the Anti-NAACP Laws." Western Political 
Quarterly, 12(2), 371-390. 1 
Muse, B. (1964). Ten Years of Prelude; the Story of Integration since the Supreme Court's 
1954 Decision. New York: Viking Press. ' 
Peltason, J.W. (1961). Fifty-eight Lonely Men; Southern Federal Judges and School 
Desegregation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Plank, D.N. & Turner, M. (1987). "Changing Patterns in Black School Politics, Atlanta, 1872-
1973." American Journal of Education, 95(4), 584-608. 
Ravitch, D.(1983). The Troubled Crusade; American Education, 1945-1980. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Rose, T. & Greenya, J. (1984). Black Leaders Then and Now. Garrett Park MD: Garrett 
Park Press. 
Sarratt, R. (1966). The Ordeal of Desegregation, the First Decade. New York: Harper and 
Row 
Sherrill, R. (1968). Gothic Politics in the Deep South. New York: Grossman. 
Trillin, C. (1964). An Education in Georgia. New York: Viking. 
Wilhoit F.M. (1973). The Politics of Massive Resistance. New York: Braziller. 
Woodward, C.V., (1974). The Strange Career of Jim Crow (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
66 
TAMING A WHIRLWIND: 
BLACK CML RIGHTS LEADERSHIP 
IN THE COMMUNITY SETTING 
WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, 
1950-1972 
John L. Godwin 
University of South Carolina 
From 1950 to 1972 the civil rights movement in Wilmington, N.C., evolved 
through three distinct and observable periods. After World War II black Wilmingtonians 
slowly took stock and by 1950-51 mounted a challenge to separate and unequal 
education through NAACP-sponsored litigation in U.S. District Court.' The equal 
treatment of black schools became the battle cry of a community that was still reluctant 
to enter the fray and whose perspective on the issues for years to come would be 
conditioned by decades of segregation and economic discrimination. As the 1950s 
passed, Wilmington slowly roused itself from the condition of apathy, ignorance, and 
stubborn adherence to tradition. From 1959 to 1963 black Wilmington began a second 
phase of civil rights activism, ·gradually mobilizing its resources on behalf of 
desegregation and equal rights. Organized protest through these years took place in a 
variety of settings.2 From 1963 to 1965 old practices of segregation were swept aside in 
1
"Wilmington School Suit," Wilmington Journal 11 August 1951, E.aton Scrapbook #1, Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington; Article, 
Wilmington Journal, March 1950, E.aton Scrapbook #1; Hubert E.aton, Every Man Should Try, (Wilmington: Bonaparte Press, (1984), pp. 
41-43. Note: Robert Norrell 's Reaping the Whirlwind, the Civil RJghts Maw:ment in Tuskegee, (N.Y.: Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1985), is a useful 
source, providing many insights into the civil rights movement on the local level in a particular setting. 
2E.aton, Every Man Should Try, p. 85, pp. 154-156; Interviews: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Wilmington, NC, 23 March 1990: Anna Burnett, 
Wilmington, NC, 18 November 1989; Billie Burnett , Wilmington, NC, 7 April 1990; Rev. J. Ray Butler, Winston-Salem, NC, 29 June 1990; 
Dan D. Cameron, Wilmington, NC, 30 November 1990; Joan Coco. Wilmington, NC, 7 September 1990; Pat Coston, Wilmington, NC, 3 
June 1990. 
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public accommodations and in some areas of public education and local govemment.3 
But the legal disestablishment of segregation did not bring to an end all vestiges of 
racially separate social and institutional life. Court-ordered plans to eliminate racially 
identifiable schools in the years from 1968 to 1972 led to a third phase in black civil 
rights activism, as crisis in the schools spilled over into the community 2t large. When 
black students staged a boycott to protest school policies, rioting soon followed, which 
included sniper fire at police and firemen, arson, widespread vandalism and assault! 
With school violence threatening to unhinge the peaceable life of the city, black leaders 
who had been key figures in the civil rights movement found themselves in an unlikely 
role as tamers of the whirlwind. 
The years of the civil rights movement in Wilmington brought forward a viable 
black leadership that succeeded at each stage of community activism in bringing forth 
concessions from whites who held the reins of power. Through school equalization, 
organized protest, and federally ordered and enforced school desegregation, black 
leaders were outspoken and changed their strategies and goals in ways that ran largely 
parallel to the course steered by black leaders elsewhere across the nation. But the 
changing role played by black leadership in Wilmington can also be viewed against the 
changing backdrop of the community setting in which it took place. In 1950 the local 
economy was growing at a moderate pace.5 State and local leaders had in the years 
from 1945 to 1949 obtained a goal they had sought for decades in the creation and 
funding of a State Ports Authority for the development of shipping and terminal facilities 
at Wilmington and Morehead City.6 For Wilmington, the development of a general 
cargoes port contributed to an ever widening spiral of industrialization in the years 
ahead.7 By 1965 a period of rapid expansion was under way as a variety of industries 
developed facilities in the Wilmington area.8 For blacks it meant that the economic 
base that had already begun to change for the better through World War II would 
sustain new growth. In the areas of housing, education, and employment, black 
3Stanford R Brookshire, North Carolina and the Negro, Report of the North Carolina Mayors' Cooperating Committee, Editors, 
Wayrick, Brooks & Pitts, (Raleigh, NC, 1964), p.v. vii, ix; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp.155-157; Marjorie Megivern, Bridge Building, 
The First Quarter Century: A History of the New Hanover Human Relations Commission, 1963-1988, (Wilmington, New Hanover County 
Human Relations Commission, 1988), pp.4-5. 
4Appellant's Brief, Carolyn Eaton et al. v. New Hanover County Board of Education, U.S. Court of Appeals. Fourth Circuit, No. 71-
1890, p.5, 9; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp.104-105; Wayne King, "'The Case Against the Wilmington Ten; New York Times Magazine, 
December 3, 1978, pp.160-162; Michael Myerson, Nothing Could Be Finer, (N.Y.: International Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 76, 89, 104; 
Reverend Eugene Templeton, "Five Questions About Gregory's Involvement in the New Hanover School Crisis-1971; Spring 1971, from 
New Hanover County Public Schools. 
5 Anicles, "Good Business Year Predicted," and "Bright Future Looms for Port Here," Sunday Star News, 26 February 1950, 14-C. 
6Charles L. Landon, The North Carolina State Pons Au1hority, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963), pp.4-9. 
7
"1lte Director Reports," North Carolina S1ait.Pons, Spring 1960, Vol 6, No. 2, p.16; Summer 1965, Vol 11, No. 2, p.9; "'The Port 
Progress," Summer 1967, pp.4-5; "New Industry for Port of Wilmington," Spring 1969, p.8; "When the World Comes Calling," Carolina 
Cargo, Fall 1976, pp.12-15; North Carolina State Pons Authority, Master Development Plan, 1986-19'}(), (N.C.S.P A, 1986), p.4. 
8
"DuPont Announcement Is Local Milestone," and "Wilmington An All-American City," Sunday Star News, 15 May 1966; "17 New 
Firms Have Located Herc Since 1955," Sunday Star News, 15 May 1966, Ten-8; Diane Cobb Cashman, Cape Fear Adveruure, An lllustrated 
History of Wilmington, (Woodlands Hill, CA: Windsor Publications, 1982), p91. 
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Wilmington felt the impact of economic transition through the 1950s and beyond.9 Signs 
of growth included a new generation of black leaders who migrated to the city from 
diverse parts of the country, ready to challenge traditional leaders whose status had been 
long-standing. 
Among the newcomers was Hubert Eaton, a black physician who had migrated to 
the port city from Winston-Salem in 1943. A strong supporter of the NAACP, Eaton 
campaigned persistently through the years ahead on behalf of local blacks and was 
instrumental in the campaign for school equalization.10 • The Reverend Edwin E. Kirton, 
pastor of St. Mark's Episcopal Church, was also a significant influence among black 
Wilmingtonians. Originally from Trinidad, he came to Wilmington in 1951 by way of 
New York City where in the 1930s he had served as vice-president of the NAACP's 
Jamaica branch.11 Kirton played an important role through the period of organized 
protest and developed a working relationship with white business and community leaders. 
The Reverend J. Ray Butler, pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church, had come to 
Wilmington from Sampson County, North Carolina in 1954. His church became an 
important focal point for civil rights activism through the years of protest and change.12 
Among the blacks of Wilmington, the most persistent and outspoken was Tom Jervay, 
editor of the Wilmington Journal. Assuming control of the paper in 1950 with his father's 
failing health, he moulded the Journal into an important force and played a leadership 
role within the black Business and Professional Men's Club, a group devoted largely to 
civil rights.13 Through every phase of black community activism, the equalization of 
schools, organized protest, and the response to court ordered school desegregation, 
Jervay's voice was important to local blacks. 
The drive for school equalization may have begun as early as 1948 when black 
teachers and principals voiced complaints that their schools had been short changed. 
The degree of black community participation in the campaign offers a striking parallel to 
the later period of civil rights protest in 1963-64. Civic clubs, Parent Teacher 
Associations, sororities and churches cheerfully made donations of scarce funds to pay 
attorneys' fees, though money frequently changed hands in secret as long as teachers, 
9
"Dedicated Program: Williston Senior High School," May 16, 1954, 8 . T. Washington, Principal, File 1 of 1, Series #6, Equali7.ation 
Suit, 1950-51, Papers of Hubert Eaton, from Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington; "Segregation No Longer . .. • Wilmington Morning Star, 
15 January 1984, p.1-A; The Cultural Enrichment Program Committee of the Greater Brooklyn Area Scries,A History of Our Religious Ufe, 
(Wilmington, NC, 1976), pp5-20; Interviews: Hubert Eaton, Wilmington, NC, 11 November 1989; Eli7.abeth Holmes, Wilmington, NC, 29 
January 1991; T.C. Jervay, Wilmington, NC, 10 October 1990; Lana Taylor, Wilmington, NC, 8 April 1990; Bertha Todd, Wilmington, NC, 
14 August 1990. 
10
"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," Wilmington Journal, 11 August 1951, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp.7-8, 
p.21, p.40, pp.45-48; Interviews: Hubert Eaton, T .C. Jervay. 
11
"Dcath-Rev. Edwin E. Kirton," Wilmington Journal, 16 October 1986, p.10: "If I Were A Christian," N.Y. Amsterdam, 14 October 
1944, 28 October 1944; N.Y. Age, 22 September 1945: Kirton Scrapbook #1, 1927-1933, Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington. 
12interviews: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Billie Burnett, Rev. J . Ray Butler, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton; Floyd McKissick, Oxford, N.C., 
25 June 1990; Leo Shepard, Wilmington, N.C. , 8 April 1990; Lana Taylor. 
13
"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," Wilmington Journal, 11 August 1951; Wilmington Journal March 1950, Eaton Scrapbook #1; "Text 
of Our Letters," Wilmington Journal, 12 October 1962; "You Can't Keep Us Down," Wilmington Journal, 21 March 1964, Eaton Scrapbook 
#1; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Wilmington, NC, 12 November 1990; Elizabeth Holmes, T.C. Jervay, Leo Shepard. 
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laborers, or domestics feared for their jobs should word of their activities spread to their 
employers. Hubert Eaton was undoubtedly the central figure in the equalization 
campaign. He was hampered by black fears of white retaliation as well as by black 
ignorance of civic affairs.14 The civil rights movement for most black Wilmingtonians 
became first and foremost part of a process of political education. Eaton, Jervay, Kirton, 
Butler, and other black community leaders, although denied direct participation in the 
decision-making process in local government, effectively used the institutions of the black 
community, its clubs, its schools, its civic societies and its press, as means to educate 
local blacks to assume their role in the movement that was slowly building. 
As editor of the Wilmington Journal, Tom Jervay campaigned vigorously in support 
of the school equalization drive and supported Eaton's board of education candidacies 
throughout the 1950s.15 In spite of his eccentricities Jervay had long been at the center 
of Wilmington's black community. Unlike Jervay, Eaton viewed Wilmington blacks from 
the perspective of an outsider and looked upon local black elites, known as the "Cape 
Fear stock," as a particularly "crabbish" group whose lack of self-assertion was the result 
of the racial violence of 1898, when white supremacists had terrorized the city16• 
Though Jervay was more conservative in outlook, he was nearer in spirit to the radical 
publicist and closer than Eaton to the people. When victory in the equalization 
campaign led to the dedication of a new Williston high school, the Journal celebrated the 
achievement and gave special praise to Eaton.11 In the years after the Supreme Court's 
Brown decision, when blacks were building their consensus in support of civil rights, the 
Journal became an effective instrument in support of civil rights protest. 
In spite of the variety of civic and civil rights groups that flourished in Wilmington 
and their relative freedom to organize, the fact remains that Wilmington blacks lagged 
behind the blacks of areas such as Greensboro, Montgomery, or Tallahassee in mobiliz-
ing for organized protest.18 Though there is some evidence of small-scale protests in 
Wilmington as early as 1959, well-organized protest on a large scale did not get under 
way until the summer of 1963.19 By this time black Wilmington had already undergone 
14
"List of Total Receipts," File 1 of 1, Series #5, March 27, 1951 to January 14, 1952, Financial Documents, Equaliz.ation Suit, 1950-51, 
Papers of Hubert Eaton, from Special Collections UNC-Wilmington; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Hubert Eaton, Eliz.abeth Holmes. 
15
"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," Wilmington Journal, 11 August 1951, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Wilmington Journal March 1950 Eaton 
Scrapbook #1; "Editorial," T.C. Je!Vcly, Wilmington Journal, 26 May 1956, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Interview: T.C. Je1Vc1y. 
16Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 43-45; Helen B. Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics in N.C., 1898-1901, (Chapel Hill: UNC 
Press, 1951), p. 233; H. Leon Prather, We Have Taken a City, the Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898, London: Associated 
University Presses, Inc., 1984), p. 88, p. 183; Interview: Hubert Eaton. 
17
"Editorial, • T.C. Je1Vc1y, Wilmington Journal, 5 June 1954, Eaton Scrapbook #1; "Eaton Wins Good Citizenship Award," Wilmington 
Journal, 26 December 1953, Eaton Scrapbook #2. 
18winiam Chafe, Civilities and Civil Righls, Greensboro, N.C. and the Black Freedom Struggle, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980), p. 6; David Garrow, Bearding the Cross, M.L. /(jn[! and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, (New York: First Vintage 
Books, Jan. 1988), pp. 11-12; Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Righls Movement, Black Communities Organizing for Change, (N.Y., 
London: Free Press, 1984), pp. 63-64. 
19
"Negroes State Demonstrations," Wilmington Morning Star, 25 May 1963; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 154-156; Interviews: 
Billie Billie Burnett, Dan D. Cameron, Joan Coco, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton, Leo Shepard. 
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a significant evolution in terms of its economic and institutional structure, but was 
basically operating from within the same institutional setting that it had all along through 
the 1950s. The black school system continued to operate until 1967-68, when the process 
of merger with the white school system got under way. 
After 1965 the pace of change of the structure of black economic and institutional 
life accelerated. The 1968 closing of Williston High School, which had graduated its first 
class in 1923, was a major event which resounded throughout the community in the 
decades ahead. The closing of Community Hospital in 1967, although unaccompanied by 
much in the way of protest, also had a far-reaching impact. But if institutional 
restructuring was significant through the late 1960s, changes in black economic affairs 
were probably as dramatic. Although it is clear that some non-discriminatory hiring of 
blacks during World War II and thereafter lightened the economic burden of blacks in 
the 1950s, it is certain that after 1965 a rapidly changing economic horizon began to 
open up to Wilmington blacks.20 By 1967 incoming manufacturers such as General 
Electric, DuPont, Hercules, and Corning Glass were in the process of completing new 
plants in the Wilmington area.21 In some cases representatives of these plants made 
explicit appeals to the black community, leaving no room for doubt that they intended to 
make minority recruitment a part of their operation. Reverend Edwin Kirton played an 
important role in what might be described as a kind of "community job diplomacy," 
communicating directly with plant public relations managers, urging them to write to 
black school officials to communicate their policies.22 By 1970 a significant movement 
of blacks away from traditional economic mainstays in laboring and domestic service type 
jobs was already well under way, with around 25.6% of the black workforce employed in 
manufacturing positions.23 
Reverend J. Ray Butler perhaps came the closest of any black Wilmingtonian to 
an assumption of the role of the popular leader through the period of organized protest. 
His church had opened early on to discussions of civil rights issues, and like Reverend 
Kirton he praised the efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr. from the pulpit. Through the 
summer of 1963 Ebenezer Baptist became more frequently the locus of meetings that 
swelled in size until the church no longer had seating space. Floyd McKissick, who was 
at that time director of an NAACP youth group, preserving loose affiliation with a 
20
'7ransportation Weck Observed," Carolina Cargo, Summer 1979, pp. 11-12; Lawrence Lee, New Hanover County, A Brief History, 
(Raleigh, N.C.: Division of Archives and History, 2nd, 1977) pp. 88-90; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Dan D. Cameron, 
Bertha Todd. 
21
•ouPont Announcement Is Local Milcston," Sunday Star News, 15 May 1966; "When the World Comes Calling," Carolina Cargo, 
Fall 1976, pp. 12-15; Diane Cobb Cashman, Cape Fear Adventure, p. 91. 
~tters, from D.G. Curley, Employee & Community Relations, General Electric, to Howard O'Dell November 28, 1967; Ibid to 
George Talley, November 28, 1967; Ibid to Ernest Swain, November 28, 1967; Ibid to SJ. Howie, December 1, 1967: Edwin Kirton 
Scrapbook #18, 1969-lm, from Special Collections, UNC Wilmington; "New Industries Seek Qualified Employees," Afro American, 21 
October 1967: Kirton Scrapbook #18, 1969-1972. 
231970 Census of Population, No. 35, Vol. I, North Carolina, Table 44, "Summary of Economic Characteristics, by Counties, 1970," 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Social and Ecomomic Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973). 
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variety of other active civil rights groups, sent twelve specially trained organizers to 
Wilmington. That summer Butler met more than once in Ebenezer Church with small 
cadres of youthful protesters, some of whom were McKissick's organizers, planning the 
non-violent demonstrations that took place with increasing popularity through July and 
August, tapering off gradually thereafter.24 Of the four leaders, Eaton, Jervay, Butler, 
and Kirton, only Reverend Kirton of Saint Marks went as far as to participate in a civil 
rights demonstration.15 
In response to the round of sit-ins in the summer of 1963, the city that was still as 
late as 1960 firmly resolved to resist desegregation, now saw community business leaders, 
the city's mayor, 0.0. Allsbrook, and representatives of the Wilmington Ministerial 
Association come forward with the first public showing of support for civil rights 
aspirations. Reverend Kirton and Hubert Eaton, along with other white and black 
community leaders, were named to a special bi-racial committee that was appointed by 
the City Council as a means to ease tensions and resolve problems created by mass 
demonstrations.26 Reverend J. Ray Butler was left out. Hubert Eaton resigned in 
disgust within a few months in the midst of an intensive campaign of jawboning between 
civil rights supporters and reluctant business leaders.27 In the years from 1965 to 1968, 
the stage was set for the crisis that would accompany federally mandated desegregation 
of the New Hanover County public schools. Through the midst of the crisis, the lead-
ership role assumed by Eaton, Jervay, Butler, Kirton, and many other blacks whose lives 
were touched by the process of change altered in ways that were subtle and sometimes 
profound. Central to this was the fact that a fundamental shift in the structure of black 
economic and institutional life that was already under way in the 1950s was much 
accelerated in the years after 1965. 
In the summer of 1968, just months after the King assassination set off violence 
across the nation which included a full-scale riot in Wilmington, the U.S. District Court 
stepped in, finding the freedom of choice plan inadequate as a means to achieve a 
unitary system of public education in New Hanover County.28 With the closing of 
Williston High School pursuant to a new plan, the massive reorganization of school 
attendance through the years from 1968 to 1972 was set in motion. The closing of 
Community Hospital in 1967, though achieved with few mishaps, contributed to the 
24Intervicws: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Billie Burnett, Rev. J . Ray Butler, Joan Coco, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton, Floyd McKissick; 
Wallace Murchison, Wilmington, N.C., 1 December 1990; Joe Nesbitt , Wilmington, N.C., 12 January 1991; Bertha Todd; William Wagoner, 
Wilmington, N.C., 7 September 1990; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 154-155. 
15Interviews, Ibid; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 156-157; Note: Interviews with Rev. B.H. Baskerville and Bertha Todd establish 
that Kirton participated in a demonstration. 
26
"Interracial Group Named." 'Wilmington Morning Star, 25 May 1963; "Negroes Stage Demonstrations," 'Wilmington Morning Star, 25 
May 1963; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 154-156; foterviews: Hannah Bloch, Wilmington, N.C., 31 May 1990; Dan D. Cameron, Hubert 
Eaton, Wallace Murchison. 
27Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 156-157; Interviews, Ibid; Also, Rev. B.H. Baskerville. 
28 Appellant's Brief, Eaton et al, pp. 5-9; 'Wilmington Morning Star, 11 April 1968; Larry Thomas, "The True Stroy Behind the 
Wilmington Ten," MA. Thesis, (Chapel Hill , N.C.: UNC, 1980), p. 19. 45; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 97-100. 
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process of institutional restructuring. Institutional change, however, coincided with the 
slower and more subtle transition in the economic structure of the black community that 
was well under way as the pace of industrialization and port development hastened 
through these same years. 
The crisis that came finally in 1971 involved many factors and a broad spectrum of 
issues that pertained to the operation of the schools. But undoubtedly the closing of 
Williston High School created a central issue which focused the general discontent of 
black youth and aroused full-force their capacity for resistance.29 This was accomplished 
most effectively by Ben Chavis, an organizer brought in from the outside by the United 
Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice. Chavis had protested the closing of 
Charlotte's black Second Ward High School in 1968, and led resistance to school closings 
in other cities.30 The boycott of the public schools that Chavis led and helped organize 
in February 1971 quickly turned to violence, leaving two dead, more than a dozen 
wounded, and a half million dollars in damages to property in consequence of arson and 
vandalism.31 The crisis within the schools which followed brought high absenteeism, 
frequent evacuation of buildings owing to bomb threats, rioting in schools that included 
the storming of the corridors, assaults on students and teachers, the destruction of school 
property, and frequent suspensions and expulsions. Teachers in the system saw a 
widespread breakdown in the orderly process of instruction, extending down into the 
lower grades through the junior high school level at least.32 Not since 1898 had 
Wilmington seen violence on such a scale. 
It is significant that in the tumultuous world of 1971, as black leaders sought to 
respond to the process of school desegregation, the relationship between local and 
outside community leaders contrasted greatly with the peaceful and cooperative rela-
tionship that had existed during the early civil rights movement. Golden Frinks, of the 
New Bern chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, came to 
Wilmington shortly after the school boycott that was led by Chavis. Describing the 
closing of Williston High Sschool as "an act of destruction against the black 
community," he ultimately played a role that was no more constructive than that of his 
counterpart. Frinks encouraged black separatists to demand the reopening of Williston 
29
"AJI Black Schools Not the Solution," Wilmington Morning Star, 20 March 1971; Wilmington Morning Star, 19 March 1971; Wilmington 
Morning Star 5 February 1971; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, p. 103, pp. 106-107; lntetviews: Carrie Anis; Diane Avery, Wilmington, N.C., 
4 June 1990; Anna Burnett, Hubert Eaton, Elizabeth Holmes; Mildred Modlin, Mocksville, N.C., 28 June 1990; Wayne Moore, Wilmington, 
N.C., 4 April 1987; Jean Taylor, Wilminton, N.C., 14 October 1990; Bertha Todd; Florence Warren, Wilmington, N.C., 14 October 1990. 
30FBI Report , "Black Panther Party,• May 23, 1%9, Charlotle, N.C. Office, CE 157-6171, from FBI File: North Carolina Black Panther 
Party, (Microfilm Publication, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986), Roll #1, Document #0019; Ibid, Document #0024-0025; Myerson, Nothing 
Could Be Finer, pp. 40-41, p. 76, p. 89, p. 104. 
31Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten," pp. 60-62; "Uneasy Quiet Returns," Wilmington Morning Star, 11 February 
1971; "Disturbance Toll Runs Half Million," Wilmington Morning Star, 11 February 1971; Myerson, Nothing could Be Finer, pp. 88-91. 
32Statement of SJ. Howie, March 30, 1971, New Hanover County Public Schools; Wilmington Morning Star, 18 March 1971; Wilmington 
Morning Star, 7 & 8 February 1971; Transcript, N .C. v. Ben Chavis et al, N.C. Court of Appeals, 5th District, No. 745SC436, September 1972, 
Allen Hall, pp. 1249-1250; lntetviews: Diane Avery; Heyward Bellamy, Wilmington, N.C., May 1987; C.D. Gurganus, Wilmington, N.C., 
16 August 1990; May High, Wilmington, N.C., 16 August, 1990; Elizabeth Holmes, Mildred Modlin, John J. Scott, Wilmington, N.C., 13 
August 1990; Jean Taylor, Bertha Todd, Florence Warren. 
73 
South Carolina Historical Association 
and threatened to stage a second boycott if the demands of the students were not met.33 
By late 1971, with the boycott efforts clearly having failed, Chavis donned the garb of 
the clergy and organized a black nationalist religious group called the First African 
Congregation of the Black Messiah.34 The following among black youth and a few black 
parents generated by Chavis and by Frinks was probably not large initially, but their 
emotionalism made them a potent force, serving to indicate the depths of the community 
divisions that had opened up among blacks. Both sounded a call for black unity at the 
same time that they indulged in a militant factionalism that left the black community 
deeply polarized." 
In March 1971, shortly after a meeting of the Wilmington-New Hanover Good 
Neighbor Council, the statements of Golden Frinks, who had been invited to speak, were 
made public. Hubert Eaton soon responded to the SCLC leader's comments on the 
subject of Williston High School. Now serving as vice-chairman of the N.C. Advisory 
Committee on Public Education, Eaton described Frinks as an outsider, without 
sufficient knowledge of Wilmington's educational needs to warrant his call for change. A 
return to separate, all-black schools, said Eaton, was not the solution to the problem 
blacks faced.36 In early April Eaton surprised many by joining the New Hanover County 
board of education in an action in U.S. District Court to seek an injunction against 
Golden Frinks, Ben Chavis, their respective organizations, and a variety of their local 
supporters for interfering in the operation of the county schools.37 
Edwin Kirton shared convictions similar to Eaton's about the problems in the 
schools. By 1971 he had occupied a string of positions on government boards such as 
Opportunities Incorporated, a federal agency whose local office dispensed thousands of 
dollars for programs such as Headstart, Job Corps, and the Neighborhood Youth 
Corps.38 In February 1971, with the city in a state of emergency, Kirton spoke out. He 
warned that violence was no solution to the problems of Wilmington. He urged the 
county board of education to meet with representatives of the boycotting students. 
Calling for three days of prayer in synagogues, churches, and homes, he urged boycott 
proponents to find acceptable avenues through which to communicate their grievances.39 
33Wilmington Morning Star, 19 March 1971; Wilmington Morning Star 20 March 1971; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 109-110. 
34Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten,• pp. 170-173; Myerson, Nothing Could Be Finer, p. 91; See also, alben Oeague, 
The Black Messiah, (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p. 126, p. 219, p. 272. 
"Ben Chavis, "Open Letter to the Black Community," Wilmington Journal, 3 April 1971; Wtlmington Morring Star, 19 March 1971; 
Wilmington Morning Star, 20 March 1971. 
36
"AJ1 Black Schools Not the Solution," Wtlmington Morning Star, 20 March 1971; Eaton, Every Man Should Try, pp. 109-111. 
37Eaton, Every Man Should Try, p. 112; Interview, Huben Eaton. 
38
"Wilmington Ministerial Alliance Elects Rev, Kinon," Afro American, 2S December 196.5; "ACC Helps Poor .. ." Afro American, 29 
July 1967; "$65,000 For Youth Program,· Wilmington Morning Star, 6 January 1967; "1970 Man or the Year," Wtlmington Morning Star, 31 
January 1971. 
39
"Violence No Solution Warns Rev. Edwin E. Kirton," Wilmington Morning Star, 6 February 1971; "Episcopal Group Finances 
Advanced Tutorial Program," Wilmington Morning Siar, 16 December 1970; Editorial, "A Gem of an Idea," Wilmington Morning Star, 16 
December 1970; Editorial, "A Gem or an Idea," Wilmington Morning Star, 17 December 1970. 
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Kirton worked in the schools with a group of parent volunteers that included other 
ministers in an effort to ease tensions and restore the trust of troubled teenagers by 
patrolling school corridors. Sheriffs deputies were included, and in the meantime the 
county hired its first black deputy since the 1890s.40 At Williston Junior High, one of 
the most troubled of the area campuses, Kirton worked frequently as ar. observer. When 
Chavis took to wearing clergyman,s garb, with his followers brandishing weapons before 
the Black Messiah church on Castle Street, Kirton dared to voice criticism in a letter 
written during Christmas 1971. The pastor of St. Mar~ denounced "force ripe prophets," 
whose behavior was "a travesty on the life of Christ, who taught us the full meaning of 
God's love."41 
In the midst of the crisis that came in the wake of federally mandated school 
desegregation, black leaders who had been instrumental in Wilmington,s civil rights 
movement were thrust into a new and challenging role as community economic and 
institutional life altered. Figures such as Eaton, Kirton, Butler, and Jervay were only a 
reflection of the manifold life of the community as a whole. There were many others 
who worked as police officers, teachers, school principals, attorneys, or in other trades 
and professions. Doubtless, too, there were many who felt a profound ambivalence 
about the violence and turmoil that beset the city. Tom Jervay, as radical publicist for a 
community that was deeply fragmented, reflected the community's ambivalence by 
providing a sympathetic front page coverage of Chavis's activities, while proclaiming 
peace and good will at the same time.42 Doubtless Jervay, too, harbored deep 
suspicions at the action of the county and the courts in the closing of Williston High 
SchooJ.43 Jervay admired the militant Chavis enough to be amused at the uneasiness 
with which white reporters covered the appearances he made at his downtown head-
quarters. When violence came, Jervay denounced it and found himself soon at the 
Wilmington Police station on behalf of law enforcement with former mayor Dan 
Cameron.44 Jervay's role was far more ambivalent than that of Eaton or Kirton, but as 
publisher of the Journal it was inevitable. As leaders of the civil rights movement they 
had summoned the courage and the resourcefulness of local blacks to act in their own 
self-interest, to advance their cause through organized protest to reform local institutions. 
But with far-reaching changes under way in the city, with federally mandated school 
desegregation implemented on the principle of racial balance, and considerable growth 
and change under way in the social, economic, and institutional structure of the 
community, they had become, perhaps out of necessity, the tamers of the whirlwind. 
40Letter, SJ. Howie, Williston Jr. High to Rev. Kirton, June 28, 1971; "Church E.stablishes Reading Clinic," Wilmington Morning Star, 
19 November 1971; Interview: Joe McQueen, Wilmington, N.C., 5 June 1990. 
41 Pastoral letter, "Christmas Greetings, 1971," St. Mark's Episcopal Church, to Parishioners and Friends, from Dr. Edwin E. Kirton, 
Kirton Scrapbook #20, 1970.1972. 
42Wumington Journal, 13 February 1971; Ibid, "An Apostle of Good Will," 13 February 1971. 
43
"Williston In Retrospect," Wilmington Journal, 9 June 1988; • A Bit of History," Wilmington Journal, 13 March 1986; Interview: T.C. 
Jervay. 
44Interviews: Dan D. Cameron, T.C. Jervay. 
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THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN: 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA REPUBLICAN 
PAR1YINTHE 
POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA 
Harris M. Bailey, Jr. 
Lander College 
"I don't know where he got them," said United States Senator Coleman L. Blease (D-
SC) of the 1,123 votes cast for Calvin Coolidge (R) by South Carolinians in the Presidential 
Election of 1924. "I was astonished to know they were cast and shocked to know they were 
counted."1 Blease's assessment of the presidential election of 1924 and the state's 
Republican vote count was not uncommon among white Carolinians. To all but a handful 
of South Carolinans the South Carolina Republican party was nonexistent. The last 
Republican to serve in the South Carolina House of Representatives was John W. Bolts of 
Georgetown in 1900. The last Republican to represent South Carolina in the United States 
Congress was George Washington Murray in 1896. In statewide elections the Republican 
party had not been a serious political threat to the state's Democrats since the election of 
1876. In the governor's race of 1892 the party fielded a slate headed by E. A Webster 
which was easily outdistanced by Benjamin Ryan Tillman.2 
Following the end of Reconstruction, the Republican party, (portrayed as the "negro 
party" and infectiously corrupt), was unable to muster enough strength to become a 
permanent opposition party. Outside of the state's "Black Belt," bitter factional disputes 
within the party blocked attempts at fusion, "a combination of minority parties to defeat a 
1Numan V. Bartley and Hugh G. Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1975), 
p. 12. 
2George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 
44. 
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majority party,"3 with disgruntled factions in the Democratic Party. To the casual observer 
the post-Reconstruction Republican party was an abject failure: unable to elect officials to 
statewide offices; unable to deliver electoral votes to the Republican presidential candidates; 
unable to curtail internal factional strife. 
Given the dissension in the South Carolina Republican party in the years between 
1876 and 1940 and its many shortcomings, was it truly a political party? The British 
statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke described the political party as "A body of men 
united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular 
principle in which they are all agreed."4 In the nineteenth century and until the middle of 
the twentieth century, political parties carried out five specific functions: (1) setting a 
political agenda, (2) establishing a network of political operatives, (3) recruiting candidates, 
(4) raising money and organizing campaigns, and (5) rewarding loyalty to the political 
agenda by operatives with patronage. On one level these functions characterized the 
organizational structure of the political party. At another level they described the behavior 
of the political organization. This article will place the post-Reconstruction Republican 
party in South Carolina within the context of these five functions. 
The South Carolina Republican Party During the Bourbon Restoration 
The development of the South Carolina Republican party can be traced through five 
distinctive phases: phase one, the foundation of the South Carolina Republican party (1865 
to 1876); phase two, the politics of accommodation, the South Carolina Republican party 
during the Bourbon Restoration (1877 to 1895); phase three, McKinney's "pacification 
policy" and the reorganization of the South Carolina Republican party (1896 to 1908); phase 
four, Bossism, Factionalism and Patronage, the South Carolina Republican party and the 
lily-white movement (1909 to 1940); and phase five, the decline of the traditional South 
Carolina Republican party and the birth of the modern South Carolina Republican party 
(1941 to 1962). 
The South Carolina Republican party came into existence on March 21, 1867 at the 
Military Hall in Charleston, South Carolina, when delegates from nine counties formed the 
Union Republican party. A fourteen-member committee, formed on March 7, presented 
to the gathering an eleven-point party platform. The twelve blacks and two whites on the 
platform committee called for a system of free public education, internal improvements, land 
redistribution, homestead legislation, and other radical reform measures.5 In the days to 
follow, political operatives spread out, first to the black majority Low Country and later into 
the upstate to organize Republican clubs. As a result of their efforts, in the November 
presidental election of 1868 Ulysses. S. Grant obtained 57.9% (63,301 of 107,538) of the 
state's votes. In the special election of 1868 to seat the General Assembly, 134 of 155 
3Jay M. Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of AMerican Government and Politics, (Chicago: the Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 238. 
4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of U.S. Political Panies, Volume I, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973, p. xxxiv. 
5w.E.B. DuBoise, Black Reconstruction in America, JB(J()..1880, (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 19TI), p. 388. Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988), pp. 281·345. 
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legislators (86.4%) were Republicans. In the nine legislative sessions between 1868 and 
1876, 1,174 (76.7%) Republicans were seated in the General Assembly. In the presidential 
elections between 1868 and 1876, the Republican party increased its turnout by 29,485 
votes.6 Within the artifical political bubble created by Congressional Reconstruction and 
maintained by military occupation, the South Carolina Republican party flourished. Yet, 
in this period of success and growth, the infrastructure of the party was rattled by 
factionalism. Joel Williamson, the author of After Slavery, makes the argument that internal 
factionalism was non-ideological in nature and that it grew out of "prejudices each (black 
and whites) entertained toward the other."7 By 1872 the factional infighting had become 
politicized. The party split into two wings: The Reform (conservative) Republicans and the 
Regular (radical) Republicans. The Reform wing of the party took up the fight against 
government corruption and worked to form fusion tickets with like-minded Democrats. The 
Regulars, largely composed of blacks, were staunch supporters of the policies of the national 
party. According to Hanes Walton in Black Republicans, during this period the membership 
rolls of the party never numbered more than 4,000 individuals. The Regulars had the most 
stable membership pool, and they made a concerted effort to expand the party. The 
Reform wing was more fluid in membership. Over time, whites in the Reform wing came 
and went at whim.8 Factionalism also took on other aspects as different groups attempted 
to take control of the party. This internal strife intensified in the waning days of 
Reconstruction. 
On April 11, 1877, following the disputed election of 1876, the Republican Governor 
of South Carolina, Daniel Henry Chamberlain surrendered the executive office to Governor-
elect Wade Hampton (D). Out of 183,388 votes cast, Hampton had defeated Chamberlain 
by 1,134 votes. The results of the election of 1876 and the Compromise of 1877 ended ten 
years of Congressional Reconstruction in South Carolina. Redemption meant the return of 
"Home Rule" and the triumph of white supremacy over "Negro Rule.'19 
Traditionally, the defeat of Chamberlain and the withdrawal of Federal troops from 
South Carolina have marked the end of the South Carolina Republican party and black 
participation in South Carolina politics. Yet, outside the mainstream of South Carolina 
politics, the Republican party still was a dynamic organization even if it played only a 
limited role in the political process. 
The factionalism of Reconstruction spilled over into the post-Reconstruction period. 
This factional discord can be placed into three broad categories: native vs. non-native, black 
vs. white, and the new freedmen vs. the antebellum freedmen. Structurally, following 1876, 
as the party attempted to resuscitate itself, it broke off into two broad groups, non-native 
and native. The first group included black and white members who had migrated to the 
6James Welch Patton, '7he Republican Party in the South 1876-1895," in Essays in Southern History, ed., Melvin Green, (Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina: University of North CarolinaPress, 1949), p. 91. Robert A. Diamond, Congressional Quanerly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975). 
7Hanes Walton, Jr. Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tan , (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975), 
p. 108. 
8Ibid., pp. 104-108. 
9Hampton M. Jerrell, Wade Hampton and the Negro , (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), p. 100. 
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state during Reconstruction. Toe second group was divided into various subgroups. The 
subgroups of native South Carolinians were antebellum freedmen, Unionists, and the 
remnants of the old southern Whig party. Each subgroup was further subdivided into black 
and white cliques. In addition the black clique was subdivided into groups representing 
dark- and light-skinned blacks. 
In 1876, despite the loss of the governorship, Republicans maintained a slight 
majority in both chambers of the General Assembly. Yet as the turmoil of the 1876 election 
cleared, special elections and resignations reduced th~ Republicans to the status of a 
minority party. Republicans retained 35 seats in the House of Representives and seven 
seats in the Senate. By 1878 only ten Republicans served in General Assembly.10 
At the 1878 nominating convention of the South Carolina Republican party the 
delegates spit into three factions. One faction wanted to field a full legislative ticket. A 
second faction agitated for fusion with reformist Democrats. The third and largest faction, 
led by Robert Smalls, carried the convention and, as a result, the party contested only 
congressional, legislative, and local elections. Smalls reasoned that it would serve the long-
term interest of the party to rebuild from the bottom up while not alienating the newly 
installed Bourbon Conservatives by seeking statewide constitutional offices. As a result of 
the Smalls strategy, between 1878 and 1895 thirty-two Republicans served in the legislature. 
Of that number, thirty were blacks from the black majority counties in the Low Country. 11 
In the 1880s a number of external and internal political factors reoriented the state's 
Republican party. The most important factor was the reapportionment of 1882, which 
created the black majority Seventh Congressional District. William J. Cooper, Jr., in 
"Economics or Race: An analysis of the Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," 
writes, ''Throughout the 1880's Negroes in the Black District [the Seventh Congressional 
District] had enjoyed a political life; they elected black legislators and black congressmen--
Republicans all. Negroes outside the Black District had, with exceptions, no political life." 
Containing 31,152 blacks, and making up 81.6% of the population, the Seventh 
Congressional District became the power base of the Republican party. This district 
included the counties of Beaufort, Berkeley, and Georgetown. It also took in parts of 
Colleton, Charleston, Willimsburg, Clarendon, Orangeburg, Sumter, and Richland counties. 
For a number of years the district was considered a "safe Congressional seat" for 
Republicans. According to the Charleston News and Courier, from 1886 to 1888 Republican 
turnout in the district increased by more than 1,250 votes.12 In some instances dissenting 
factions in the Republican party fused with white Democrats to field opposition tickets to 
the official Republican slate of candidates. The Black District was also the site of a unique 
experiment in fusion politics. Under the "Georgetown Plan" certain legislative and county-
wide elective offices were allocated to Democratic and Republican candidates. State 
Senator Bruce H. Williams, a black Republican from Georgetown, declared that the plan 
1
°Tindall, "South Carolina Negroes, 1877-190()," pp. 309-310. 
11William J. Cooper, Jr., "Economical or Race: An Analysis of The Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," (Ibe South 
Carolina Historical MAgazine, 73 October 1972), p. 210. 
12william J. Cooper, Jr., The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1880, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 104. 
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amounted "to a fair and equal distribution of the offices without regard to race or party 
affiliations."13 The Georgetown Plan was extended to Beaufort and Berkeley counties. 
Outside the Black District the Republican party was in total disarray. The politicized 
factionalism of the 1870s had deteriorated into personal attacks. The Bowen and Mackey 
factions grew out of a dispute between Christopher Bowen and Edmund W. M. Mackey. 
Bowen was responsible for having Mackey's father, A G. Mackey, removed from the post 
of Collector of the Port of Charleston. At the 1890 party convention one angry delegate 
called Robert Smalls "a penitentiary convict."14 The 1880s saw the first serious attempts by 
white Republicans such as Ellery M. Brayton and R. W. Memminger to "Hamptonize" the 
South Carolina Republican party. Appointed Collector of Revenue for South Carolina in 
1880, Brayton came to the state with the "hope of building up a white Republican party."15 
While advocating a limited role for blacks in the party, they appealed for a wider range of 
white support. The "new southern republicanism" would be based on the industrialization 
of the state, the diversification of the state's agricultural base, and a program of immigration 
which would bring northern money and Republican voters to South Carolina.16 These lily-
white movements heightened tensions in the party. 
Factional conflicts restricted the effectiveness of the party to contest elections at the 
state-wide level. In 1884 the party nominated a full ticket, picking Daniel T. Corbin, a white 
New Yorker still residing in New York, for governor and Daniel Augustus Straker, a black 
lawyer from Barbados, for lieutenant governor. Only Straker, a naturalized citizen and 
prominent Orangeburg attorney, actively campaigned for office. During the election 
tabulations Straker's votes were thrown out because the state of South Carolina refused to 
accept his documentation of citizenship.17 In 1890 bickering between fictions led by 
Brayton and E. A Webster. deadlocked the convention and prevented the party from 
presenting a slate. Fred Nix, a black Brayton supporter, told the delegates, "I'm as good a 
Republican as any man in South Carolina, but I'll go home and vote for Ben Tillman before 
I'll support your slate."18 
The most serious threat to the political effectiveness of the South Carolina 
Republican party came from the South Carolina Democratic party and its control of state 
government institutions. The political accomplishments of the Republican party during the 
Bourbon Restoration, 1877 to 1895, were gradually undermined by a program of fraud, 
intimidation, and restrictive legislation. 
The first attemtps to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina came with 
the passage of the Eight Box Law in 1882. Formulated by Edward Mccrady, Jr., the Eight 
Box Law was a literacy test which required "voters to choose by the label the proper box for 
13Tindall, •south Carolina Negroes, 1877-19()(),• pp. 63-{;4. 
14Patton, "'The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 97. Thomas Holt, Black Over While, (Chicago: University of lllionis 
Press, 1977), pp. 114-116. 
15Patton, "'The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 98. 
16i>aul Lcwinson, Race, Class, and Pany, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 171. 
171..awrence Bryant,Negro Lawmakers in South CArolina, 1868-1902, (Orangeburg, South Carolina: South Carolina State College, 1967), 
p. 95. 
18Patton, "'The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 98. 
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hi~ ballot."19 Other provisions of the bill stan~ardized. the ballot. Ballots were to be 
pnnted on "plain white paper of two. and a h.alf .mches wide by five inches l~ng, clear an~ 
even cut, without ornament, designation, mut1lat1on, symbol or mark of any kind whatever. 
In the congressional elections of 1890 for the 7th Congressional seat, 7, 026 votes for 
Thomas Miller, a black Republican, were thrown out because his ballots were "one-sixteenth 
of an inch shorter than required by law," and they were printed on ''white paper of a 
distinctly yellow tinge." Miller lost the election by 477 votes.20 
The Eight Box Law also outlined the mechanism for dealing with more ballots in the 
ballot box than names on the poll tax list. In cases of excessive balloting, "the clerk (local 
registrar) shall without seeing the ballots, draw therefrom and immediately destroy as many 
as there are in excess."21 Excessive balloting was not an uncommon practice in South 
Carolina politics. In the election of 1880, 6,247 votes were cast in excess of the names on 
the poll tax list.22 
In regard to voter registration, the law allowed the local registrar "to his satisfaction" 
to open the voter roll to "qualified voters" who had failed to register. McCrady, the author 
of the Eight Box Law, estimated that registration and education requirements would 
disfranchise 12,000 whites and 71,000 blacks.23 With the Republican voter turnout declining 
with each election, in 1888 Governor John P. Richardson told a correspondent for the News 
and Courier, "We now have the rule of a minority of four hundred thousand over a majority 
of six hundred thousand . .. the only thing which stands today between us and their rule is 
a flimsy statute--the Eight Box Law--which depends for its effectiveness upon the unity of 
the white people."24 
The rising political fortunes of the agrarian movement, led by John L. M. Irby and 
Benjamin Ryan Tillman, splintered the Democratic party. During the 1890s the Bourbon 
Conservatives pressed hard to regain control of the party and the state government from the 
Tillmanites. In the election of 1890 the Bourbon Conservatives bolted and fielded an 
opposition ticket in the general election against Tillman. Breaking with the tradition of 
white democratic solidarity, A. G. Haskell, the leader of the Bourbon Conservatives, made 
an open appeal to black voters for support. In response to Haskell's plea, a group of black 
civic leaders met in Columbia and debated the situation in the Democratic party. The 
conference recommended that blacks "for the betterment of the condition ... vote the 
Haskell Ticket."25 Because of the racist overtones in Haskell's appeal, the Republican party 
endorsed the ticket but did not actively support the candidate. Haskell, one of the primary 
architects of the "Red Shirt Strategy" in the election of 1876, in terms of political gains 
1
~indall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, p. 69. 
20Patton, "The RepublicanParty in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 107. 
21Ibid., 106. 
22Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 108. 
23J. Morgan Kousscr, The Shaping of Southern Politics, (New Haven, Massachusetts: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 145. 
24Ibid., p. 145. 
Zi.'indall, The South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, p. 53. 
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promised nothing to potential black supporters in order to placate potential white 
supporters. Haskell's straightout ticket polled 14,828 votes to Tillman's 59,159 votes.26 
In 1894 a dispute erupted within the ranks of the Tillmanites as Tillman's lieutenants 
jostled for position to succeed him as governor. John Gary Evans won the Democratic 
nomination for governor, but Dr. Sampson Pope bolted and ran in the general election as 
an independent. Pope only obtained 17,828 votes of 56,785 votes cast.v Bolstered by his 
strong showing at the polls (he got 30.4% of the vote), and the support he received from 
factions within the Republican party, Pope called "a convention of Republicans of all color" 
to organize for the election of 1896. 28 
As T. Harry Williams writes in Romance and Realism in Southern Politics, "there was 
a vestigial Republican party in almost every state that had to be constantly watched."29 This 
''vestigial Republican party" in South Carolina and the danger of a legitimate fusion with 
dissident Agrarian elements and Bourbon Conservatives led to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1895. The major thrust of the convention was legally to eliminate the black 
vote by embracing a series of educational and property qualifications as well as 
institutionalizing fraud. The "discouragement to Negro registration" eroded the Republican 
base of support and eliminated it as a political factor in state politics.30 
The Functions of A Political Party 
At the end of the Civil War South Carolina to a large extent was a "rudimentary 
democratic state." There had been very little two-party development in antebellum South 
Carolina. For South Carolina in many ways Reconstruction was Jacksonian Democracy 
delayed. As the franchise was extended to all male citizens in the state, the South Carolina 
Republican party became the great experiment in participatory democracy. 
Not favored by the Founding Fathers or mandated by the Constitution, political 
parties developed out of political necessity. The Hamiltonian Federalists used a loose party 
structure to marshal support for their political agenda. The Jefferson Republicans created 
a centralized organization to pursue and capture political offices. As a consequence of the 
American constitutional structure and the expansion of the political culture in American 
society, political parties thrived. It was during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods that 
the party system evolved into its specific mission.31 
26Coopcr, "Economics of Race: An Analysis of the Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," p. 211. 
Z7Francis Butler Simkins, The Tillman Movement in South Carolina, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 1926), p. 181·182. 
28David Duncan Wallace, South Carolina: A Short History, 1520-1948, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
1951), p. 630. 
»r. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1966),p. 48. 
JOwallacc, South Carolina: A Short History, 1520-1948, pp. 630-632. For a discussion of the Republican response to the 1895 
Constitutional Convention, sec: Randy Wellford, "Disenfranching the Black Citizens: The S.C. Constitutional Convention of 1895," in Black 
Carolinians: Studies in the History of South Carolina Negroes in the Ni~teenth Century, ed., Charles W. Joyner, (Laurinburg. North Carolina: 
St. Andrews Presbyterian College). 
31For a discussion of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian party systems, see Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Pany System, 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1966). 
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In Parties and Politics in America, Clinton Rossiter argued that these functions were 
subsidiary. The inclusive function of the party was to coalesce and control factionalism and 
direct that energy in the struggle for political po~~r.32 Frank.J. Sorauf, Political Parties in 
the American System, divided the functions of a pohttcal party mto two categories: manifest 
and latent. He described manifest functions as the operational activities of a party and 
latent functions as the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of a party.33 within each 
party, according to Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, are a 
number of subgroups with their own political agendas. It is the function of the party 
leadership to bargain with these subgroups and find a workable compromise which merges 
their agendas with that of the party. These coalitions add to the party's electoral strength 
and the overall party structure.3,1 
In the nineteenth century the American party system existed to execute five 
distinctive functions. (1) At the national level a political party established a nationwide 
political agenda which attracted supporters. (2) At the state and local level, a political party 
constructed a network of political operatives to implement its national agenda. (3) At the 
national, state, and local levels, a political party recruited agents/ candidates for elective 
posts to carry out the policies and programs of the party. ( 4) At all levels, political parties 
raised money and organized the political campaigns of their candidates for office. (5) The 
parties rewarded loyalty to the national party and support for the party's political agenda 
with patronage and pork barrel at all levels. 
With this as a backdrop, was the post-Reconstruction South Carolina Republican 
party able to perform these functions? Given the racial constraints of the day and the 
program of organized fear and intimidation carried on against it, the party was moderately 
successful. 
FUNCTION 1: Did the party establish a political agenda attractive to a spectrum of 
supporters? 
James Welch Patton argues that a key shortcoming of the party was its failure to 
develop an original platform addressing the needs of the state. Ousted from power, the 
Republican leadership clung to its reformist tradition and continued to promote the use of 
government as an agent of change. The party's platform was built upon its past 
accomplishments in the areas of public education, tax reform, and humanitarian care of the 
mentally ill. Despite its internal discontent the party was steadfast in its support of the 
institutions and programs established during the Reconstruction period. Attacking the lack 
of originality exhibited by the party, Patton observed that the documents and resolutions of 
the party were "copied" or "lifted boldly" from the platforms of Northern states or the 
Republican National Convention. All of this is true. But a substantial number of South 
Carolinians, the party's black rank and file, accepted without question the aspirations of the 
320inton Rossiter, Panies and Politics in America, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 45-50. 
33Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 2-39. 
3,1Samuel J. Eldersveld, parties Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 1-23. 
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National Republican party. The Republican party was first and foremost the party of 
freedom and equality. It was the party of OPPORTUNITY and middle class values of hard 
work and thrift. A vast majority of the black population of South Carolina wholeheartedly 
embraced or aspired to these values. 
FUNCTION 2: Did the party construct a network of political operatives to implement its 
political agenda? 
The ability to survive despite the taxing odds against survival is the greatest 
achievement of the South Carolina Republican party. Party officials were able to construct 
an immense electoral pool from Freedman's Bureau contacts and the membership rolls of 
the statewide Union Leagues. Like missionaries, the sons nd daughters of the antebellum 
free black families of Charleston spread out across the state and brought many Freedmen 
into the party. Turnout in presidential elections during the Reconstruction period grew with 
each election. Despite legal and illegal restrictions, Republican turnout in the "Black 
District" was respectable. Turnout in other areas of the state was marginal. 
There was without question a continuity of leadership in the party. Men such as 
Martin R. Delany and Robert C. DeLarge were followed by such leaders as Robert B. 
Elliott and Robert Smalls. In time they were succeeded by Thomas E. Miller and William 
D. Crum. White political bosses such as Christopher Bowen and E.W. M. Mackey faded 
and were followed by Ellery M. Brayton and Webster. They, in tum, would be displaced 
by Joseph Tolbert and John G. Capers. 
FUNCTION 3: Did the party recruit candidates for elective posts at the statewide and local 
level? 
Much attention is attached to the fact that after 1876 at the statewide level the 
Republican party was not competitive. Yet in congressional, legislative, and local elections, 
the party was quite competitive. Between 1868 to 1900, in 75 congressional elections the 
Republican party fielded candidates. Turnout for congressional elections was quite high. 
Statewide, in 1880, 60,796 Republican votes were cast in the state's seven congressional 
districts. In the first election after the enactment of the Eight Box Law, the statewide 
congressional vote fell by over 30,000 votes, but 20,369 Republicans were still able to vote. 
In the three elections from 1890 to 1895 the Republican turnout in congressional elections 
averaged 13,414 votes. In presidential elections Republican turnout dropped off 
substantially after 1876, but did not fall below 10,000 votes until 1896. 
FUNCTION 4: Did the party raise money and organize political campaigns? 
The least successful aspect of the South Carolina Republican party was its ability to 
raise money. Being primarily a party of black yeomen, it lacked wealthy benefactors. Its 
leaders, for the most part, were underpaid federal bureaucrats who financially contributed 
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little to the party. To a large extent the fi?ancial base of the party was dependent upon the 
~upport of Northern political philanthi:op1sts: . But philanthropists were unwilling to invest 
m the party's future given its political mstab1hty. In part the party's political failings. were 
caused by the fmancial condition of the party. At the state convention of 1884 Chamnan 
Robert Smalls passed the hat to solicit funds to pay the cost of cleaning the meeting hall.15 
FUNCTION 5: Did the state party reward its members for their loyalty to the national 
party? 
During most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries critics of the South Carolina 
Republican party have argued that it was only a conduit for federal patronage. Patton 
writes, "the party sank to little more than a political fiction, an aggregation of federal office 
holders and placemen. . . . 36 Shut out of higher statewide constitutional offices, 
appointments to the federal bureaucracy were the only means by which Republicans could 
serve the people in a meaningful manner. In much of the literature of the day, patronage 
was identified with "the pie hunt" or "easy berth" or "financial remuneration." Willard 
Gatewood forcefully makes the case that "a federal office provided them [black Republicans] 
the means to bargain with whites. . . ."37 The politics of patronage furthered factional 
disputes within the state party. The white political bosses were ruthless in their attempts 
to gain control of and hold onto the flow of federal patronage in the state. Black leaders 
argued that there was an unequal distribution of patronage in the state. Blacks, who 
represented the bulk of the party's political base, were, for the most part, given minor or 
insignificant bureaucratic posts. The patronage controversy also stimulated caste animosities 
within the black leadership caucus. The less influential party members accused the national 
party of lavishing patronage on a handful of specific black leaders and ignoring the rest of 
the caucus. In the long term, patronage totally saturated the ideological goals of the party. 
By the 1900s, Hanes Walton, Jr. notes, "the group [Black and Tan organization] made only 
minor attempts to enter state and local politics but emerged every four years to go to the 
national convention, get seated, and acquire patronage, the last being its chief objective."38 
CONCLUSION 
By the turn of the century, the South Carolina Republican party had retreated from 
the political playing field. There would be occasional campaign . sorties, but they were 
hollow gestures. After the disenfranchisement convention of 1895 the party was a coffer of 
dreams. The loyal core of black middle-class supporters desperately held onto the dreams 
of the past. They dreamed of the opportunity to participate on a fair and equal footing on 
15Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 101. 
~bid., p. 96-101. 
37Willard B. Gatewood, "William D. Crum: A Negro in Politics," Journal of Negro History, 53 October 1968, p. 305. 
JBwalton, "Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tans," p. 114. 
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a level political playing field. White factions continued to dream of mobilizing large blocks 
of voters to capture elections or building a "respectable" white party free of "negro 
influence." But it is clear that the South Carolina Republican party was little more than a 
political shadow. 
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, party infighting at the state and 
national level, coupled with disenfranchisement efforts, devastated the South Carolina 
Republican party. Year after year, these forces ate away at the party, gradually eroding its 
ability to fulfill the specific functions of a political party. Leadership was the greatest failing 
of the state's Republican party. The leadership was unable to quash the flare-up of personal 
disputes in the party or control the growth of factionalism. If the leadership had adopted 
coalition strategies, fusion tickets with factional elements in the Democratic party might 
have made the party more competitive in statewide elections. While fusion politics enjoyed 
limited success in South Carolina at the local level, a number of factors acted as a barrier 
to a true statewide fusion ticket. Racial animosities and mistrust were a deterrent to 
coalition building. Many Republicans feared losing their political identity if they 
compromised and joined with breakaway Democrats. Black leaders felt that political fusion 
meant political displacement for the politically active black citizenry. The leadership also 
failed · to make an impact on the state's political agenda. The black and white leadership 
of the party allowed the Democrats to dictate the content of political debate within South 
Carolina. Substantial questions of policy and ideology were subjugated to questions of race 
and, to a subliminal degree, questions of caste. The rhetoric of white supremacy and black 
inferiority replaced discussions of the needs and goals of public education, of basic civil and 
human rights, and the industrialization of the state. The state's Republican leadership was 
drawn into these arguements and failed to build on Reconstruction successes. 
Part of the demise of the South Carolina Republican party can be blamed on the 
national Republican party. The inability of the national Republican party to develop a 
"southern strategy" or to support the South Carolina party in its struggle against 
disenfranchisement doomed the party. Looking back, the South Carolina Republican party 
can easily be characterized as "political fiction." In many instances the party failed to carry 
out many of the functions expected of a political party. Beyond campaigns and elections, 
however, although unable to provide many political needs, the South Carolina Republican 
party provided esteem needs. For blacks it was connection to a more triumphant past. It 
was one of the few institutions in the state where blacks and whites met on a semi-equal 
level. The party represented middle class respectability. If these factors are taken into 
account it is understandable why, after twenty years of political repression, black Republican 
activists would strongly support Eisenhower in 1952. The history of the South Carolina 
Republican party is a story of opportunities lost in a sea of possibilities. 
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THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING 
MENDEL RIVERS AND HIS 
BA1TLE WITH THE 
BOTTLE 
Will Huntley 
Governor's School for Science 
and Mathematics 
Representative Lucius Mendel Rivers' alleged drinking problem generated 
controversy prior to and especially after he became chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC). Although his difficulties with liquor were more pronounced in his 
early years, they substantially subsided when he became chairman and yet, ironically, this 
is when they received the most print and criticism. This paper will cite some incidents which 
were never put into print, relate concerns by others in the Congress, and examine the 
charges made against Charleston's congressman regarding this problem. 
As Mendel Rivers' power in congress increased, so did his problems with alcohol. 
Within a few years after being elected to congress in 1940, Rivers began to have trouble 
controlling his drinking. It was something that only certain members of his immediate 
family and a few intimate friends knew about for close to a decade.1 Not even the 
congressman's sister, Madge, was aware that he was drinking to excess until 1958.2 
By the mid-1950s Rivers' excessive drinking became known to others.3 Ironically, 
Rivers' First District constituents and the people of South Carolina were the last to learn 
of his bouts with the bottle} This was because whenever the Low Country lawmaker went 
on a drinking spree he was usually out of the state or out of the country. Rivers also was 
not a constant drinker. Even during the worst period of his hard drinking he would go 
1Interview with Judge L. Mendel Rivers, Jr., son of the late congressman, Charleston, SC, February 26, 1986. 
2Interview with Mrs. Madge Danley, sister of the late congressman, conducted by Dr. Walter J. Fraser, Charleston, SC, January 12, 1973. 
3Rivers, op. cil. 
4Confidential conversation with researcher. 
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about five or six months without touching a drop of liquor; once he did, though, he lost 
control of himself.5 His binges usually lasted about two weeks.6 On those rare occasions 
when they occurred in South Carolina, he had friends who would spirit him away to 
Asheville or Beaufort to dry out.7 
Over a period of time some of his constituents found out about his inappropriate 
drunken behavior through others who had witnessed it firsthand. One constituent, who was 
traveling in Europe in 1957, heard from a US Army officer stationed in Germany that 
Rivers had gotten into some trouble in Heidelberg and it had been the officer's 
responsibility to help get him on a plane back home. The officer was surprised to discover 
that the constituent was unaware of Rivers' drinking problem which he thought most 
everyone in the First Congressional District knew.8 
One at least one other occasion Rivers again was put on a plane which returned him 
to Charleston. Congressman William Jennings Bryan Dorn was at his home in Greenwood 
when he got a phone call from a man in Lynchburg, Virginia who told Dorn that Rivers was 
out cold, "buck-naked" on the floor. The man warned Dorn that "if you don't come and get 
him he is not going to live." Dom immediately enlisted the help of a friend who owned a 
plane and they flew up to Lynchburg. After arriving they went to where Rivers was staying, 
carried him out, loaded him on the plane, and took off for Charleston. Prior to leaving 
Lynchburg, Dorn contacted people in Charleston and instructed them to meet their party 
at the airport and to take Rivers home.9 
Rivers came close to ruining his own "Mendel Rivers Appreciation Day" which was 
held in Charleston in May 1958. Before getting on a plane in Washington, which was to 
take him and other government officials to Charleston to help celebrate, Rivers made a stop 
at a liquor store where he bought a large quantity of whiskey. On the flight home he began 
drinking and became intoxicated. Fortunately Rivers rode in a 35-car parade the next 
morning and just had to wave at the crowd, but in the afternoon he was to give a speech to 
thousands of admirers at Johnson Hagood Stadium. Underneath the stands his daughter 
Peggy grabbed out of his hands a bottle of bourbon he had been nipping and smashed it on 
the ground. It became apparent to Congressman Dorn and others that Rivers was in no 
condition to make a speech. Dorn advised him to tell those assembled that he was too full 
of emotion to speak long or adequately. He took Dom's advice and made his speech 
exceptionally brief. Still, disaster almost struck as Rivers came close to falling off the 
podium after he finished his remarks.10 The thousands who had come to hear Rivers were 
not aware of the real reason why he kept his speech so short. 
5Rivers, op. ci1. 
6Rivers, op. cit. and interview with the HonorabJ~ William Jennings Bryan Dom, former member of the House of Representatives, 
Greenwood, SC, March 1, 1985. 
7Interview with Jack Leland, retired reporter for the Charleston E\'ening Post, Charleston, SC, June 7. 1985, and interview with Mrs. 
Blanche Darby Odom, sister of the later congressman, conducted by Dr. Walter J. Fraser, Charleston, SC, January 12, 1973. 
8Confidential conversation with researcher. 
9Dom, op. cit. 
1
°Dom, op. cit. 
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The drinking became so bad that Mend:l Rivers was considered by some in authority 
!o be a. liability to the government of th~ Uruted States. In 195~ Rivers made a military 
mspect10n trip to Spain and other bases m Europe. Somehow nvers managed to wander 
away from military officials and could not be f?und.. After an extensive search was 
conducted, he was discovered in a vineyard conversmg with a drunken Spaniard in Gullah.11 
The team from the CIA which participated in the search was shaken, but concluded that 
Rivers had not inadvertently given away any American military secrets.12 Fortunately for 
Rivers this incident was not reported to the press, but his nemesis Drew Pearson did report 
in one of his syndicated columns that the Low Country's lawmaker was seen chasing a nude 
woman down a hotel hall in Madrid.13 This sorry incident made Mendel Rivers out to be 
a womanizer, which he was not. 14 It was a case where he lost the better part of himself to 
liquor. 
There were people on the Democratic side of the aisle who had serious reservations 
about Mendel Rivers possibly becoming the chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee due to his drinking. What had happened on the 1958 European inspection tour--
being found drunk in a Spanish vineyard, chasing the nude woman down the hall in Madrid, 
other incidents which later happened in France and Germany, and his attempt to fire his 
escort officer who was trying to keep him in tow--worried Carl Vinson (D-GA), the powerful 
chairman of the HASC and Rivers' boss.15 What complicated matters for Vinson just a few 
years later was the prospect that Rivers could follow him as chairman, as three members 
who were senior to Rivers on the HASC departed for various reasons. 
In 1959 Overton Brooks (D-LA) left to become chairman of the newly formed 
Science and Astronautics Committee. Carl Durham (D-NC), announced he would not seek 
re-election in 1960. Paul Kilday (D-TX) resigned from the House in September 1961 to 
become a judge on the Court of Military Appeals. This upset Vinson's plans for retirement 
in January 1963, as Rivers was now the heir apparent. Vinson was not pleased with the 
prospect and evidently neither was President Kennedy. It was later learned that Kennedy 
made a personal presidential plea and asked Vinson not to retire and stay on as chairman. 
Vinson promised Kennedy that he would "run again, God willing."16 
As time passed, the opposition to Charleston's congressman becoming chairman 
began to subside in the House. His colleagues came to realize that Rivers possessed 
extensive knowledge of military matters and they noticed his bouts with the bottle becoming 
less frequent and intense. When a young naval congressional liaison officer mentioned some 
of his apprehensions privately about Rivers possibly becoming chairman to Representative 
Frank Becker (R-NY), who served on the HASC and was held in high esteem by those in 
11Gullah is a distinctive and unique blend of English and African languages which is spoken by blacks in the Lowrountry. It is a dialect 
few understand. 
12Inte1View with Dr. Donald Fowler, former South Carolina Democratic Party Chairman, Columbia, SC, May 15, 1985. 
13Leland, op. cu. 
141nteiview with John R. ("Russ") Blandford, former Chief Counsel to the House Armed Seivices Committee, Seabrook Island, SC, 
November 17, 1985. 
15Blandford, op. cit. 
16Charleston News and Courier, March 18, 1963, p. 1-a. 
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the Pentagon, the liaison officer was stunned as Becker informed him that Rivers was an 
individual who worked for all that he had, was a true patriot, and had a dedication to the 
nation's military which no one could question. Becker also told him that "Mendel Rivers 
is a better man drunk than most men are sober and he is never so drunk that he loses 
complete control." Over the course of the next few years the officer came to agree 
completely with Becker's assessment of Rivers.11 
The one man who might have prevented Rivers from becoming chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), died in 
November 1961. Fortunately for Rivers, Rayburn was succeeded by John McCormack (O-
MA). Rivers and McCormack got along famously which was definitely to Rivers' advantage. 
Carl Vinson began to work with his heir apparent and personally instructed him on how he 
ran the committee. He got Rivers to become more interested and involved in the details 
of various HASC activities. Mendel Rivers responded to the extra attention, learned well, 
and Vinson was pleased with the extraordinary progress his charge had made.18 Because 
both McCormack and Vinson gave Charleston's congressman their personal stamp of 
approval to become the House Armed Services Committee's new chairman, no one in the 
party dared publicly oppose it. 
One man outside the party who publicly opposed Rivers being chairman was the 
prominent muckraking columnist Drew Pearson whose column appeared in over 650 papers, 
almost double any other.19 Pearson was the first reporter to put into print that Mendel 
Rivers had problems with liquor.20 After Rivers assumed the chairmanship Pearson wrote 
about scandalous events related to Rivers' binges which had occurred years in the past, but 
he made them seem like they had happened only yesterday.21 He unfairly branded Rivers 
as a common drunk and people believed him, there being little else in print to refute 
Pearson's allegations. (The only reporter of national prominence to refute Pearson's 
charges--and this was indirectly--about River's drinking was Don Oberdorfer of the New 
York Times. Oberdorfer in an August 1965 article about the Low Country lawmaker 
acknowledged that Rivers had been "one of the champion hell-raisers of Capitol Hill" but 
that he had become more subdued since he had become chairman.)22 Whenever Rivers 
attended a party or Washington function, those people who had read Pearson's columns 
assumed any drink in his hand to be alcoholic.23 
Mendel Rivers' office staff in Washington was angered and frustrated by Pearson's 
columns. One of his stories stated that when Rivers' staff came in to work on Monday 
17Interview with Captain John Fitzgerald, US Navy Ret., Columbia, SC, November 10, 19&5. 
18Robert LF. Sikes, He Coon: The Bob Sikes StlJry, (Pensacola, Aorida: The Perdido Press, 1984), p. 451. 
19
"The Tenacious Muckraker," Time, September 12, 1969, p. 82. 
20Robert Sherrill, "Drew Pearron: An Interview," The Nation, July 7, 1969, p. 15. 
21Blandford, op. cit. 
22Don Oberdorfer, "Rivers Delivers," The New York Times Magazine, August 29, 1965, p. 91. 
23Interview with the Honorable Mendel Davis, former First District Congressman, North Charleston, SC, March 7, 19&5. 
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mornings they frequently found him on the office floor with liquor bottles beside him. It 
was a complete fabrication. This never happened on Monday or any other day, ever.24 
It was not the first unfounded charge by Person, nor would it be the last. A secretary 
who went to work for Rivers' Washington office in 1963 declared that all of the stories 
written about Charleston's congressman by Drew Pearson during her tenure with Rivers 
(which ended with his death in 1970) were "absolutely ridiculous" and that neither she nor 
any of the other staff members ever "knew one of them to be true." They also wondered 
where Pearson was getting his information which w~ so erroneous when it concerned 
Rivers.25 
John R. Blandford, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale, was a top-ranking 
government bureaucrat who worked for the HASC for twenty-five years before retiring in 
1972. He came to serve Carl Vinson, Mendel Rivers, and Edward Hebert as their chief 
counsel. One particular Pearson charge especially incensed Blandford. Pearson had written 
that Rivers kept sensitive top secret documents on his desk all the time and that anyone 
could come in and steal them when he was intoxicated. Blandford vehemently declared that 
this was never the case and that in his opinion it was one of Pearson's biggest lies.26 
The House of Representatives was equally incensed by another allegation made by 
Pearson that was untrue. Rivers suffered from bursitis in his neck, shoulders, and hips, and 
it forced him to wear a neck brace or use a cane when it would flare up. When the pain 
became intolerable, he found it necessary to go to Bethesda Naval Hospital to take heat 
treatments and be placed in traction to lessen the discomfort he was experiencing. This was 
the case when he checked into Bethesda during the last days of May 1966 with excruciating 
pain which affected his neck and upper spine. Drew Pearson became aware of Rivers' 
absence, because the HASC was scheduled to convene on five separate occasions over a 
two-week period to approve a $17.8 billion military procurement bill. He charged that it 
never did, because its chairman was 
drying out from a drunk. It was so serious that 
the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 
had to be taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital.21 
He also claimed that this was not the first time Rivers had been sent to Bethesda to dry out. 
Pearson came to question Rivers' competency to head the HASC stating 
that when nearly $18 billion are involved [for 
military procurement], together with the defense 
of the nation, it's important to examine the 
24InteIView with Kathy S. Worthington, former secretary to Representative L. Mendel Rivers (Mendel Davis and Thomas Hartnett), 
Federal Office Building, Charleston, SC, November 20, 1985. 
isworthington, op. cil. 
26e1andford, op. cil. 
27Fayetteville Observer, June 13, 1966. 
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mental or physical instability of the man who 
masterminds the military law.28 
Mendel Rivers happened to read this story on June 13, the day it hit the papers 
across the country, and got out of his sick bed so he could get the bill out of the HASC and 
then steer it through the House. He went to his office wearing a leather neck brace and 
spoke to reporters who had learned of his return. He told them that though he was still in 
discomfort, the pain was less severe than it had been.29 He then cleared the bill out of his 
committee so it could go to floor of the House to be debated. 
His arrival at the House was met with a long and thunderous ovation as his 
colleagues enthusiastically showed their support of him in the face of Pearson's charges. 
(Representative Richard Ichord, a Democrat from the "Show Me" state of Missouri later 
remarked that the standing ovation given Rivers was the "longest ... I have ever seen given 
any member on the floor of the House during congressional deliberations."r Rivers 
thanked the members for their acknowledgement and quipped that he was not going to go 
back to the hospital as it was "bad publicity."31 
When the debate on the military procurement bill was about to begin, something 
unusual happened. Speaker of the House John McCormack took the floor and what he had 
to say had nothing to do with the bill: 
28Ibid. 
I think this is the appropriate time, before the 
debate starts, to make a few remarks that are 
extremely justified .... The committee [HASC] is 
indeed fortunate to have as its chairman the 
distinguished gentlemen from South Carolina. 
Throughout his entire service on the committee 
on Armed Services he has been a bulwark of 
strength in the national interest and in the 
national defense .... Under his leadership ... 
his committee has rendered service to our 
country which will go down in history as occupying 
the outstanding pages of legislative history of our 
country .... He has filled this important position 
with honor, with distinction, with ability, and 
with courage and dedication. . . . He is one of the 
greatest Americans I have ever met, and one of the 
outstanding legislators of my long period of service 
in the Congress of the United States.32 
29News and Courier, June 14, 1966, p. 1-b. 
· 3tJNews and Courier, June 19, 1966, p. 10-b. 
31News and Courier, June 15, 1966, p. 1-b. 
32News and Courier, June 16, 1966, p. 10-b. 
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More than a dozen congressmen followed McCormack and lavished praise on the Low 
Country lawmaker. Carl Albert (D-OK), the House Majority Leader, met with reporters 
and informed them that Rivers had wanted to come back on June 9, but that the 
Democratic leadership was aware of the pain he was suffering from bursitis and insisted he 
not return "until he felt better."33 All of the praises and the statement by Albert were a 
direct refutation of Pearson's charges and his call for Rivers removal as chairman. Naturally 
P~arson did not report the events which transpired in response to h~s co~umn concerning 
Rivers, and scores of Americans never learned the truth of the s1tuat1on. One other 
unfortunate aspect of the unfounded charge was that whenever Rivers again suffered from 
bursitis he refused to go to Bethesda to take the necessary treatments to lessen his pain.34 
Blandford and others could never figure out why Drew Pearson despised and hated 
Mendel Rivers so intensely, because Rivers got along well with most of the reporters who 
covered Capitol Hill.3.S A congressman who wrote his memoirs nearly fifteen years after 
Rivers' death offered this explanation of Pearson's attacks: 
Mendel was a favorite target of liberal 
columnist Drew Pearson, and once Pearson 
opened fire on a member of Congress he usually 
kept the pressure on indefinitely. When he 
could say that he had driven a man out of 
Congress, it gave him added prestige. Many 
of us in Congress had our differences with 
Pearson, but his attacks on Mendel were more 
highly personal than most. He tried to portray 
Mendel as a common drunk who was a security risk, 
and this was altogether untrue. Mendel had a 
drinking problem ... which he overcame, but he 
never was a security risk.36 
When Pearson died in September 1969, Rivers remarked to one of his secretaries, 
"Well Miss Kathy, if that man goes to heaven, ain't none of us got to worry.'137 Pearson's 
columns had done their bit to make Rivers' life on earth hell . . They also gave people in 
other parts of the country a distorted view of Rivers which was indelibly etched in their 
minds. What is tragic is that after becoming chairman, Rivers was an "entirely different 
person who met the challenge and responsibility of his new position well.''38 His drinking 
problems diminished to the point that he did not take a drink of liquor the last three years 
33News and Courier, June 15, 1966, p. 1-b. 
34Worthington, Op. cil. 
3.SBlandford and Worthington, op. cit. 
36sikes, p. 462. 
37worthington, op. cit. 
38Biandford, op. cit. 
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of his life.39 Although Rivers had numerous and significant election and legislative victories 
during his lifetime, he told his sister that when he stopped drinking it was "the greatest 
victory he ever had.'040 
39Rivers, op. cit. 
40Qdom, op. cit. 
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THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
PHILIPPINES: 
FORESHADOW OF VIETNAM 
Joseph Taylor Stukes 
Francis Marion College 
At the eve of the twentieth century, in the 110th year of its existence, the United 
States emerged as a full-fledged empire. Reflecting its inner indecision, the nation mixed 
noble aims and naked ruthlessness. It was an odd mix of opposites. In time, the noble aims 
were trumpeted as characteristic traits of the American Republic. In time, the naked 
ruthlessness was muted, even forgotten. Records of it are still there for those who would 
be reminded. 
Most historians recognize the timely doggerel of that year. Although less than poetry 
perhaps, it is surely punnish and clever: 
Oh, dewy was the morning 
Upon the first of May, 
And Dewey was the admiral 
Down in Manila Bay. 
And dewy were the Spaniards' eyes 
Them orbs of black and blue; 
And dew we feel discouraged? 
I dew not think we dew!1 
Dewey's lopsided victory over the ramshackle fleet of Spanish Admiral Patricio 
Montojo occurred on May Day 1898. Responding to the need for army units to occupy what 
1Ironquill (Eugene Fitch Ware) in the Topeka Daily Capital, 3 May 1898. Quted in Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, Fifteenth and 125th 
Anniversary Edition, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 647. 
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the navy had conquered, President William McKinley named Major General Wesley C. 
Merritt, an officer of intelligence and ability who was highly respected.2 Merritt and his 
fellow-officers struggled with unpreparedness in San Francisco much as did his colleagues 
in Tampa. He finally dispatched his troops piecemeal, and the first brigade of 2,500 men 
steamed for the tropics in May. They wore heavy wool clothing and carried obsolete black-
powder Springfield rifles, not modern Krag-Jorgensens.3 A month later, similarly dressed 
but better armed, Merritt and the remainder of bis 10,600 men followed. In time, there 
would be almost 100,000 men under arms in the Philippines. Escalation was irresistible; the 
snowball rolled downhill. 
McKinley underestimated the Filipino yearning for independence. He assumed "that 
Filipinos, incapable of self-rule, would welcome benevolent control from outside." 
Consequently be instructed General Merritt that there should be no joint occupation of the 
Philippines with the natives. For their part, natives were simply to recognize the authority 
of the United States. Merritt should employ, wrote the president, "whatever means in your 
judgment are necessary to this end."4 
Merritt's judgment was put to the test almost immediately. When he landed on 26 
July 1898, he found a complex situation and advisors who were divided in their advices. 
Emilio Aguinaldo, respected and even loved by Filipinos despite his youth, had led the 
islands to declare independence from Spain nine months earlier. Events had caused him 
to flee briefly but had not damaged his standing. Brought back to the Philippines on the 
initiative of Admiral Dewey himself, Aguinaldo had fashioned a Republican Army, poorly-
equipped but high-spirited. It expected to liberate Manila from the Spanish forces in a joint 
US-Philippine attack. Philippine fibre, so to speak. Such it anticipated. Such was not to be. 
Aguinaldo's army, brave bushwhackers rather than disciplined infantry, could not 
alone defeat the Spanish force which still occupied Manila. Merritt, determined to avoid 
a joint attack, feared that he might end up fighting both Spaniards and Filipinos. The 
starved and war-weary Spanish commander broke the impasse with an offer to surrender 
after only token resistance if the Americans would keep the Filipinos out of Manila. 
Privately Merritt agreed. The resulting battle of Manila on 13 August 1898 mounted just 
enough gunfire and casualties to satisfy the honor of both Spaniards and Americans.5 
Not privy to the secret bargain, the Republican Army enthusiastically, albeit naively, 
entered the sham battle, capturing some city blocks and suburban areas. When later turned 
back by the Americans, they considered themselves betrayed. Bitterly they returned to their 
original trenches and began a second siege of Manila. 
Following this schism, Merritt moved swiftly to effect a patchwork rapprochement 
while such was still possible. By proclamation, he publicized his intentions of honoring 
2Menitt should have been retired in June 1898 on his 64th birthday. He was mistakenly recorded in army records as two years younger. 
He served on active duty until 16 June 1990, actually his 66th birthday. A brief summary of his career is in Ezra J. Warner, Generals in 
Blue, 1988 Printing, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 322-23. . 
3Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Anny and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1989), 2-3. 
4John Dobson, Reticent Expansionism, The Foreign Policy of William McKinley, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988), 106-07. 
5Linn, 8. 
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per~onal and religious rights. By action, he provide? relief fo; distressed and displaced 
natives, restored the city's water supply, and cleaned its streets. 
But the damage had been done. Hearts hardened on both sides. When Merritt was 
assigned to Paris as advisor to the treaty-makers in August, he was succeeded by his second-
in-command, Major General Elwell S. Otis. Otis proved to be, in his relations with 
Filip!nos, harsh, unsympathetic, and dictatori~l. In his nine-m?~th ten~re, US-Filipino 
relations deteriorated steadily from uneasy alhance to wary susp1C1on to bitter warfare. 
Such deterioration in the islands was matched by a hardening of attitudes in 
Washington. McKinley's public statements changed from equivocation to conviction. From 
an intentionally ambiguous policy which kept all options open (McKinley explained this 
ambiguity by saying that he did not want to giv~ away what he might later want to keep), 
he came to espouse publicly a policy of annexation. 
Shortly after the treaty was signed in December 1898, President McKinley described 
his policies officially. Anxious that Filipinos bless the American Republic, he wrote that the 
army was not to abuse the Filipinos but to protect them, their property and rights, keep 
open commercial ports, and collect taxes. McKinley concluded this way: 
Finally, it should be the earnest and 
paramount aim of the military administration 
to win the confidence, respect, and affection 
of the inhabitants of the Philippines by 
assuring them in every possible way that full 
measure of individual rights and liberties 
which is the heritage of free peoples, and by 
proving to them that the mission of the United 
States is one of benevolent assimilation, 
substituting the mild sway of justice and right 
for arbitrary rule.7 
Meanwhile Aguinaldo had despaired of cooperation with the Americanos. Even 
before McKinley had articulated this policy of "benevolent assimilation," Aguinaldo had 
rejected it. In May 1898 Aguinaldo had been encouraged by Admiral Dewey and others to 
see himself as co-liberator of his homeland. In June patriots had drafted a constitution for 
a Philippine Republic and Aguinaldo had assumed the presidency pending its adoption. In 
late July he announced the creation of a Republican Army composed of three "Aguinaldo 
regiments" supplemented by battalions raised locally in each Tagalog province. It was this 
so-called army which was checked by Americans as Manila fell on 13 August 1898. 
Relations between the American regulars and the Filipino irregulars went from bad 
to worse. 
6/bid., 8-9. 
7McKinley to Alger (21 December 1898), Co"espondence Relating to the War Wuh Spain, 2: 858-59. 
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"Almost without exception," an American major 
reported to Washington, "soldiers and also 
many officers refer to the natives in their 
presence as 'niggers.' ... Houses were searched 
without warrant by Americans brandishing guns; 
at checkpoints, it became common to knock 
Filipinos down at the first hint of 'disrespect,' 
though some Americans showed anything but respect 
when searching Filipino women. Shopkeepers saw 
their wares 'confiscated' or bought with Confederate 
money; sentries regularly shot at Filipinos if they 
did not like their looks."8 
Differences between Filipinos and Americans became heated quarrels which, in turn, 
became bitter disputes. On 4 February 1899 a shooting incident in Manila resulted in 
deaths of American and Filipino soldiers.9 Both sides accused the other of firing first. 
Regardless, the Philippine insurrection is usually dated from this incident of 4 February 
1899. Clashes grew into pitched battles. The Republican Army attempted to imitate 
western armies. Encouraged by his capable associate Antonio Luna, Aguinaldo risked his 
weak forces in open battle against Otis' better-trained and better-armed Americans. Losses 
were overwhelming. For over a year, such fighting continued, growing more and more 
bloody. American forces sought confrontation and won repeated victories. The main island 
of Luzon was divided into four military districts. District commanders conducted action 
locally. Soon, Filipino resistance was at the outer edges of the island only. 
In November 1899 Otis launched a three-pronged push to clear Luzon. Major 
General Arthur MacArthur pinned down the Filipinos in the central Luzon plain, Major 
General Henry W. Lawton swept to the northeast and occupied the mountain passes, 
preventing any retreat to the east. When the Filipinos fell back to the north, they were 
pincered by Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton's troops who had made an amphibious landing 
at Lingayen Gulf.10 
This three-pronged offensive almost finished the Republican Army. Several 
important leaders were captured; some others voluntarily surrendered; Aguinaldo himself 
narrowly escaped, leaving behind his family, treasury, bodyguard, and much of his staff. As 
the only well-known rebel leader remaining at large, he sought safety in mountainous 
northeast Luzon. From there he directed a guerrilla offensive. 
Otis poisoned conditions by consistently underestimating Aguinaldo's support, 
tenaciousness, and resoluteness. One critical historian comments this way: 
8Cited in David H. Bain, Sitting in Darkness, (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1984), 78-79. 
9Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 1971), 301. Also cited in Dobson, 141. 
10AJJan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 290-91. Also Linn, 14-15. 
98 
His heavy-handed soldier's diplomacy had 
done much to alienate Aguinaldo ... in 
the six months leading up to the war. 
Once the shooting started, he deployed 
units with maddening inconsistency, often 
sending brigades to take territory at a 
great loss only to be withdrawn, allowing 
the Filipinos to reoccupy their lost ground. 
When the war began, Otis was shown to be 
hungry for publicity for his expeditionary 
force, but only of the right sort: pro-
Republican, pro-McKinley, pro-army. His 
press releases made ridiculous claims of 
victories and used inflated battle 
statistics; nearly every sheet spoke of 
another "disastrous blow to the enemy" 
that would presage the imminent collapse 
of the "rebellion."11 
Joseph Taylor Stukes 
Resentment towards Otis was widespread and deep: his officers grumbled among 
themselves, soldiers made caustic jokes, and news reporters even threatened an uprising 
against his arbitrary interference. He reacted by becoming stricter than ever. Conditions 
worsened, becoming critical. 
Aguinaldo viewed the Americans of 1898-99 not as liberators but as conquerors. He 
regarded Americans as colonialists as had been the Spaniards earlier. Americans were 
worse, thought he, since they had come as liberators and stayed as conquerors. Worse still, 
the Americans were perfidious, proclaiming a policy called "benevolent assimilation" but 
practicing a policy as ruthless as the Spaniards' had been in Cuba. 
While pursuing military conquest, Otis began social reconstruction as well. Recalling 
McKinley's directive to cause Filipinos to "bless the American Republic" by demonstrating 
"that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild 
sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule," Otis instituted constructive projects similar to 
those which British colonialists cited with pride: roads, bridges, infirmaries, schools, 
telephone and telegraph lines, and so forth. Remarkable success came in the health field 
where traditional diseases such as cholera, smallpox, and the plague were practically 
eliminated and infant mortality greatly reduced.12 
But this twin effort of "schoolbooks and krags" was met with more cynicism and 
resentment than admiration and gratitude. Its successes were less noted by the natives than 
the patronizing ethnocentrism and the arrogant disregard of local customs. Americans were 
11Bain 82-83 
12Mill~tt and· Maslowski, 291. 
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puzzled by such cold rejection. After all, this was the year that Collier's published Rudyard 
Kipling's widely-hailed poem. Americans felt that they were assuming the white man's 
burden, binding their sons to exile to serve the captives' need, engaged in socio-moral uplift 
of these new-caught sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child.13 
The successes of the "other war" had counter-productive effects as well. They 
encouraged the American public to believe that the insurrection was in its dying stages, that 
Filipinos had been converted to progress and American humanitarianism, that the tunnel 
was shortening and the distant light brightening. 
It was a false dawn. In May 1900 Elihu Root, the new Secretary of War, replaced 
General Otis with Major General Arthur MacArthur. Instead of winding down, the war 
simply entered a new phase. Convinced that he would never win by imitating western battle 
styles, Aguinaldo switched to guerrilla tactics. Such fighting came more naturally to him and 
his men. Military histories describe the fighting of 1900-02 in phrases which ring familiar 
on ears which, seven decades later, tuned in to radio and television. 
In their highly-regarded textbook For the Common Defense, Allan Millett and Peter 
Maslowski describe the Philippines of 1900 in terms which might have described Vietnam 
in 1970: 
Filipinos increasingly fought only when 
victory was a certainty, usually ambushing 
small patrols. When confronted by a superior 
force, the guerrillas hid their weapons and 
dispersed to their homes, where they greeted 
the Americans with a friendly smile and a 
hearty "Amigo!" They also engaged in sniping 
and sabotage, inflicted hideous tortures on 
prisoners, and set trailway traps such as pits 
filled with sharpened stakes. Soldiers quickly 
learned that a "pacified" area extended no 
further than the range of a Krag-Jorgensen.14 
Those Americans who later sought Villa in Mexico or Sandino in Nicaragua or the 
Viet Cong in Vietnam could identify with such an enemy. 
The combination of stepped-up fighting and "other war" successes prompted 
Aguinaldo to strike back. To counter the Americans' "policy of attraction," which was 
wooing some local leaders to cooperation, Filipinos turned to terrorism. Calling it 
"exemplary punishment of traitors," they fell viciously on those who were opting for peace 
with Americans rather than independence without them. To control areas, the insurgents 
13Kipling's much-quoted poem, often cited as "'The White Man's Burden; appeared originally in McClure's, Vol. XII (February 1899), 
291 . Its impact on contemporary imperialist thought is discussed in Bain, 78-79. 
14Kipling's much-quoted poem, often cited as "'The White Man's Burden; appeared originally in McClure's, Vol. XII (February 1899), 
291. Its impact on contemporary imperialist thought is discussed in Bain, 78-79. 
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~st~blished shadow governments which determined penalties .and administered kan¥aroo 
Justice. Some victims were merely reprimanded, fined, or barush~d; others were mutilated 
or murdered; still others were buried alive or left exposed for arumals to ravage. 
Duplicity became a lifestyle. Some natives who wor.k~~ ope~y f~r the ~ericans by day 
worked secretly for the insurgents by night. M~nr Flhpmos h~e? m the rught and the fog. 
In September 1900 the Philippine Commission, led by Wilham Howard Taft, assumed 
its official duties. The Table of Organization neatly divided authority between the 
Commission which was to exercise legislative and non-military functions and the army which 
was to exercise executive and police functions. Such a jurisdictional line of authority 
between Taft and MacArthur was neater in theory than in practice. Not surprisingly, clashes 
resulted. While Taft spoke of his "little brown brothers" and the blessings of civilization, 
MacArthur invoked General Orders No. 100 and pressed military activity. Mutual respect 
prevented an open break between the two men, but tension existed and grew steadily more 
intense. 
General Orders No. 100, originally issued during the Civil War, had gained a bit of 
international acceptance. It noted that war should be waged in conventional style between 
uniformed combatants. Partisans and guerrillas deserved little mercy, being subject to 
imprisonment, deportation, or execution. Armies were to respect the rights of non-
combatants. However, there were two loopholes: military necessity and retaliation. 
Through these two loopholes slipped the frustrated and angry US army. A new war began. 
The main reason this new war began in 1901 rather than earlier was that both sides 
had awaited the outcome of McKinley's bid for re-election in November 1900. Among the 
aspects of the election was the anti-imperialist issue. William Jennings Bryan, McKinley's 
opponent in 1900 as he had been in 1896, embraced the Democrats' stand on anti-
imperialism although he chose to emphasize other issues (particularly that of silver) more 
than that of anti-imperialism. The election of 1900 was not a referendum on imperialism 
alone. One accusation made by the anti-imperialists against McKinley was that he was 
conducting a war of bare-faced cynical conquest that was unconstitutional since Congress 
had never declared war.15 McKinley's re-election undercut the opposition to Philippine 
annexation. It dismayed the followers of Aguinaldo. The time was ripe to renew the war. 
Ever determined that the Filipinos eventually accept US terms, MacArthur in early 
1901 revived attempts at pacification and at close collaboration with Taft and the Philippine 
Commission. Each side regarded the other as misguided and as a stumbling-block. Taft and 
MacArthur did work towards the same end, however, accommodating friction and making 
progress. 
In 1901, as drastic methods were used in US tactics, the war became more and more 
unpopular at home. An increasing number of soldiers sought re-assignment. MacArthur 
and Root sought to "philippinize" the war by enlisting 12,000 Filipino troops, hoping to 
1snie election of 1900 is covered in general in books centering on presidential elections. For an outstanding discussion of the election 
as it pertained to the issues of imperialism and the Philippine insurrection, see Garel Grunder and William Livezey, The Philippines and 
the United States, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 76-78. 
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release a comparable number of Americans.16 The stratagem did not work. MacArthur 
continued to rely on Americans as soldiers, Filipinos as scouts. It was the same as the army 
had done in the Indian wars. 
A major breakthrough came in March 1901, one on which Americans built victory 
and from which Filipinos never recovered. In a daring raid in which Filipino scouts 
pretended to be Aguinaldo supporters, a small unit led by General Frederick Funston 
captured Aguinaldo himself near Palawan in northeastern Luzon. In captivity Aguinaldo 
was persuaded that his cause was hopeless. Within a month · he issued a proclamation 
accepting American suzerainty and urging his compatriots to do the same. 
The country has declared unmistakably 
for peace [he wrote], so be it. Enough 
of blood; enough of tears and desolation 
.... By acknowledging and accepting the 
sovereignty of the United States throughout 
the entire Archipelago, as I do now, without 
any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I 
am serving thee, my beloved country. May 
happiness be thine! 17 
Aguinaldo's capture and capitulation halted most of the Philippine resistance, but 
not all of it. Fighting was continued by Miguel Malvar in the province of Batangas in 
southwestern Luzon and by Vicente Lukban on Samar Island south and east of Luzon. 
With resistance thus reduced, McKinley ordered on 1 July 1901 the final transfer of 
executive authority from the military establishment to the Philippine Commission, now 
widened to include three native Filipinos. Thus strengthened the Commission created a 
Philippine Constabulary, manned by Filipinos though officered by Americans. This 
Philippine constabulary, clearly separate from the army's scouts and each municipality's 
police, won quick acceptance from the population. 
In the same month of July 1901 McKinley replaced MacArthur with Major General 
Adna R. Chaffee, a seasoned cavalryman determined to pacify the archipelago by using 
Krags to create cemeteries. To bring an end to resistance on Samar Island, he assigned 
Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, a tough veteran proud of his nickname of "Hell-roaring 
Jake." His first order was to take no prisoners. 
I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill 
and burn the better it will please me. I want all 
persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in 
actual hostilities aga~p.st the United States.18 
16Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Schenchman Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), 227. 
17Bain, 385. 
18Millett and Maslowski, 295. 
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Those "capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States" were 
defined as males aged 10 or above. Although generally failing to carry out these orders 
literally, soldiers wrought shocking destruction and left many survivors destitute. Thus did 
quiet come to Samar Island. As Tacitus had once observed, "they made it a wilderness and 
called it peace." As an army report of a later war put it, ''we pacified the village by 
destroying it." 
While Smith tended to Samar resistance, Chaffee selected Brigadier General John 
Franklin Bell to tend to Batangas province. Bell called attention to General Orders No. 100 
again, but he voiced reservations about respecting the rights of civilians who found 
themselves in harm's way. "It is an inevitable consequence of war," he acknowledged, "that 
the innocent must generally suffer with the guilty."19 Bell saw the loopholes in General 
Orders No. 100 more than the other parts of that document. General Bell had his 4,000 
soldiers hound the guerrillas in Batangas. Not only did the Americans kill thousands of non-
uniformed peopJe (indeed, they were all un-uniformed!) but systematically destroyed crops 
and livestock. As on Samar, smoke pinpointed the location of American forces. 
In an attempt to halt resistance, Bell herded more than 300,000 into concentration 
zones, explaining the action as military necessity and making sincere attempts to alleviate 
the worst conditions. Comparisons with Sherman's March to the Sea during the Civil War 
and with Cuban conditions of five years earlier were commonplace, even reaching the 
United States Senate. Later studies concluded that malnutrition, poor sanitary conditions, 
disease, and demoralization cost as many as 11,000 Filipino lives and rendered the 
population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902.20 
Malvar finally surrendered in April 1902. Sporadic resistance continued in southern 
Luzon and on some outlying islands, but they were ill-organized and futile. On 4 July 1902 
Theodore Roosevelt, having succeeded to the presidency following the murder of McKinley, 
proclaimed the rebellion over. The fighting ended. 
The cost had been high. More than 125,000 US troops saw service, suffering 
casualties of 4,200 killed in action and 2,800 injured. Financial costs approximated $400 
million, twenty times the price paid to Spain for the 7,000 islands in 1898. As many as 
20,000 Filipino fighters died, while an estimated 200,000 civilians perished due to famine, 
disease, and other war-related calamities. 
Another casualty suffered by the United States, however, was the damage done to 
some of its cherished ideals: the sanctity of human rights, the concept of self-government, 
and the love of liberty for all. Critics of American imperialism in general and the military's 
ruthlessness in particular attempted to publicize the issue of American-committed atrocities. 
Senator George F. Hoar (R-Mass) pushed for an investigation, which, to his dismay, was 
referred to the Standing Committee on the Philippines, chaired by Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge (R-Mass), the Senate's most determined imperialist. 
19Jbid. 
20Linn, 255. 
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During the Senate investigation public feelings were aroused even more so than in 
the presidential campaign two years earlier. President Roosevelt, unsympathetic to the army 
and its tactics and hoping to de-fuse public opinion, ordered three courts-martial: 
1. Major Littleton Waller (accused of shooting eleven defenseless 
Filipinos without trial on Samar); 
2. Major Edwin F. Glenn (who had used the infamous water cure to extract 
information which led him to burn a native town of 10,000 to the 
ground); and 
3. General Smith himself. 
Waller was acquitted by his court-martial, Glenn was fined $50, and Smith was 
"admonished."21 So much for the mild sway of justice and right. 
Meanwhile Lodge proceeded to drag out proceedings, stack the witness list, cite 
hundreds of cases of Philippine brutality, and keep all proceedings secret. In the mood of 
the times and in the aftermath of victory, the United States was not ready to muster moral 
indignation on behalf of non-white people 7,000 miles away. 
And so the lid was closed on the annexation of the Philippine Islands and the 
crushing of local resistance to it. The lid closed unevenly; some snakes were left inside. 
The are there as a reminder for those who would be reminded. 
21Schirmer, 238-39. 
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ANNUAL MEETING 1991 
The sixty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association convened 
at Columbia, South Carolina, on 2 March 1991. An estimated seventy-five members and 
guests of the Association attended the meeting. Following registration the membership 
attended a rich offering of four morning programs beginning at 9:30 a.m. 
Session I, chaired by Robert J. Moore of Columbia College, focussed on "South 
Carolina Politics." Harris M. Bailey, Lander College, presented ''The Only Game in Town: 
The South Carolina Republican Party in the Post-Reconstruction Era." Will Huntley, 
Governor's School for Science and Mathematics, discussed ''The Controversy Surrounding 
Mendel Rivers and His Battle with the Bottle." James 0. Farmer, Jr., USC at Lancaster, 
commented on the two papers. 
Session II, chaired by William S. Brockington, Jr. of USC at Aiken, was entitled "A 
Historical Kaleidoscope," a rich offering of a group of widely disparate topics. Kathy 
Pearson, Emory University, presented "The Role of Germanic Males in the Early Middle 
Ages" and Bertrand van Ruymbeke, College of Charleston, offered "The Huguenot 
Emigration from the French Perspective." Denis Paz, Clemson University, commented on 
the two papers. Joseph T. Stukes, Francis Marion College, presented "The United States 
in the Philippines: Foreshadow of Vietnam" which was commented on by David Hess, USC 
at Aiken. 
Session III, chaired by John B. Edmunds of USC at Spartanburg, was entitled 
"Politics and Reform in South Carolina." Walter B. Edgar, USC at Columbia, presented 
"Evolution of the Legislative State in South Carolina;" John Crangle, Benedict College, 
offered "South Carolina General Assembly Elections, 1988;" and Cole Blease Graham, USC 
at Columbia, discussed "Constitutional and Political Reform in South Carolina." A. V. Huff, 
Furman University, offered comments, and a lively discussion by all in attendance ensued. 
Session IV, chaired by W. Calvin Smith of USC at Aiken, was entitled ''The Civil 
Rights Movement in the South." Miles Richards, USC at Columbia, offered "The Life of 
Osceola McKaine;" Thomas O'Brien, Emory University, explained "Georgia's Response to 
Brown vs. Board of Education;" and John Godwin, USC at Columbia, presented 'Taming 
a Whirlwind: Civil Rights Leadership in the Community Setting, Wilmington, N.C., 1950-72." 
Comments on the papers were offered by Joseph E. Lee, UNC at Charlotte. 
Following the morning sessions the membership recessed for a luncheon at 
Humphreys Hall on the Columbia College Campus. While members were enjoying dessert, 
Robert J. Moore, Columbia College, introduced the speaker. John Hammond Moore, 
Columbia, delivered an entertaining talk on the topic of "Reflections on Columbia and 
Richland County." President William S. Brockington, Jr. thanked the speaker for his talk. 
Valdis 0. Lumans, USC at Aiken, was recognized for his hard work at providing an 
excellent program for 1991. Robert Moore and Selden Smith of Columbia College were 
thanked for the hospitality extended to the SCHA by their institution. 
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After lunch the business meeting was held. President Brockington called the 
meeting to order. A brief Treasurer's Report was given by John Crangle, Benedict College. 
The Executive Board report was given by President Brockington. First, increased dues for 
members from $7 .50 per annum to $10 and for libraries from $10 per annum to $15 were 
announced, while student dues are to remain at $5 per annum. Second, a proposed slate 
of 1991-1992 Officers and Members of the Executive Board was introduced, voted on, and 
passed. The 1991-1992 officers are: 
President - Valdis 0. Lumans, USC at Aiken 
Vice President - Charles H. Lesser, S. C. Department of Archives and History 
Secretary /Treasurer - Wm. S. Brockington, Jr., USC at Aiken 
Editor of THE PROCEEDINGS - Peter W. Becker, USC at Columbia 
At Large - Denis G. Paz, Clemson University 
At Large - Marcia G. Synnott, USC at Columbia 
Finally, the sixty-second annual meetingh is to be held at USC at Aiken on March 7, 1992. 
There being no further business, the sixty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina 
Historical Association adjourned to the historic Ensor-Kenan House for refreshments, gentle 
libations, and delightful conversations before the journey home. 
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FINANCIAL STATEMENT, 1991 
South Carolina Historical Association 
CHECKING ACCOUNT: 
Financial Statement, July 1, 1991 
Deposits, July 1 - December 31, 1991 
Total 
Expenditures, July 1 - December 31, 1991 
Luncheon Speaker 1991 Meeting 
Printing Cost of The Proceedings 
Mailing 
Journal Binding Fee 
Lockbox 
Other expenditures 
Total 
Total Checking Balance, December 31, 1991 
GENERAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: 
The First Savings Bank [089-9974058] 
NCNB [1388935] 
Total General Savings 
$ 1122.04 
$ 1648.30 
$ 2770.34 
$ 200.00 
$ 1766.36 
$ 178.51 
$ 50.00 
$ 25.00 
$ 12.20 
-$ 2232.07 
$ 538.27 
$ 682.95 
$ 1666.09 
$ 2349.04 
PROCEEDINGS PUBLICATION ENDOWMENT FUND: 
NCNB [9127414] 
NCNB [9173896] 
Total Endowment Fund 
HOLLIS PRIZE ACCOUNT: 
The First Savings Bank [028-5761219] 
The First Savings Bank [028-5761235] 
The First Savings Bank [028-5766160] 
Total Hollis Prize Account 
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$ 2178.98 
$ 1368.43 
$ 3547.41 
$ 521.28 
$ 781.79 
$ 263.01 
$ 1566.08 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William S. Brockington, Jr. 
Secretary /Treasurer, SCHA 
January 25, 1992 

